# \*\*Neg – Gendered LAWS- FMPS\*\*

## \*\*Notes\*\*

### Thank Yous

This is a case neg to the gendered LAWS affirmative.

Thank you to the following students for their excellent work:

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### File Navigation + Strategy Tips

Pro-tips:

* Make sure you integrate the applicable cards from various feminist IR files. For example, most of the link cards in those files can serve as Ks of disads for this aff.
* You should also integrate generic cards from other files. We’ve done this for most other relevant files, but there may be other useful cards we missed. For example, a lot of the ethical AI aff/neg cards will be useful.

# \*\*AT: Case\*\*

## Advantage

### 1NC---Advantage---Alt Causes

#### Alt causes – software, surveillance, and algorithms aren’t included in the plan

**Michel 20** [Arthur Holland Michel (the co-director of the Center for the Study of the Drone at Bard College and the author of Eyes in the Sky: The Secret Rise of Gorgon Stare and How It Will Watch Us All), 1-20-2020, "The Killer Algorithms Nobody’s Talking About," Foreign Policy, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/01/20/ai-autonomous-weapons-artificial-intelligence-the-killer-algorithms-nobodys-talking-about/>] // st

Many such technologies are already in use. Many more are right around the corner. And because of our singular focus on headline-grabbing killer robots, they have largely gone ignored.¶ Militaries and spy services have long been developing and deploying software for autonomously finding “unknown unknowns”—potential targets who would have otherwise slipped by unnoticed in the torrent of data from their growing surveillance arsenals. One particularly spooky strand of research seeks to build algorithms that tip human analysts off to such targets by singling out cars driving suspiciously around a surveilled city.¶ Other lethality-enabling technologies can translate intercepted communications, synthesize intelligence reports, and predict an adversary’s next move—all of which are similarly crucial steps in the lead-up to a strike. Even many entry-level surveillance devices on the market today, such as targeting cameras, come with standard features for automated tracking and detection.¶ For its part, the U.S. Department of Defense, whose self-imposed rules for autonomous weapons specifically exempt nonlethal systems, is allowing algorithms dangerously close to the trigger. The Army wants to equip tanks with computer vision that identifies “objects of interest” (translation: potential targets) along with recommendation algorithms—kind of like Amazon’s—that advise weapons operators whether to destroy those objects with a cannon or a gun, or by calling in an airstrike. All of these technologies fall outside the scope of the international debate on killer robots. But their effects could be just as dangerous.¶ The widespread use of sophisticated autonomous aids in war would be fraught with unknown unknowns. An algorithm with the power to suggest whether a tank should use a small rocket or a fighter jet to take out an enemy could mark the difference between life and death for anybody who happens to be in the vicinity of the target. An algorithm with the power to suggest whether a tank should use a small rocket or a fighter jet to take out an enemy could mark the difference between life and death for anybody who happens to be in the vicinity of the target. But different systems could perform that same calculation with widely diverging results. Even the reliability of a single given algorithm could vary wildly depending on the quality of the data it ingests.¶ It is also difficult to know whether lethality-enabling artificial intelligence—prone as computers are to bias—would contravene or reinforce those human passions that all too often lead to erroneous or illegal killings. Nor is there any consensus as to how to ensure that a human finger on the trigger can be counted on as a reliable check against the fallibility of its algorithmic enablers.¶ As such, in the absence of standards on such matters, not to mention protocols for algorithmic accountability, there is no good way to assess whether a bad algorithmically enabled killing came down to poor data, human error, or a deliberate act of aggression against a protected group.¶ A well-intentioned military actor could be led astray by a deviant algorithm and not know it; but just as easily, an actor with darker motives might use algorithms as a convenient veil for an intentionally insidious decisions.¶ Automation’s vast potential to make humans more efficient extends to the very human act of committing war crimes.¶ If one system offers up a faulty conclusion, it could be easy to catch the mistake before it does any harm. But these algorithms won’t act alone. A few months ago, the U.S. Navy tested a network of three AI systems, mounted on a satellite and two different airplanes, that collaboratively found an enemy ship and decided which vessel in the Navy’s fleet was best placed to destroy it, as well as what missile it should use. The one human involved in this kill chain was a commanding officer on the chosen destroyer, whose only job was to give the order to fire.¶ Eventually, the lead-up to a strike may involve dozens or hundreds of separate algorithms, each with a different job, passing findings not just to human overseers but also from machine to machine. Mistakes could accrue; human judgment and machine estimations would be impossible to parse from one another; and the results could be wildly unpredictable.¶ These questions are even more troubling when you consider how central such technologies will become to all future military operations. As the technology proliferates, even morally upstanding militaries may have to rely on autonomous assistance, in spite of its many risks, just to keep ahead of their less scrupulous AI-enabled adversaries.¶ Once an AI system can navigate complicated circumstances more intelligently than any team of soldiers, the human will have no choice but to take its advice on trust¶ And once an AI system can navigate complicated circumstances more intelligently than any team of soldiers, the human will have no choice but to take its advice on trust—or, as one thoughtful participant at a recent U.S. Army symposium put it, targeting will become a matter of simply pressing the “I-believe button.” In such a context, assurances from top brass that their machines will never make the ultimate lethal decision seem a little beside the point.

### 1NC---Advantage---LAWs inevitable

#### Lethal autonomous weapons are impossible to ban but trying to ban them trades off with countermeasures.

**Scharre, 17** [Paul Scharre is the vice president and director of studies at the Center for a New American Security, 12-22-2017, accessed on 6-27-2022, IEEE Spectrum, "Why You Shouldn’t Fear “Slaughterbots”", https://spectrum.ieee.org/why-you-shouldnt-fear-slaughterbots]/ISEE

Killer drones in the hands of terrorists massacring innocents. Robotic weapons of mass destruction breeding chaos and fear. A video created by advocates of a ban on autonomous weapons would have you believe this dystopian future is right around the corner if we don't act now. The short video, called “Slaughterbots," was released last month coinciding with United Nations meetings on autonomous weapons. The UN meetings ended inconclusively, but the video is getting traction. It's gotten over 2 million views and has sparked dozens of news stories. As a piece of propaganda, it works great. As a substantive argument for a ban on autonomous weapons, the video fails miserably. Obviously, a world in which terrorists can unleash swarms of killer drones on innocent civilians would be terrible, but is the future the video depicts realistic? The movie's slick production quality helps to gloss over its leaps of logic. It immerses the viewer in a dystopian nightmare, but let's be clear: It's very much science fiction. The central premise of “Slaughterbots" is that in the future militaries will build autonomous microdrones with shaped charges that can fly up to someone's head and detonate an explosive, killing the person. In the film, these “slaughterbots" quickly fall into the hands of terrorists, resulting in mass killings worldwide. The lethal microdrones depicted in “Slaughterbots" use facial recognition to identify their targets, then fly up to them and detonate shaped explosives.Image: Slaughterbots/YouTube The basic concept is grounded in technical reality. In the real world, the Islamic State has used off-the-shelf quadcopters equipped with small explosives to attack Iraqi troops, killing or wounding dozens of Iraqi soldiers. Today's terrorist drones are largely remotely controlled, but hobbyist drones are becoming increasingly autonomous. The latest models can navigate to a fixed target on their own, avoid obstacles, and autonomously track and follow moving objects. A small drone equipped with facial recognition technology could potentially be used to autonomously search for and kill specific individuals, as “Slaughterbots" envisions. It took me just a few minutes of searching online to find the resources necessary to download and train a free neural network to do facial recognition. So while no one has yet cobbled the technology together in the way the video depicts, all of the components are real. I want to make something very clear: There is nothing we can do to keep that underlying technology out of the hands of would-be terrorists. This is upsetting, but it's very important to understand. Just like how terrorists can and do use cars to ram crowds of civilians, the underlying technology to turn hobbyist drones into crude autonomous weapons is already too ubiquitous to stop. This is a genuine problem, and the best response is to focus on defensive measures to counter drones along with surveillance to catch would-be terrorists ahead of time. The “Slaughterbots" video takes this problem and blows it out of proportion, however, suggesting that drones would be used by terrorists as robotic weapons of mass destruction, killing thousands of people at a time. Fortunately, this nightmare scenario is about as likely to happen as HAL 9000 locking you out of the pod bay doors. The technology shown in the video is plausible, but basically everything else is a bunch of malarkey. The video assumes the following: These assumptions range from questionable, at best, to completely fanciful. Of course, the video is fictional, and defense planners do often use fictionalized scenarios to help policymakers think through plausible events that may occur. As a defense analyst at a think tank and in my prior job as a strategic planner at the Pentagon, I used fictional scenarios to help inform choices about what technologies the United States military should invest in. To be useful, however, these scenarios need to at least be plausible. They need to be something that could happen. The scenario depicted in the “Slaughterbots" video fails to account for political and strategic realities about how governments use military technology. First, there is no evidence that governments are planning to mass-produce small drones to kill civilians in large numbers. In my forthcoming book, Army of None: Autonomous Weapons and the Future of War, I examine next-generation weapons being built in defense labs around the world. Russia, China, and the United States are all racing ahead on autonomy and artificial intelligence. But the types of weapons they are building are generally aimed at fighting other militaries. They are “counter-force" weapons, not “counter-value" weapons that would target civilians. Counter-force autonomous weapons raise their own sets of concerns, but they aren't designed for mass targeting of civilians, nor could they be easily repurposed to do so. Second, in the video, we're told the drones can defeat “any countermeasure." TV pundits scream, “We can't defend ourselves." This isn't fiction; it's farce. Every military technology has a countermeasure, and countermeasures against small drones aren't even hypothetical. The U.S. government is actively working on ways to shoot down, jam, fry, hack, ensnare, or otherwise defeat small drones. The microdrones in the video could be defeated by something as simple as chicken wire. The video shows heavier-payload drones blasting holes through walls so that other drones can get inside, but the solution is simply layered defenses. Military analysts look at the cost-exchange ratio between offense and defense, and in this case, the costs heavily favor static defenders. In a world where terrorists launch occasional small-scale attacks using DIY drones, people are unlikely to absorb the inconveniences of building robust defenses, just like people don't wear body armor to protect against the unlikely event of being caught in a mass shooting. But if an enemy country built hundreds of thousands of drones to wipe out a city, you bet there'd be a run on chicken wire. The video takes a plausible problem—terrorist attacks with drones—and scales it up without factoring in how others would respond. If lethal microdrones were built en masse, defenses and countermeasures would be a national priority, and in this case the countermeasures are simple. Any weapon that can be defeated by a net isn't a weapon of mass destruction. Third, the video assumes that militaries are incapable of preventing terrorists from getting access to military-grade weapons. But we don't give terrorists hand grenades, rocket launchers, or machine guns today. Terrorist attacks with drones are a concern precisely because they involve DIY explosives strapped to readily available technology. This is a genuine problem, but again the video scales this threat up in ways that are unrealistic. Even if militaries were to build lethal microdrones, terrorists are no more likely to get their hands on large numbers of them than other military technologies. Weapons do proliferate over time to nonstate actors in war zones, but just because antitank guided missiles are prevalent in Syria doesn't mean they're commonplace in New York. Terrorists use airplanes and trucks for attacks precisely because successfully smuggling military-grade weapons into a Western country isn't that easy. In “Slaughterbots," AI-powered microdrones are built en masse, and there seems to be no defenses and countermeasures to stop them.Image: Slaughterbots/YouTube Fourth, the video assumes terrorists can carry out coordinated attacks at a scale that is not plausible. In one scene, two men release a swarm of about 50 drones from the back of a van. This specific scene is fairly realistic; one of the challenges of autonomy is that a small group of people could launch a larger attack than might otherwise be possible. Something like a truck full of 50 drones is a reasonable possibility. Again, though, the video takes this scenario to the absurd. The video claims that 8,300 people are killed in simultaneous attacks. If the men in the van depict a typical attack, then this level of casualties would equate to over 160 coordinated attacks worldwide. Terrorist groups often launch coordinated attacks, but usually on the scale of single digit numbers of attacks. The video assumes not just superweapons but ones that are in the hands of supervillains. The movie uses hype and fear to skip past these crucial assumptions, and in doing so it undermines any rational debate about the risk of terrorists acquiring autonomous weapons. The video makes clear we're supposed to be afraid. But what are we supposed to be afraid of? A weapon that chooses its own targets (which the video is actually ambiguous about)? A weapon with no countermeasure? The fact that terrorists can get ahold of the weapon? The ability of autonomy to scale up attacks? If you want to drum up fears of “killer robots," the video is great. But as a substantive analysis of the issue, it falls apart under even the most casual scrutiny. The video doesn't put forward an argument. It's sensationalist fear-mongering. Of course, the whole purpose of the video is to scare the viewer into action. The video concludes with UC Berkeley professor Stuart Russell warning of the dangers of autonomous weapons and imploring the viewer to act now to stop this nightmare from becoming a reality. I have tremendous respect for Stuart Russell, both as an artificial intelligence researcher and as a contributor to the debate on autonomous weapons. I've hosted Russell at events at the Center for a New American Security, where I run a research program on artificial intelligence and global security. I have no doubt Russell's views are sincere. But in attempting to persuade the viewer, the video makes assumptions that are not supportable. Even worse, the proposed solution—a legally binding treatybanning autonomous weapons—won't solve the real problems humanity faces as autonomy advances in weapons. A ban won't stop terrorists from fashioning crude DIY robotic weapons. Nor would a ban on the kinds of weapons the video imagines do anything to address the risks that arise from counter-force autonomous weapons. (In fact, it's not even clear whether a ban would prohibit the weapons shown in the video, which are actually fairly discriminate.) By focusing on extreme and implausible scenarios, the video actually undermines progress on real concerns about autonomous weapons. Nations who are leading developers of robotic weapons are likely to dismiss the fears raised in “Slaughterbots" out of hand. The video plays into the hands of those who argue that these fears of autonomous weapons are overhyped and irrational. Autonomous weapons raise important questions about compliance with the laws of war, risk, and controllability, and the role of humans as moral agents in warfare. These are important issues that merit serious discussion. When Russell and others engage in spirited debate on these topics, I welcome the conversation. But that's not what “Slaughterbots" is. The video has succeeded in grabbing media attention, but its sensationalism undercuts the kind of serious intellectual discourse that is actually needed on autonomous weapons.

## Turns

### 1NC---Turn---LAWS Better

#### **LAWS break the boundaries between militarism and hegemonic masculinity.**

De Carvalho, 18 [Juliana Santos de Carvalho is a research associate at the Public International Law and Policy Group, Spring Issue 2018, accessed on 6-21-2022, Amsterdam Law Review, “A Male Future? An Analysis on the Gendered Discourses Regarding Lethal Autonomous Weapons”, <https://amsterdamlawforum.org/articles/10.37974/ALF.320/galley/450/download/>]/ISEE

The current examination of the inter-relations between gendered discourses and robotic warfare is focused on their ability to mutually shape and influence each other. To comprehend such relation between gendered discourses and robotic warfare, there is a need to first understand some key-theoretical concepts from which feminist literature on war and militarism stems, namely the idea of hegemonic masculinity and its interplay with militarisation/militarism. To understand hegemonic masculinity, the concept of gender performativity is pivotal. Pursuant to the theoretical prepositions of philosopher and gender theorist Judith Butler, gender does not follow from sex or “nature”. Rather, it is performatively and socially produced, as well as enforced by „the regulatory practices of gender coherence‟. Masculine and feminine attributes are socially constructed within frames of masculine domination, which in turn operate through regulated processes of repetition that consolidate and perpetuate gender hierarchy. Within this context, “hegemonic masculinity” is a constructed and idealised notion of certain attributes socially linked to the male gender, which subordinates and marginalises all other practices that do not conform to such ideal. Scholar Frank J. Barrett explains that the current hegemonic ideal of masculinity in Western societies is that of the independent, risk-taking, aggressive, heterosexual and rational man. As a result, a hierarchy is created not only between women and men, but also between the men who are coherent with hegemonic masculinity ideals and those who are not. In this regard, current hegemonic masculinity language applied to the military can actually demean and criticise robotic warfare. As these novel military technologies require no physical strength, no courage to “be in the battlefield” and no risk for the individual soldier, it alleviates the “dirty work of war”, and therefore can be considered as coward and feminine. A very telling example of this is the case of the “Nintendo Medal”, as explained by professor in women and gender studies Lorraine Bayard de Volo. In this instance, Leon Panetta, U.S Secretary of Defence in 2013, had proposed the Distinguished Warfare Medal to laud robotic pilots for “extraordinary achievements”. However, the medal was met with a huge backlash from the overall military community, as they argued that medals of honour should not be endowed to coward “button-pushers”. This is particularly interesting when one analyses the role of “sacrifice” to the “formation of the soldier-citizen as an archetype of heroic masculinity”. As explained by gender studies scholar Bianca Baggiarini, military sacrifice publicises the death, injury and suffering of soldiers that put themselves in harm’s way for the „greater good of the national community and subsequently the life of the body politic‟. Soldier’s lives then become gendered, as their value is located in the public sphere – often seen as the „male‟ realm, in contrast to the private, family and domestic domain associated with feminine roles. This does not mean to say that such sacrificial effort is expected only from male-bodied soldiers: this is an overarching gendering of the commitment of soldiers – male and female – to take risks for the national good, which grounds itself in the masculinised domain of the public to validate such endeavour. Drone war, for its turn, can distance the military enterprise from “public sacrifice”, and potentially “emasculate” military heroism.

### 1NC---Turn---Casualties

#### AI development is key to increase military effectiveness and safety – it will impact every facet of society

Hitchens 19 Theresa Hitchens (Hitchens was a senior research associate at the University of Maryland’s Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM). Before that, she spent six years in Geneva, Switzerland as director of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR)), 11-5-2019, "DoD Should Consider Truly Autonomous Weapons: Bipartisan AI Commission," Breaking Defense, https://breakingdefense.com/2019/11/bipartisan-ai-commission-dod-should-consider-truly-autonomous-weapons/

**DoD Should Consider Truly Autonomous Weapons: Bipartisan AI Commission** "The Commission is not glorifying the prospect of AI-enabled warfare, [but] adopting AI for defense and security purposes is an urgent national imperative." WASHINGTON: The US military should adopt artificial intelligence urgently without letting debates over ethics and human control “paralyze AI development,” a congressionally mandated panel says. “In light of the choices being made by our strategic competitors, the United States must also examine AI through a military lens, including concepts for AI-enabled autonomous operations.” (Emphasis ours). In what will likely be controversial on Capitol Hill, the interim report released yesterday by the the bipartisan National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence is full-throated in its defense of the pursuit of autonomous, AI-driven military systems as not only ethical but essential for future US military operations. Even in the military, some commanders have been publicly reluctant to trust AI — especially for anything related to nuclear weapons. [Read about the independent Defense Innovation Board’s call for ethical military AI] Notably, nowhere does commission use the phrase ‘human in the loop,’ the language currently favored by the Pentagon to assert that a human would always have ultimate control over any autonomous system.” That phrase, in turn, is an oversimplification of the current Department of Defense policy on autonomous systems, DoD Instruction 3000.9 — which also goes remarkably unmentioned, referenced in a single footnote to one of its 101 pages. “Ethics and strategic necessity are compatible with one another,” the report says. “Defense and national security agencies must develop and deploy AI in a responsible, trusted, and ethical manner…. Everyone desires safe, robust, and reliable AI systems free of unwanted bias, and recognizes today’s technical limitations. Everyone wants to establish thresholds for testing and deploying AI systems worthy of human trust and to ensure that humans remain responsible for the outcomes of their use. Some disagreements will remain, but the Commission is concerned that debate will paralyze AI development.” “Inaction on AI development raises as many ethical challenges as AI deployment,” the report continues. “There is an ethical imperative to accelerate the fielding of safe, reliable, and secure AI systems that can be demonstrated to protect the American people, minimize operational dangers to U.S. service members, and make warfare more discriminating, which could reduce civilian casualties.” “Adopting AI for defense and security purposes is an urgent national imperative,” is one of the seven consensus-agreed principles agreed to be the commissioners. “The Commission is not glorifying the prospect of AI-enabled warfare,” they write. “But new technology is almost always employed for the pursuit of power. In light of the choices being made by our strategic competitors, the United States must also examine AI through a military lens, including concepts for AI-enabled autonomous operations.” The concept of fully autonomous weapon systems is highly controversial, both in the US and among US allies. As we reported back in August, the International Campaign to Stop Killer Robots nearly doubled its membership over the past year, to 113 NGOs in 57 countries as well as The Vatican and Palestinian Authority. A total of 90 nations have called for negotiations towards some kind of ban. In addition, an August report by the Congressional Research Service found that there is a widespread consensus at the United Nations that “appropriate levels of human judgement must be maintained” over any lethal autonomous weapon even though there is not agreement on a ban. The commission’s seven guiding principles were agreed as a method for shaping the robust US debate about the linkage of AI to national defense and military systems, the report explains. Others include making global leadership a national security priority with a robust government investment strategy in order to maintain the US technological edge; investing in domestic STEM eduction and recruiting foreign talent; and maintaining free and open academic research. The commission stressed, however, that the 101-page report is not final and thus does not make “final recommendations, suggest major organizational changes, or propose specific investment priorities in rank order attached to dollar figures.” The final report is due to Congress in October 2020. NSSL 7 may 2020 ULA pic Recommended With billions at stake, lobbying heats up for future rights to Space Force launches “Key for us is allowing on-ramps, allowing for some smaller launches to have a chance,” a senior Space Force official told Breaking Defense, in order to avoid billion-dollar “Titan-era prices.” By THERESA HITCHENS The commission was established by the 2019 National Defense Authorization Act. Chaired by former Google CEO Eric Schmidt, who also chairs DoD’s Defense Innovation Board, it has 15 members including Bob Work, former DoD deputy secretary who serves as vice chairman. “The development of AI will shape the future of power,” the report states bluntly. “The nation with the most resilient and productive economic base will be best positioned to seize the mantle of world leadership. That base increasingly depends on the strength of the innovation economy, which in turn will depend on AI. AI will drive waves of advancement in commerce, transportation, health, education, financial markets, government, and national defense.” It identifies “five fundamental lines of effort that are necessary to preserve U.S. advantages: Invest in AI Research and Development (R&D); Apply AI to National Security Missions; Train and Recruit AI Talent; Protect and Build Upon U.S. Technology Advantages; and Marshal Global AI Cooperation.” The report explains that the commission’s work so far has focused on four major issues: foreign threats to our national security in the current AI era; how AI can improve the government’s ability to defend the country, cooperate with allies, and preserve a favorable balance of military power in the world; the relationship between AI and economic competitiveness as a component of national security, including the strength of our scientific research community and our larger workforce; and ethical considerations in fielding AI systems for national security purposes. Threats posed by AI misuse, the report says, include disinformation that undermine democratic systems; erosion of privacy and civil liberties; increasing cyber attacks; and increased potential for catastrophic accidents. It also posits the benefits of AI for homeland defense, the Intelligence Community (IC) and the military: For homeland defense, the report says, **AI-enable tools can assist with border protections, cybersecurity, protection of critical infrastructure and natural disaster response**. For the Intelligence Community, “**AI algorithms can sift through vast amounts of data to find patterns, detect threats, and identify correlations. AI tools can make satellite imagery, communications signals, economic indicators, social media data, and other large sources of information more intelligible. AI-enabled analysis can provide faster and more precise situational awareness that supports higher quality decision-making.”** On future battlefields, the **military “could use AI-enabled machines, systems, and weapons to understand the battlespace more quickly; develop a common joint operating picture more rapidly; make relevant decisions faster; mount more complex multi-domain operations in contested environments; put fewer U.S. service members at risk; and protect innocent lives and reduce collateral damage.”** Of course, if those applications, however appealing, require relinquishing or even reducing human control, the controversy will be intense.

#### **LAWS reduces the risk of human casualties during war by removing humans from the warzone – makes wars less escalatory**

Müller 16 (Vincent C., Professor of Philosophy at Eindhoven University of Technology, University Fellow at the University of Leeds, Turing Fellow at the Alan Turing Institute, President of the European Association for Cognitive Systems, PhD Phil with Cognitive Science, Linguistics, and History, and chair of the euRobotics topics group on 'ethical, legal and socio-economic issues’, (PDF), 2016 “Autonomous killer robots are probably good news," ResearchGate,

Are killer robots good for us? Assuming there is no particular ethical problem with humanitarian law or responsibil-ity, the remaining question is whether the consequences of LAWS are good overall, in the long run—do they reduce or increase human well-being? If utility is reduced by the existence and use of these weapons we should not allow them. There are two sub-ordinate questions here. Do LAWS increase or decrease the suffering and loss of war? Do LAWS make war more or less likely? 3.3.1. Reducing the human cost of war There are a number of points that suggest LAWS would reduce the human cost of war. • Robots reduce war crimes and crimes in war: they do not rape, do not get angry or afraid, they do not intentionally commit war crimes—unless pro-grammed to do so. They follow orders more closely. • “One of the great arguments for armed robots is they can fire second,” Jo-seph W. Dyer, cited in (Markoff 2010) • Drones are excellent data-collectors, so perpetrators of war crimes are more likely to be caught. This also makes war crimes less likely • Fewer deaths, injuries and traumas of combatants • Fewer deaths, injuries and traumas of non-combatants • Thus less damage to future generations 3.3.2. Making war worse There are a couple of points that suggest LAWS would make wars worse: • LAWS have limited judgment and common sense, which will lead to errors and to carrying out orders that violate the law of war. • Killing is made easier if the command can be passed on to an autonomous system, so proportionality is under threat. 3.3.3. Making war more likely There are some points that suggest LAWS would make wars more likely: Autonomous Killer Robots Are Probably Good News 12/16 • With LAWS, a war can be expected to result in less death and injury to the soldiers on the side that has them available (but only slightly, if compared to remote-controlled systems). • They make wars less bad, generally, and thus wars are more likely to be cho-sen as a means. • They make a particular military action easier to decide for a military com-mander (see Krishnan 2009). • Fewer losses of soldiers’ lives reduce the political hurdle for wars and esp. military action short of war. • Finally, they make it easier to maintain a ‘low level’ war for some time, espe-cially if it is an asymmetric war. 3.3.4. Utility, fairness and arms races The reasons why LAWS make a war more likely apply equally to remote-controlled weapons; in fact they apply to any weapon that acts at a distance. Such weapons have always resulted in relative safety for the first users: Goliath probably thought David’s sling unfair; the Lateran Council of 1139, Canon 29, banned use of the large cross-bow [ballista] and archery against fellow Christians. The criticism that LAWS lower the risk for attackers and thus make wars and other killings more likely is thus correct, but applies to any weapon that the one side has, but the other does not: In other words, it is the result of an on-going arms race. As soon as the other side has acquired the new weapon, the risk of war goes down again. This is not to say that I think LAWS are part of an unstoppable arms race. Some weapons systems have been banned (anti-personnel mines, chemical weapons) and with nuclear weapons the arms race is highly controlled. We can stop developing these weapons—the question is whether it is right to do so, given that they seem to save lives. Let us note that the reasons why LAWS make wars less bad do not apply to all weapons at a distance. This is so especially for weapons of mass destruction or weap-ons with poor accuracy—and thus with poor compliance to the humanitarian law requirements of distinction and proportionality. If killer robots become cheap and easy to obtain or make, then the consequences would certainly be bad – as in any case of a weapon becoming more widely available (see Müller 2015) – so we would do well to prevent this spread. 3.3.5. Utility Overall So, what is the overall utility count? As usual with utility in the long run, this is very hard to say but it seems quite clear that LAWS would do something to reduce the human cost of war. Some reduction is extremely valuable, given how serious the suf- Autonomous Killer Robots Are Probably Good News 13/16 fering of war is. Further, while LAWS do raise the probability of wars in the short run, there is no reason to think they will do so in the long run. The overall utility calcula-tion depends on the balance of how much less bad wars become and how much more likely they become. How bad the short run raise in probability will turn out depends mainly on which the first parties to acquire them are. Given current military spend-ing, we know who these are: USA, China, Russia. It also depends on how big the dif-ference to remote-controlled systems is, which currently looks minimal. If they do not substantially increase the probability of war, then killer robots are good news for hu-manity.

### 1NC---Turn---Deterrence

#### Autonomous weapons reinforce red lines for deterring hostilities.

Amatai **Etzioni and** Oren **Etzioni,** May-June 20**17**, “Pros and Cons of Autonomous Weapons”, Military Review, https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Military-Review/English-Edition-Archives/May-June2017/Pros-and-Cons-of-Autonomous-Weapons-Systems/

Why to begin. However, one should note that human-out-of-the-loop arms are very effective in reinforcing a red line. Declaration by representatives of one nation that if another nation engages in a certain kind of hostile behavior, swift and severe retaliation will follow, are open to misinterpretation by the other side, even if backed up with deployment of troops or other military assets. Leaders, drawing on considerable historical experience, may bet that they be able to cross the red line and be spared because of one reason or another. Hence, arms without a human in the loop make for much more credible red lines. (This is a form of the “precommitment strategy” discussed by Thomas Schelling in Arms and Influence, in which one party limits its own options by obligating itself to retaliate, thus making its deterrence more credible.) We suggest that nations might be willing to forgo this advantage of fully autonomous arms in order to gain the assurance that once hostilities ceased, they could avoid becoming entangled in new rounds of fighting because some bombers were still running loose and attacking the other side, or because some bombers might malfunction and attack civilian centers. Finally, if a ban on fully autonomous weapons were agreed upon and means of verification were developed, one could aspire to move toward limiting weapons with a high but not full measure of autonomy.

#### LAWs provide credible threat of retaliation, accelerating nuclear disarmament

**Umbrello et. al 19** [Steven Umbrello, Phil Torres, and Angelo F. De Bellis. Umbrello works for the Institute for Ethics and Emerging Technologies and the University of Turin. Torres is an employee at the Project for Future Human Flpurishing. De Bellis is a Professor at the Universiy of Edinburgh. 01/24/2019, “The future of war: could lethal autonomous weapons make conflict more ethical?”, Journal of AI & Society, doi:10.1007/s00146-019-00879-x]

To begin, one of the most compelling reasons for opposing nuclear non-proliferation efforts is that the destructive potential of nuclear weapons increases the threshold of use (Jürgen 2008; Wilson 2012). Thus, only in extreme circumstances would rational actors deem their use to be either morally or strategically acceptable. This strongly contrasts with the case of LAWs, whose cost would be small compared to the cost of paying military personnel. Consequently, states could maintain stockpiles of LAWs that are far larger than any standing army. The low cost of LAWs would also make them more expendable than human soldiers (Jacoby and Chang 2008; Singer 2009a, b; Jenks 2010), and they could strike the enemy with greater precision than human scolders can currently achieve (Thurnher 2012; Ekelhof and Struyk 2014). These four properties—low cost, military effectiveness, expendability, and precision—could drive proliferation while lowering the threshold for use and, therefore, undermine geopolitical security. Incidentally, similar claims could be made about anticipated future nanotech weaponry (see Whitman 2011). The attractiveness of LAWs is apparent in the US’s use of “unmanned aerial vehicles” (UAVs, also known as “drones”) in Iraq and Syria. These semi-autonomous systems offer a cheap, effective, and relatively precise means for conducting surveillance and targeting enemy combatants [despite unsatisfied infrastructural needs to sustain the drone program] (McLean 2014). As a result, the US drone program has grown and the frequency of drone use against terrorist organizations like the (now-defunct) Islamic State has steadily increased in the past decade (Higgins 2017). Yet the proliferation of LAWs discussed in this paper is different in important respects from the proliferation of current UAV devices. LAWs are theoretically capable of becoming moral actors capable of making life and death decisions without human intervention. The absence of a human operator suggests that LAWs will be even cheaper than current UAVs and, as such, more vulnerable to proliferation. But this might not be undesirable given that, for example, ethical LAWs will—almost by definition—not serve to glorify or extend war efforts beyond the initial scope. Furthermore, UAVs still require human intervention and, as we will soon discuss, the emotional volatility of humans could lead to overspending and high death tolls. More generally speaking, the growing use of UAVs in conflict situations is consistent with a broader trend toward high-precision weaponry and away from larger, more destructive weapons like those in the world’s nuclear arsenals (Wilson 2013). There are some reasons for welcoming this shift. For example, the use of high-precision weapons like LAWs to achieve a state’s military objectives could reduce the probability and proportion of indiscriminate harm, thus violating the LoW and “rules of engagement” (RoE) less than might otherwise have been possible. Even more, the “ease-of-use” of LAWs that are fully autonomous could enhance the “balance of terror” that prevents conflict from breaking out by providing a credible means for retaliation: “If you strike me first, I will unleash a swarm of LAWs that devastate your infrastructure, poison your streams, set fire to your farms, destroy your armies, and assassinate your leaders.” The precision and effectiveness of LAWs could also accelerate the process of nuclear disarmament, seeing as the conception of LAWS regards them as agents capable of conventional weapons use rather non-conventional weapons platforms. First, consider that research on the potential climatic consequences of a nuclear war resulted in the replacement of MAD (“mutuallyassured destruction”) with SAD (“self-assured destruction”). The reason is that an exchange of nuclear weapons—even a regional one [citation]—could initiate a “nuclear winter” that causes global agricultural failures, widespread starvation, the spread of infectious disease, and other catastrophic sequelae that cannot be contained within national borders (Mills et al. 2014; Xia et al. 2015). Consequently, a nuclear war would all but guarantee the self-annihilation of states involved. As Seth Baum (2015) notes, though, LAWs could provide a kind of “winter-safe deterrence” by providing states with a credible threat of retaliation without the global catastrophic risks of nuclear conflict. Thus, LAWs could render the world’s nuclear arsenals irrelevant and, in doing so, lower the overall risk of human annihilation. Distinguishing valid targets As mentioned above and discussed further below, the most significant obstacle to the development and acceptance of LAWs is their current inability to reliably distinguish between valid and invalid targets. This is a crucial shortcoming because, as previously alluded, the Geneva Conventions require that attacks must be exclusively directed at military rather than civilian entities (United Nations 1979). As Article 51(3) of Sect. 1 of the Additional Protocol to the Geneva Convention states, “civilians shall enjoy the protection afforded by this Section, unless and for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities” (United Nations 1979). Complicating the situation further is an ambiguity about what exactly counts as a “civilian”—eg., some civilians engage in combative activities, some of which are not clearly overt, thus making it a matter of interpretation whether such individuals should fall within the “combatant” or “noncombatant” categories.

#### Nuclear disarmament reduces the risk of war

**Baum 15** [Seth Baum, 7/27/15, “Breaking down the risk of nuclear deterrence failure”, Bulletin of the Nuclear Scientists, https://thebulletin.org/2015/07/breaking-down-the-risk-of-nuclear-deterrence-failure/]

Which risk is larger? This is where the empirical details come in. Risk can be quantified as the probability of some harm times the severity of that harm if it were to occur. That means we are comparing four quantities: the probability of war with nuclear weapons, the probability without them, the severity of war with them, and the severity without them. The probability of any war is a very difficult number to pin down. The causes of war are complex and contingent on many case-specific factors, and the historical record is murky and limited. But at least one thing is clear: The probability of nuclear war is not zero. Nuclear deterrence can fail. It is a fallacy to presume that just because no nuclear war has occurred since the post-World War II advent of nuclear deterrence, therefore it will never happen. The historical record contains several near-misses in which nuclear war was narrowly avoided due in no small part to luck. When these points are raised in disarmament debates, there is no significant international divide. When pushed, everyone seems to agree that nuclear deterrence can fail. Like nuclear weapons, conventional weapons can also act as deterrents, discouraging states from going to war by presenting a counter-threat. So how does the probability of deterrence failure with nuclear weapons compare to the probability without them? This is a much harder question, and not one commonly considered in the debates. Several studies have attempted to answer it by looking at data on the history of war between states that do and do not have nuclear weapons. A 2009 study by Robert Rauchhaus found a lower probability of war between states that both have nuclear weapons but a higher probability when only one has them. However, a 2015 study by Mark Bell and Nicholas L. Miller finds no significant difference in the relative probabilities. These studies are helpful but inconclusive. Such an important policy decision should ideally rest on more robust research. (I would welcome any reader comments on these two studies or suggestions for additional ones.) The relative severity of nuclear and non-nuclear war is also complex and uncertain, but easier to compare. In principle, either war could result in few or many deaths depending on how it proceeded. In practice, there is reason to believe that nuclear war would be vastly more severe. Non-nuclear war could result in many millions of deaths, as in the two World Wars, but the unparalleled explosive force of nuclear weapons makes great harm much easier to cause and therefore more probable. By far the biggest difference between nuclear and non-nuclear war would be that the former would likely result in nuclear winter. Nuclear explosions send smoke up past the clouds, into the stratosphere, which causes global environmental problems for years. Crop failures could ensue in every country, no matter where the war occurred. The survival of human civilization could be at stake. Nuclear winter could astronomically dwarf the potential harm of a non-nuclear war, unless the latter involved some other weapon of global destruction, such as contagious biological weapons. (Those are already banned by treaty and not in active deployment). The relative severity of nuclear and non-nuclear war is likewise not a point of international disagreement. While awareness of nuclear winter remains low, all sides concur that the impacts of the former would be catastrophic, and the impacts of the latter not as bad. Taking nuclear winter into account, the ambiguity about the probabilities of whether war will occur becomes less important. That is, even if nuclear weapons significantly improve deterrence, nuclear disarmament still reduces the risk of war. Thus, while it is understandable that nucleararmed states would want to avoid disarmament in order to avoid war, the world will ultimately be safer without nuclear weapons. In other words, nuclear disarmament should proceed rapidly.

### 1NC---Turn---Ethics Generic

#### LAWs are key to eliminate gender-based violence and norms in the military

**Ibrahim 20** [Lara Miriam Ibrahim (Bachelor of Civil Law candidate at the University of Oxford. Incoming DPhil in Law candidate at Oriel College, University of Oxford), 9-10-2020, "Autonomous Weapons Systems: Perpetuating the Gender Bias in Armed Conflict?," IntLawGrrls, <https://ilg2.org/2020/09/10/autonomous-weapons-systems-perpetuating-the-gender-bias-in-armed-conflict/>] // st

Gender as a social construct and the binary of sex difference embedded within gender identity has been translated into many areas of international law and IHL is not exempt from this critique. It is a regime that predominantly prioritises men, relegating women to the status of victims and child-bearers. This discrimination and bias can be seen especially in the principle of distinction.¶ Masculinity in war is associated with a natural ‘protector’ dynamic; the combatants embodying the image of chivalric, just warriors as a direct result of patriarchal norms within society. Women are regularly placed in the same group as children when their experiences within war is considered. In turn, this analogises women with the perceived vulnerability and innocence that children bear in society. It is therefore expected from men’s gendered roles that their duty is to fight in wars to protect women and children. This hegemonic masculinity sustains the patriarchal military structure.¶ The reality is that many women do act as combatants in armed conflicts, defying the gendered narratives of war. However, their role as combatants is often over-looked by many participants. The generalisation of women as civilians also serves to ignore their unique experiences of war as victims of gender-based violence, perpetrated in armed conflict to ensure maintenance of the subordination of women.¶ The use of AWS may present an opportunity to rid the gender bias embedded within the principle of distinction; the phrase “robots do not rape” is one that has been used in arguments that propose the use of AWS. Their use presents an opportunity to eliminate gender-based violence as a way of upholding the patriarchal military structure. Rather than viewing women as innocent subordinates, AWS warfare could result in the emancipation of the traditional gender roles prescribed to men and women during wartime. The protector and protected dyad would cease to continue, as all genders would be protected during war by AWS.

### 1NC---Turn---Ethics Soldiers

#### Advanced autonomous weapons would be more ethical than human soldiers – human flaws make war atrocities more likely.

**Arkin, 2008 – the Mobile Robot Laboratory at Georgia Institute of Technology** [Ronald “Technical Report GIT-GVU-07-11 Governing Lethal Behavior: Embedding Ethics in a Hybrid Deliberative/Reactive Robot Architecture” <https://dl.acm.org/doi/abs/10.1145/1349822.1349839> Acc 12/27/20 TA]

It is not my belief that an unmanned system will be able to be perfectly ethical in the battlefield, but I am convinced that they can perform more ethically than human soldiers are capable of. Unfortunately the trends in human behavior in the battlefield regarding adhering to legal and ethical requirements are questionable at best. A recent report from the Surgeon General’s Office [Surgeon General 06] assessing the battlefield ethics of soldiers and marines deployed in Operation Iraqi Freedom is disconcerting. The following findings are taken directly from that report: 1. Approximately 10% of Soldiers and Marines report mistreating noncombatants (damaged/destroyed Iraqi property when not necessary or hit/kicked a noncombatant when not necessary). Soldiers that have high levels of anger, experience high levels of combat or those who screened positive for a mental health problem were nearly twice as likely to mistreat non-combatants as those who had low levels of anger or combat or screened negative for a mental health problem. 2. Only 47% of Soldiers and 38% of Marines agreed that noncombatants should be treated with dignity and respect. 3. Well over a third of Soldiers and Marines reported torture should be allowed, whether to save the life of a fellow Soldier or Marine or to obtain important information about insurgents. 4. 17% of Soldiers and Marines agreed or strongly agreed that all noncombatants should be treated as insurgents. 5. Just under 10% of soldiers and marines reported that their unit modifies the ROE to accomplish the mission. 6. 45% of Soldiers and 60% of Marines did not agree that they would report a fellow soldier/marine if he had injured or killed an innocent noncombatant. 7. Only 43% of Soldiers and 30% of Marines agreed they would report a unit member for unnecessarily damaging or destroying private property. 8. Less than half of Soldiers and Marines would report a team member for an unethical behavior. 9. A third of Marines and over a quarter of Soldiers did not agree that their NCOs and Officers made it clear not to mistreat noncombatants. 10. Although they reported receiving ethical training, 28% of Soldiers and 31% of Marines reported facing ethical situations in which they did not know how to respond. 11. Soldiers and Marines are more likely to report engaging in the mistreatment of Iraqi noncombatants when they are angry, and are twice as likely to engage in unethical behavior in the battlefield than when they have low levels of anger. 12. Combat experience, particularly losing a team member, was related to an increase in ethical violations.

### 2NC---Turn---Ethics Soldiers

#### Even if it’s not perfect, it is better than human soldiers

**Arkin, 2008 – the Mobile Robot Laboratory at Georgia Institute of Technology** [Ronald “Technical Report GIT-GVU-07-11 Governing Lethal Behavior: Embedding Ethics in a Hybrid Deliberative/Reactive Robot Architecture” <https://dl.acm.org/doi/abs/10.1145/1349822.1349839> Acc 12/27/20 TA]

Along other lines [Sparrow 07], points out several clear challenges to the roboticist attempting to create a moral sense for a battlefield robot: • “Controversy about right and wrong is endemic to ethics”. o Response: While that is true, we have reasonable guidance by the agreed upon and negotiated Laws of War as well as the Rules of Engagement as a means to constrain behavior when compared to ungoverned solutions for autonomous robots. • “I suspect that any decision structure that a robot is capable of instantiating is still likely to leave open the possibility that robots will act unethically.” o Response: Agreed – It is the goal of this work to create systems that can perform better ethically than human soldiers do in the battlefield, albeit they will still be imperfect. This challenge seems achievable. Reaching perfection in almost anything in the real world, including human behavior, seems beyond our grasp.

### 1NC---Turn---Effectiveness

#### The affirmative focuses on distinguishing autonomous from non-autonomous weapons is counterproductive - it prevents us from focusing on how to use them effectively and responsibly.

**Noyes, 2019 - Major, US Army Reserve** [Matthew MPP, Harvard Kennedy School 14-06-2019 “Autonomous Weapons: The Future Behind Us” https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/AD1085435.pdf Acc 12/27/20 TA]

Militaries have long used weapons with autonomous capabilities and are likely to increasingly use autonomous weapons as their effectiveness is demonstrated. Autonomous weapons predate remotely operated weapons in most domains. The air domain is instructive in this regard, as the invention of television in the 1930s disrupted prior work on more autonomous aircraft by allowing for the remote operation of aircraft out of sight from the pilot. Remotely operated systems are likely to continue to be generally preferred by militaries, but those systems will have increasingly autonomous capabilities, particularly in targeting enemy systems that disrupt their command and control links. This suggests rather than viewing “autonomous weapons” as a distinct class of systems, instead we should consider the autonomous capabilities of a weapon and how it is controlled by its user. Correctly considering autonomy in weapons begins with recognizing weapons are tools, and like all tools have a user. “Full autonomy,” in the sense of absolute independence, is not a desirable property of a tool. Rather, users will maintain some control over their tools to ensure they are accomplishing their desired purpose. Instead of trying to distinguish between what is autonomous and what is not, we should focus on the relationship between the user and the tool. To paraphrase David Mindell: “Where are the [users]? Who are they? What are they doing? When? Why does it matter?”152 Unencumbered with trying to distinguish between what is autonomous and non-autonomous allows analysis to instead focus on autonomy in executing particular functions. Recognizing militaries have long used autonomous weapons makes predicting their future use a matter of identifying the capabilities militaries have sought to achieve through autonomous weapons in the past, and how technology is changing what is possible. Considering this history, autonomous weapons have predominately been used to address at least one of four challenges: the mundane, the fast, the denied, and mass. Autonomous weapons aid militaries in addressing the mundane, or long duration, by providing greater persistence in observing and reacting to events over an extended period than is efficiently achieved with a manned system. In terms of both reaction speed and at high accelerations, autonomous weapons can operate at speeds exceeding what people are capable of. A particularly attractive feature of autonomous weapons is the ability to operate in denied environment, either due to environmental conditions or enemy action, that present unacceptable risk to manned systems or to the control channels for remotely operated systems. Finally, autonomous weapons provide increased mass, like most any military technology, by increasing the military power of a state relative to its available population for military service.

#### Banning autonomous weapons prevents us from focusing on ways to use them to Counter uncontrolled human deaths.

**Noyes, 2019 - Major, US Army Reserve** [Matthew MPP, Harvard Kennedy School 14-06-2019 “Autonomous Weapons: The Future Behind Us” https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/AD1085435.pdf Acc 12/27/20 TA]

The normative and ethical considerations related to autonomous weapons are an area that needs further research. Existing literature on the ethics of autonomous weapons tends to describe them as a potential future capability not an existing capability, which may create a status quo bias in arguing against autonomous weapons. It also appears a substantial element in some moral arguments against autonomous weapons is a reaction to a challenge in what it means to be human. There seems to be a deeply held moral intuition that humans ought to have control over killing other humans. Autonomous weapons may be a key means for providing for that control, for example by targeting systems to disrupt command and control channels. If autonomous weapons are seen not as a means to kill humans, but as a means to target adversarial military systems that undermine control over who is killed, I suspect it fundamentally alters normative perspectives. It also suggests rather than seeking to ban autonomous weapons, to seek banning electronic warfare and other systems that erode control over the use of force.

### 1NC---Turn---Hacking

#### Banning LAWs increases the risk of hacking because it undermines research that helps cyber defense against hacking

**Messinger 15** [Eric Messinger (the Assistant Managing Editor of Just Security and Research Associate at the Center on Law and Security), 1-15-2015, "Is it Possible to Ban Autonomous Weapons in Cyberwar?," Just Security, <https://www.justsecurity.org/19119/ban-autonomous-weapons-cyberwar/>]

Of course, those familiar with the debate over AWS in kinetic warfare have already heard arguments about potential upsides for efficacy. Yet the nature of the cyber battleground, and especially cyber defense, will provide strong incentives to employ autonomous offensive cyber systems. The cyber theater consists in whole or in part of computerized systems, where the speed of movement is not constrained by the physical limitations of feet and engines and rockets, and where the scope and scale of combat may proceed beyond the ability of human observers to comprehend in real-time. As Dorothy Denning argues, “[a]t the speed of cyber, placing humans in the loop at every step is neither practical nor desirable.” As a result, in direct analogy to defense systems such as anti-missile systems, [m]ost anti-malware and intrusion prevention systems have both manual and automated components. Humans determine what goes into the signature database, and they install and configure the security software. The processes of signature distribution, malicious code and packet detection, and initial response are automated, but humans may be involved in determining the final response. Effective cyber defenses, in short, will have to rely upon automatic routines. Further, to date, the technological development and practical adoption of autonomous weapons systems for defense has progressed further than that of autonomous offensive systems.

### 1NC---Turn---Military

#### Usage of LAWs avoid exposing soldiers to unnecessary harms

**Reisen 2/28** [Erich Reisen (writer for The Blog of the American Philosophical Association (APA) which shares a variety of perspectives from a broad array of APA members, to highlight the activities being undertaken by the APA, as well as provide a forum where the APA leadership and membership can communicate with one another more effectively), 2-28-2022, "The Moral Case for the Development of Autonomous Weapon Systems," Blog of the APA, <https://blog.apaonline.org/2022/02/28/the-moral-case-for-the-development-of-autonomous-weapon-systems/>] // st

In a 2010 paper, Bradley J. Strawser offers a convincing argument in favor of the use of remotely piloted but uninhabited aerial vehicles (i.e., drones) provided the war being fought is a just one. On his view, drones are just another in a long list of weapons that remove soldiers further from harm’s way. The use of spears, guns, tanks, planes, and drones are all justified, according to Strawser, by the Principle of Unnecessary Risk (PUR). PUR says (roughly) that a state and its agents should avoid exposing their soldiers to unnecessary lethal risk. Regardless of the weaponry wielded by the enemy, if the war is just, then governments, armies, and commanders ought to provide their soldiers with whatever weapon(s) will most shield them from unnecessary lethal risk while still being able to get the job done. Applying PUR to drones gives us the following conditional: “For any just action taken by a given military, if it is possible for the military to use [drones] in place of inhabited aerial vehicles without a significant loss of capability, then the military has an ethical obligation to do so” (2010, p. 346). Worrying that such a principle might be used to argue in favor of AWS, Strawser tells us that this “fails to appreciate that PUR, although a strong at first view moral principle, can be overridden by a strong enough countervailing normative reasons,” and he finds the “principled objections [to AWS] to be sufficiently strong such that they override the moral demands of PUR” (ibid., p. 350). One might further point out that drones already provide a lot of coverage when it comes to lethal risk: Can it really get any safer than bombing the enemy from a bunker in Nevada? And would the additional coverage that (perhaps) comes from taking humans further out of the loop be enough to outweigh the objections to AWS?¶ I think Strawser unfairly stacks the deck against AWS by focusing on lethal risk. Lethal risk is not the only type of risk that soldiers must deal with. Depression, anxiety, post-traumatic stress disorder, and feelings of guilt have a severe and negative impact on the well-being of our soldiers. Due to this, I suggest the following extension of PUR (EPUR): The state and its agents should avoid exposing their own soldiers to unnecessary moral, psychological, and lethal risk. If we have some technology that could reduce such risk, while remaining as effective as alternatives, we ought to use it. Moreover, if a military technology might seriously reduce the moral, psychological, and lethal risk of soldiers in the future if only we were to develop it, then we have strong reasons to spend some time and money doing so.¶ I contend that a state and its agents would avoid exposing their own troops to unnecessary moral, psychological, and lethal risk by deploying AWS, and that there is no other feasible way of achieving these decreased levels of risk. Therefore, a state and its agents are obligated to deploy technologically sophisticated AWS. A technologically sophisticated autonomous weapon is one that matches the average performance of human-in-the-loop systems (e.g., drones) when it comes to acting in accordance with the laws of war (e.g., distinctness, surrender, proportionality). In other words, if we were to create AWS that can reliably adhere to the laws of war, we would have strong moral reasons to use them. Utilizing such systems would reduce psychological risk by reducing the number of humans on the ground (or in Nevada) making life and death decisions. Fewer pilots and soldiers means less psychological harm.

### 1NC---Turn---NATO Bad for Feminism

#### NATO is inherently patriarchal – gendered violence, trafficking, and decreased social welfare programming. This makes it impossible for the aff to solve conflict by preserving excess militarization and intentionally viewing “weak” countries through a feminine lens; thus, “proper” manhood is synonymous with violence. This infiltrates every aspect of the affirmative and turns any aff claim of solvency.

* TW: non-graphic mentions of sexual violence and human trafficking

**War Resisters' International 10** [War Resisters' International (A global pacifist and antimilitarist network with over 80 affiliated groups in 40 countries. They facilitate mutual support, by linking people together through publications, events and actions, initiating nonviolent campaigns that actively involve local groups and individuals, supporting those who oppose war and who challenge its causes, and promoting and educating people about pacifism and nonviolence), 09/20/10, "Women-against-NATO," <https://wri-irg.org/en/story/2010/women-against-nato-making-feminist-case>] // st

What is our ‘feminist case’ against NATO? In many ways it’s the same case we make against militarism and war in general. That’s to say, we note the adverse ways they impact on women, and the damaging gender roles, active and passive, into which they draw both sexes. We point up the fact that gender relations, as we know and live them, are relations of power and inequality, founded in violence. They involve the social construction of masculinity as combative. Proper manhood requires a readiness to use force in defence of ‘honour’, while femininity is associated with passivity and victimhood. Women who want to escape the feminine stereotype have little choice but to imitate the masculine model. This dichotomous gender culture is one of the long-term, underlying, causes of war, because it predisposes our societies to see taking up arms as a normal and acceptable way of dealing with political conflicts. Consequently, feminist activists call for the transformation of gender relations as a necessary element of the movement to end war.¶ So how does this apply in the struggle against NATO? It’s important to stress that, for sure, all the women on our ‘Women Against NATO’ e-list are making exactly the same base-line case as all other opponents of NATO. Briefly, that NATO is a Cold War instrument that should have been closed down when the Warsaw Pact folded; that it is primarily a vehicle for the economic and military interests of the USA and to a lesser extent those of the post-colonial Western European states; and that its current strategy of enlargement and its increasingly ‘expeditionary’ mode make it a growing threat to peace on a global scale. Furthermore, NATO’s existence flouts international law and United Nations principles; it chimes with increasing militarization of the European Union; and it locks member states into the nuclear weapons and MDI systems on which the USA continues to insist.¶ However, beyond this general critique of NATO, we perceive the alliance in gendered terms. NATO is a massive military alliance of nation states. Nira Yuval-Davis and other feminist theorists have shown how the concept of ‘nation’ is gendered, how nationalism and patriarchy are interlocked, and how nations and nationalists use and exploit ‘women’. NATO is the product of Cold War thinking that saw the globe as divided into two ‘blocs’ of nation states, champions of rival ideologies. Some feminist contributions to the Strasbourg workshop talked about the ‘patriarchal logic’ of blocs, a brotherhood of nations in arms seeking out fantasy enemies long after the Cold War has ended.¶ Secondly, women have been making a feminist case against NATO’s military bases, installations and production facilities in our countries. Although, for the most part, these belong to the national armed forces of member states, they are in effect part and parcel of NATO resources in Europe. Several women wrote workshop papers about the damaging effect of military installations on the lives of women in neighbouring communities. They described women’s non-violent direct action outside the razor wire and security checkpoints, protesting against the toxic pollution, the danger of radiation, the noise and blighted areas entailed by the military use of land. Women also protest against sexual exploitation and violence against women by military personnel. In Bosnia and Kosovo, UN and NATO-led forces not only generated a massive sex industry, but individual soldiers – along with NATO contractors and UN police – were actively involved in the trafficking process, receiving trafficked women and girls at borders, smuggling them into military bases and acting as pimps. Although NATO adopted, in 2004, a Policy Against Human Trafficking, no suspected NATO traffickers have been prosecuted.[2]¶ Third, the persistence of the ‘NATO system’ after the collapse of the Soviet Union has prevented each European country cashing in ‘the peace dividend’ by reducing its armed forces and humanizing its international posture. It has required them to sustain a high degree of militarization that masculinizes and deforms everyday life. It has, what’s more, fostered the militarization of the European Union, so that an economic alliance we joined as a guarantor of cooperation and harmony is turning into yet another war-fighting machine. It has been argued that the EU is converting to this ‘hard’ image in response to the chiding of US policy-makers that Europe is a feminine, soft, civilian power. European leaders want to play ‘with the big boys’.[3] A commitment to contribute to a European force as well as to NATO calls for high military expenditures in EU member states. Feminists argue that this drains funds from the education, health and housing services badly needed by women, the sex that still carries a very high proportion of the burden of domestic life and care.¶ Finally, feminist antimilitarists make a case against NATO as a perpetrator of wars. The effects of war are dramatically gendered. There is a growing trend to civilian casualties, disproportionately women and their dependants. Women are the majority of the displaced and refugees, trying to maintain their families in impossible circumstances. Thousands are widowed, deprived of a viable existence. Sexual violence redoubles in and after war. We see all this in NATO’s war in Afghanistan.¶ Improbable as it may seem, NATO prides itself on ‘mainstreaming’ gender into its structures and activities. ‘NATO and its Partners’, they say on their website, ’are promoting the role of women within NATO-led operations and missions’ and increasing the knowledge and skills available on ‘gender and diversity’. Last year the Strategic Commands received guidelines for the integration into the NATO Command Structure of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on ‘Women, Peace and Security’. There is a NATO Office on Gender Perspectives, and gender advisers have been appointed. An implementation report is to be published in time for the Lisbon Summit.[4]¶ Given the implications for women of NATO’s campaign Afghanistan, the Alliance’s self-professed gender sensitivity can only deepen feminist cynicism about ‘gender mainstreaming’. Here is an alliance of powerful Western states exploiting the notion of ‘liberating Afghan women from oppression by the Taliban’ as one of its devious justifications for invading the country. Women’s insecurity is multiplied in the chaos and brutality of a decade of armed conflict. Then the intruders announce plans to make their escape by negotiating the re-entry to power of – the Taliban. Afghan women certainly have a feminist case against NATO. So do women in NATO member states.

#### NATO is ineffective at gender mainstreaming

Jody M **Prescott**, 10-30-20**13**, "NATO Gender Mainstreaming," Taylor & Francis, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/03071847.2013.847722

As currently constructed, however, NATO gender mainstreaming has two significant flaws that will likely prevent its effective institutionalisation for some time to come. The first of these is the apparent overtasking and underresourcing of the personnel held most responsible for incorporating a gender perspective into NATO military operations: the gender advisors. The second flaw is its current approach to the conduct of operations, characterised by an emphasis on international human rights law, which, as it applies outside contexts of armed conflict, tends to neglect the importance of factoring gender into kinetic military operations. As such, NATO should devote greater numbers of qualified personnel to gender mainstreaming and its members’ forces should adopt a holistic approach in incorporating a kinetic appreciation of gender into their doctrine and education, training and exercises, information gathering and intelligence analysis, and planning and operations in order to truly effect gender mainstreaming. Directive 40-1 and the Roles of the Gender Advisors The NATO gender-mainstreaming programme suggests a three-tiered advisory hierarchy. In static headquarters, Gender Advisors provide advice and expertise on gender matters. In field headquarters, Gender Field Advisors perform this function, while in subordinate tactical units, Gender Focal Points receive the mission as another assigned task. Whilst comprehensive in the sense that the programme sets out a staffing mechanism that would appear to provide for gender expertise at the different levels of command, the directive’s implementation is likely to be marred by certain flaws in its provisions regarding training, the terms of reference of the gender advisor as a staff officer, and the large number of specific and complex tasks gender advisors would be expected to accomplish. As to the training to be undertaken by gender advisors, Directive 40-1 identifies both mandatory and recommended courses and posits a learning programme consisting of online ‘advanced distributed learning’ courses with classroom instruction. Although it is intended that advisors participate in operational planning groups as part of their wider role, the directive only ‘recommends’ courses in this area, rather than making them mandatory. 14 However, experience suggests that not only should these operational planning courses be required so that advisors in static and field headquarters can participate in actual planning with a sufficient degree of expertise and credibility as staff officers in this function, there should also be a requirement that trainee advisors actually participate in a number of exercises, if not operations, as full-time members of operational planning groups before being certified as Gender Advisors or Gender Field Advisors. Directive 40-1 states that the roles and responsibilities of the Gender Advisor and Gender Field Advisor will be set out by a standard operating procedure, and that ordinarily they are expected to report directly to the commander, because such access would highlight to the rest of the staff the importance of the gender advisors and their multidisciplinary function. Depending on the nature of the operation, and the size of the headquarters, however, such access might be infrequent at best. To be accepted by the rest of the staff asspecial staff advisors who add value, the Gender Advisors and Gender Field Advisors will likely find themselves attending many different meetings and working group sessions over the course of a typical day – meetings in which they might have no substantive role to play but which they cannot afford to miss because they will otherwise not be seen as part of the team. Furthermore, the directive, quite properly, requires gender advisors to establish a technical chain among superior and subordinate gender advisors within the command structure.15 The directive does not, however, set out what the responsibilities and obligations of superior and subordinate gender advisors are in relation to each other. This could become problematic when contingents from different troop-contributing nations begin implementing their own versions of gender mainstreaming in accordance with their respective national action plans and guidance.

### 1NC---Turn--- Positive LAWs

#### Specifically, a fear of accidents will limit nuclear LAWs to only positive ones.

**Horowitz, 2019 – prof of Political Science at Univ of Pennsylvania** [Michael with Paul Scharre, and Alexander Velez-Green “A Stable Nuclear Future? The Impact of Autonomous Systems and Artificial Intelligence” December arXiv:1912.05291 https://arxiv.org/abs/1912.05291 Acc 12/27/20 TA]

Many of these ways that autonomous systems could increase the resiliency and accuracy of NC2 are speculative, however. Existing automation, as the Petrov incident shows, already creates the risk of automation bias. Knowledge of this will probably make most nuclear-armed states unlikely to further automate the early warning or command-and-control processes, with two exceptions: first, in situations where human-machine teaming might be further integrated to mitigate potential false alarms; second, in situations where a state fears for its secure second strike, and believes that further automation would reinforce deterrence of a potential aggressor. It is also possible, though less likely, that more automation could occur via a highly risk-tolerant nuclear-armed state that believes automated NC2 protocols would improve its ability to manage escalation.

#### When ethical robots go to war, they place themselves in harms way, rather than human soldiers. The proliferation of LAWs will dramatically decrease casualties of war.

**Del Re, 2017 – US Army Major** [Amanda “Lethal Autonomous Weapons: Take the Human Out of the Loop A paper submitted to the Faculty of the US Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the Ethics of Emerging Military Technology Graduate Certificate. 16 June 2017 https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/citations/AD1041804 Acc 12/27/20 TA]

Lethal Autonomous Weapons (LAWS) should be employed by the United States on the field of battle. LAWS will save lives because they are potentially more proficient on the battlefield than humans. There will not be as many combat-related deaths or injuries which will result in a healthier, more resilient military. It behooves the United States to employ this emerging technology because other nations already are. As a superpower, the United States bears the burden of setting the example in warfare and foreign policy. A Lethal Autonomous Weapon is a robot that is designed to select and attack military targets without direct intervention by a human operator. The idea of not having a human operator is called “human-out-of-the-loop.” Autonomous weapons also have the capability of operating with a “human-in-the-loop” (like a drone and drone operator) or a “human-on-the-loop” in which a human operator supervises the targeting process and can intervene at any time during the cycle. Currently, the US employs both human-in-the-loop and human-on-the-loop weapons in combat. Lethal autonomous Weapons are also called LAWS, LARS (lethal autonomous robots), robotic weapons, or killer robots. For these purposes, LAWS, robots, or lethal autonomous weapon will be used. This study will present a somewhat unrepresented argument, that LAWS should be developed and employed by the United States on the battlefield. There are several premises to support this conclusion. First, humans are overall inferior on the battlefield as compared to robots. Historically humans deal poorly with the traumatic effects of combat resulting in war atrocities, posttraumatic stress disorder, increased veteran suicide and homelessness; robots would not be negatively affected by combat like humans are. Additionally, human soldiers are more expensive in the long run than robots. 7 Second, the United States needs to stay on the cutting edge of technology especially in warfare. History provides examples of the United States using ethically questionable strategies in war such as unrestricted submarine warfare and strategic bombing, both in WWII, without having had the chance to fully examine the potential ramifications of those strategies prior to the heat of conflict. Moreover, other nations are already employing LAWS. The United States needs to lead the development of these weapons in terms of technological capabilities and ethical standards so that an international agreement can be achieved before they are misused by another nation.

## Solvency

### 1NC---Solvency---Alt Causes---General War

#### The aff’s attempt to ban LAW’s spectacularizes their violence whilst ignoring the way that warfare before remains entrenched in the same violence they critique.

Jones et al. 18 [Emily Jones is a Lecturer in Law at the University of Essex, and Sara Kendall, and Yoriko Otomo, (2018) Gender, War, and Technology: Peace and Armed Conflict in the Twenty-First Century. Australian Feminist Law Journal, 44 (1). pp. 1-8. ISSN 1320-0968.]/ISEE

Since the end of the last world war, the global economy has witnessed tremendous change. This was driven by developments in computing and (mechanical, genetic, electrical, chemical and materials) engineering, which we call ‘technology’ for the purposes of this issue. The resulting impact on social, behavioural and economic changes were shaped in large part by post war ideology that scalable inventions could make human life extend further, act faster, and work cheaper.4 With the evolution of proxy warfare during and after the Cold War (and resulting war-weariness among the populations of the Great Powers), the capacity for states to exercise their influence, both remotely and diffusely, has been driving the global military research agenda. The second half of the twentieth century thus saw the invention of the internet, the development of cybernetics/artificial intelligence and the creation of new materials (genetic, programmable) and laser weaponry. This century such technologies have evolved to produce the likes of drones (lethal autonomous weapons) and other military landbased autonomous and semi-autonomous robots.5 Not only has the transformation of armed conflict through such inventions impacted on targeting methods, but it has also materialised an apocalyptic vision of everyday surveillance warfare.6 This has provoked sustained global debate, both in international law and international policy fora. In a telling example from late 2017, a UC Berkeley-based computer scientist and the Campaign to Stop Killer Robots advocacy organisation used a United Nations platform to screen a dystopian futuristic film, ‘Slaughterbots’, to call greater state attention to the perils of autonomous weapons systems while lobbying for an international treaty to ban their use. 8 The event illustrates how overlapping communities – academics, humanitarian activists and state representatives – turn to legal forms as sites of potential regulation and redress for technological developments in armed conflict that are seen to threaten human well-being. It also invites critical reflection: about the relation between the human and the non-human (or indeed post-human); the broader political economies of armed conflict in which such weapons may be used; the role of legal architectures in constraining – and at times enabling – the use of force and methods of warfare; and on what other forms of suffering remain hidden from view when spectacular forms of violence determine political agendas. We think there is a pressing need for further examination of the interplay between these emerging inventions against existing international laws and the changing backdrop of contemporary armed conflict. Importantly, the role of gender in their creation, production and deployment is under-theorised: this special issue is an invitation to others to think with us. 9 The contributors to this issue undertake their analyses alongside, but not within, existing legal debates, which predominantly concern matters of procedure and classification. The articles here look outwards, at more amorphous but no less important forces on law and war: the interplay between rhetoric, images, ideology, and affect. What matters of concern appear within this constellation? 10 As the following articles illustrate, triangulating gender, war and technology as a field of inquiry produces a wide domain of analysis, with topics ranging from human enhancement technologies to autonomous weapons systems, surveillance and aerial bombardment, artificial intelligence and big data. The three terms themselves invite interpretation and debate. 11 ‘Gender’, for example, has been used in the context of international humanitarian law to signify vulnerability; women are treated as a group that may require further protection, where gender operates as a qualified identity that supplements the category of civilian.12 Yet some of the articles considered here adopt a more reflexive approach informed by feminist scholarship, considering issues of agency, difference, and intersectionality, and contesting gendered constructions that presuppose femininity, ethnicity, and passivity. Animated by concern about this and other technological inventions described earlier – and by the relative shortage of scholarly feminist perspectives on technology and conflict – this special issue emerged from out of an international workshop organised by Emily Jones in June 2016 at SOAS University of London that sought to address this gap.

### 1NC---Solvency---Definition

#### States that utilize LAWs have an incentive to disagree over definitions

**Thornton, 2019 - Senior Lecturer in the Centre for Defence Education Research and Analysis, King’s College** [Rod, “One to ponder: the UK’s ethical stance on the use of Artificial Intelligence in weapons systems https://defenceindepth.co/2019/06/17/one-to-ponder-the-uks-ethical-stance-on-the-use-of-artificial-intelligence-in-weapons-systems/ Acc 4/16/22 TA]

Given its declared position, it might seem logical for the UK to push for an international ban on the use of LAWS. Trying to level the playing field so that no other state possessed them would seemingly work to the UK’s advantage. A ban is also the favoured UN option. UN Secretary General António Guterres has, for instance, described LAWS as ‘morally repugnant’. Within the UN, however, the UK is part of a group of states (alongside Australia, Israel, Russia and US) that has collectively stated that currently they do not want to see any regulation that forbids the use of LAWS. To explain the UK’s position, an MOD spokesperson said that, ‘We believe a pre-emptive ban is premature as there is still no international agreement on the characteristics of lethal autonomous weapons systems’. We are thus back to the thorny problem of definitions. If we do not know what something is then how can it be banned? The question here, though, is why is the UK trying to prevent a ban on a weapon it has ‘no intention’ of developing itself? This does not look very ethical or, indeed, sensible. It seems to be giving licence to potential adversaries to continue with their own development of LAWS while the UK sits on its AI hands. Whatever the UK’s position, it seems that LAWS will prove impossible to ban anyway. Firstly, because the world’s major states will be seeing the benefits of LAWS there will probably (and maybe conveniently?) never be an internationally agreed definition on them, which would then allow any ban to accrue. Secondly, the technology that underpins any ‘killer robot’ will come to be developed anyway in the civilian sector – with systems designed, for instance, to deliver parcels or to tackle forest fires. Any military organisation could simply buy such systems off the shelf and convert them readily into LAWS. The genie will thus be out of the bottle on LAWS fairly soon anyway and can never be put back in. It will therefore, and unfortunately, be very hard for the UK to maintain a credible stance as a ‘pioneer in ethical AI’.

### 1NC---Solvency---Bans Fail

#### Lack of international support for bans ensures they fail

Morgan 20 [Forrest E. Morgan (A senior political scientist at the RAND Corporation and an adjunct professor at the University of Pittsburgh Graduate School of Public and International Affairs) "Military Applications of Artificial Intelligence: Ethical Concerns in an Uncertain World." Published by the Rand Corporation in 2020, https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/AD1097313.pdf]// st

A significant number of countries supports a new legally binding treaty that would ban the development and use of LAWS. The Campaign to Stop Killer Robots has circulated a list of 26 states that support a ban. However, most of the states supporting a new legal instrument are developing countries that do not possess sophisticated AI technology sectors or have military forces with extensive AI capabilities. Meanwhile, most of the major military powers perceive significant value in military AI and do not wish to create new international constraints that could slow its technological development. The United States, the United Kingdom, Russia, and other countries hold that existing international law, including LOAC, already provides significant humanitarian protections regarding the use of LAWS, and thus no new treaty instruments are necessary.¶ China, conversely, has proposed a ban on LAWS modeled on the UN protocol prohibiting the use of blinding laser weapons, but it seems to define LAWS so narrowly that a ban on this class of weapons would not apply to systems currently under development. China has also suggested that concepts such as meaningful human control should be left up to sovereign determination, rather than defined through international processes. Thus, it appears that China’s professed support for a new legal instrument would not actually constrain the development or use of military AI. ¶ In addition, some states have questioned what verification and monitoring measures would be associated with any new international ban. Given the inherent lack of transparency of many AI systems, states have expressed concern that signatories to any ban might not live up to their international commitments. As a result, many governments, including those of France, Germany, and other European states, have supported simply developing a nonbinding political declaration that would articulate the importance of human control being designed into and exercised across the acquisition, development, testing, and deployment life cycle of military AI systems. A nonbinding declaration or code of conduct of this sort would be easier to reach than a new treaty, but other states have expressed doubt that it would be useful, since it could not be enforced.¶ Given the resistance of several major military powers and the need for their acquiescence to a new treaty, the international community is not likely to agree to a ban or other regulation in the near term. However, there is a view broadly resonant among many countries, including the United States, key allies, and important stakeholders, such as the International Committee on the Red Cross, that further international discussion regarding the role of humans in conducting warfare is necessary.

#### Even if a ban is good, definitional issues and variations guarantee circumvention

Rosert and Sauer 20 [Elvira Rosert (Faculty of Business, Economics, and Social Sciences, Universität Hamburg and the Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy, Hamburg, Germany) and Frank Sauer (Researcher at Institute for Political Science, Bundeswehr University Munich, Munich, Germany), 5-30-2020, "How (not) to stop the killer robots: A comparative analysis of humanitarian disarmament campaign strategies," Taylor & Francis, <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13523260.2020.1771508>] // st

Conclusion In this article, we set out to answer how an international, legally binding regulation of LAWS can be brought about. Humanitarian advocacy campaigns wield significant influence in general; the Campaign to Stop Killer Robots does so in particular. We thus focused on its strategy in engaging the international community at the CCW in Geneva, the epicenter of the debate surrounding a possible regulation of LAWS. We found the campaign’s strategy to be less than optimal. As our comparative analysis of three humanitarian disarmament processes revealed, the campaign against LAWS is modeled after past successes, despite weapon autonomy differing from blinding lasers or landmines in several important ways. These differences limit the portability of some tried-and-tested strategy components. Actor-related components such as awareness-raising, dissemination of expertise, and coalition-building are similar in the three campaigns against LAWS, BLW and APL, and appear to be conducive to the goal of a ban on LAWS too. However, rehashing the issue- and institution-related components of the BLW and APL campaign strategies creates weak spots in the case of LAWS. The “killer robots” frame, for instance, while attempting to convey a simple and dramatic message, also renders the issue futuristic and, thus, less urgent. The prominent focus on the indiscriminateness of LAWS is an attempt to activate an argument that proved powerful against APL and CM, but might turn out to be obsolete in the case of LAWS due to technological improvements. Most importantly, LAWS are portrayed as a category of weapons, which is not accurate because weapon autonomy is an elusive function in a human-machine system. Lastly, due to the lack of critical mass and “champion state” leadership, the LAWS process is not (yet) ripe for a venue shift. Our approach confirms the necessity of the components we studied, but it cannot (nor was it designed to) specify their relative importance or identify sufficient combinations. That said, our findings do highlight an aspect that deserves further attention: the fit of the framing to the issue. This insight is less trivial than it may seem. In theoretical literature thus far, the framing’s fit has been considered almost exclusively with regard to different audiences and normative environments. The issue itself has remained neglected. Having shown how a mismatch between the framing and the issue’s key characteristics can compromise a campaign’s message, we suggest exploring the relevance of the framing/issue fit in additional cases. Our findings also suggest that modifying the substance of the argument, the expected regulatory design, and the institutional factors would increase the likelihood of the KRC’s strategy achieving its stated goal. In terms of substance, the most straightforward argument against LAWS is not a legal but an ethical one, namely, the argument that delegating life and death decisions to machines infringes upon human dignity. We therefore propose moving further away from the KRC’s initial messaging, which was heavily focused on the indiscriminateness of LAWS, their incompatibility with IHL, and the plight of civilians. Shifting toward more fundamental ethical concerns will, first, make the case against LAWS less susceptible to consequentialist counter-positions (which argue that the illegality of LAWS will be remedied by technological progress). Second, it makes it more likely that the general public will react viscerally and reject LAWS more sharply (Rosert & Sauer, 2019; Sharkey, 2019, p. 83).

#### It is impossible to ban LAWs because there is no solid definition of LAWs.

**Lewis, 2020 - Research Director of the Harvard Law School Program on International Law and Armed Conflict** [Dustin September 28, “An Enduring Impasse on Autonomous Weapons” <https://www.justsecurity.org/72610/an-enduring-impasse-on-autonomous-weapons/> Acc 12/27/20 TA]

The Current Impasse The current impasse on autonomous weapons might be traced to at least two factors. The first concerns definitions. There are widely differing conceptions of autonomous weapons and their technical characteristics (at least for purposes of the GGE). And there is also a divergence on sequencing, especially whether States must first agree on minimal definitional elements before taking more concrete steps or, alternatively, whether countries can develop a political declaration (or even a legal instrument) without first establishing agreement on what specific technologies are of concern. The second factor is a significant difference of views on what international law already permits, mandates, and prohibits in practice and corresponding positions on whether or not the law is satisfactory.

#### US officials reject a ban of LAWs

**Guardian 12/2** [Guardian (A global news organization that delivers fearless, investigative journalism - giving a voice to the powerless and holding power to account. Their independent ownership structure means we are entirely free from political and commercial influence. Which means they determine the stories we choose to cover – relentlessly and courageously.) , 12-2-2021, "US rejects calls for regulating or banning ‘killer robots’," <https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2021/dec/02/us-rejects-calls-regulating-banning-killer-robots>] // st

The US has rejected calls for a binding agreement regulating or banning the use of “killer robots”, instead proposing a “code of conduct” at the United Nations.¶ Speaking at a meeting in Geneva focused on finding common ground on the use of such so-called lethal autonomous weapons, a US official balked at the idea of regulating their use through a “legally-binding instrument”.¶ The meeting saw government experts preparing for high-level talks at a review conference on the Convention of Certain Conventional Weapons from 13 to 17 December.¶ “In our view, the best way to make progress ... would be through the development of a non-binding code of conduct,” US official Josh Dorosin told the meeting.¶ The United Nations has been hosting diplomatic talks in Geneva since 2017 aimed at reaching an agreement on how to address the use of killer robots.¶ Activists and a number of countries have called for an all-out ban on any weapons that could use lethal force without a human overseeing the process and making the final kill order.¶ In November 2018, the UN chief, António Guterres, joined the call for a ban, but so far countries do not even agree on whether there is a need to regulate the weapons.¶ During Thursday’s debate, a number of countries, including India and the United States, criticised the idea of a legally binding agreement.¶ Dorosin insisted a code of conduct “would help states promote responsible behaviour and compliance with international law”.

#### LAWs aren’t the root cause of the aff’s violence – a ban fails

**Galliott 18** [Jai Galliott (Dr Jai Galliott is a senior lecturer at UNSW Canberra, non-resident fellow at the Modern War Institute, West Point and visiting fellow at the University of Oxford, PhD on the ethics and social implication of autonomous systems@Macquerie University.) 08-31-18, "Elon Musk wants to ban 'killer robots'. Here's why it's a bad idea," No Publication, <https://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-08-31/killer-robots-weapons-banning-them-is-not-a-good-idea/10177178/>] // st

People kill people¶ While it has become a distasteful dictum in the wake of recent shootings, people kill people.¶ It is not the weapon that is the root of the evil.¶ The terrible damage inflicted on multitudes of human beings in places like Rwanda and Sudan with knives, sticks or stones shows the need for a very different approach to the international debate on autonomous weapons.¶ Lack of consensus among the 125 nations involved in the UN meetings in Geneva, including countries with significantly advanced robotics technology such as the US, Russia, China, and Israel, has created a vacuum in which a consortium of non-government actors led by the Campaign to Stop Killer Robots has encouraged ill-informed countries to subscribe to a ban on lethal autonomous weapon systems.¶ This is despite the fact that autonomous robots are a highly effective defensive weapon for countries like Australia.¶ They are always on, unafraid of getting shot, can be quickly deployed and spare soldiers' lives.¶ Covered by gun fire, they can create a formidable obstacle.¶ A ban would be impossible to enforce¶ No ban will ever obtain universal agreement in this age of uncertainty.¶ It would also be difficult to control and impossible to enforce.¶ It would bind only those nations which, were they to use autonomous weapons, would do so in an orderly and therefore naturally less destructive fashion.¶ The reluctance of Australia's key allies to ban autonomous weapons, for example, will likely never be overcome.¶ For instance, if the US were to agree to regulation, it would come with conditions — in particular the right to retain autonomous weapons on the Korean Demilitarised Zone.¶ They would also call for a strict verification regime, which is difficult to implement when it comes to inspecting ones and zeros.¶ And although modern warfare is increasingly mobile and digital, there will always be positions that will have to be held in the transition to a better world.¶ Autonomous weapons provide a powerful means for troops to rapidly protect themselves and others.¶ Just as important is that there are no major conflicts are on the horizon, and that trade dependencies remain effective at stopping international violence before it occurs.¶ Autonomous weapons might even have limited applications in peacekeeping operations.¶ Rogue regimes will always acquire them¶ Simple autonomous weapons in the form of self-guided bombs have also been used since World War I.¶ More advanced systems like the Phalanx close-in weapon system, capable of protecting naval ships from incoming enemy planes, have been used for decades without moral qualms, so why ban killer robots altogether?¶ Unlike nuclear, chemical or biological weapons, which require rare scientific and technical knowledge and rare earth minerals, as well as large-scale manufacturing and storage facilities, basic autonomous weapons are more easily developed than the public might think.¶ There is no shortage of disaffected programmers and engineers willing to serve the next prominent non-state group likely to surface in the West's game of whack-a-mole.¶ Some components are also able to be purchased off-the-shelf and open-source software code can always be deployed for nefarious purposes.¶ Regardless of any ban, rogue regimes or militant forces will always acquire and use them if they feel the need.¶ Robots can do nothing without a human¶ Meanwhile, if a ban were to go ahead, law-abiding nations would be deprived of weapons that could be force for good in some scenarios.¶ The campaign to ban autonomous weapons merely serves to detract attention from the fact that nations should be seeking to regulate human beings with killer intentions, rather than killer weapons.¶ Another more limited objective would be achievable.¶ What we need to do is understand how human beings frame the lethal decisions of robots through code and algorithms and how they are written and engineered by fallible human beings.¶ Robots themselves can do nothing without a human, contrary to the fear mongering of certain proponents of a complete moratorium.¶ Can we not investigate proactive technical solutions to ameliorate potential misuses of AI technologies?¶ Such refocusing might reveal the true positive potential autonomous weapons.¶ Imagine if we could automate the recognition of protected symbols such as the Red Cross and Red Crescent symbol and that this could be built into "killer robots" to enable the automatic protection of the persons, vehicles, ships and buildings bearing them, immediately reducing casualties and limiting unwarranted destruction.

### 1NC---Solvency---Circumvention

#### Circumvention is easy---there is no difference between highly autonomized systems and completely autonomous systems.

Anderson et al., 14 [Kenneth Anderson, Daniel Reisner, and Matthew Waxman, 2014, accessed on 6-27-2022,90 INT’L L. STUD. 386, Stockton Center for the Study of International Law, "Adapting the Law of Armed Conflict to Autonomous Weapon Systems", https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA613290.pdf]/ISEE

Before addressing some of the enforceability problems and dangers of any effort to prohibit autonomous weapons, it is important to understand the proposed formulas do not, as it may seem initially, contain a bright line that would be useful for promoting adherence. Lawyers experienced in the law of armed conflict will quickly see that each of these seemingly clear-cut definitions leaves many open questions as to what systems would be banned under any particular formulation. Even something as seemingly plain as “lethal decision making” by a machine does not address, among other things, the lawfulness of targeting a tank, ship or aircraft which is ultimately the source of the threat, but inside of which is a human combatant. Beyond definitions, the technology and basic architecture of an autonomous system and a nearly autonomous, highly automated system are basically the same—if you can build a system that is nearly autonomous, for example with human override, then you can probably reprogram it to eliminate that human role. Moreover, whether a highly automated system—say, one with a human supervisor who can override proposed firing decisions—is in practice operating autonomously depends on how it is being manned, how operators are trained and how effectively oversight is exercised. It also depends on operational context and conditions, which may limit the degree to which the human role is in any way meaningful. For these and other reasons, a fully autonomous system and a merely highly-automated system will be virtually indistinguishable to an observer without knowing a lot about how that system is used in particular operational conditions. The difference might not matter very much in practice, given the variable performance of human operators. In any case, these systems will be easily transitioned from one to the other. The blurriness of these lines means that it will be very difficult to draw and enforce prohibitions on “fully” autonomous systems or mandates for minimum levels of human decision making. Given the great practical difficulty of distinguishing between autonomous and highly automated systems, applying a legal ban on autonomous systems would be relatively easy to circumvent and very difficult to enforce. At the same time, and as alluded to above, imposing a general ban on autonomous systems could carry some highly unfavorable consequences— and possibly dangers. These could include providing a clear advantage in autonomous weapon technology to those States which generally would not join (or in reality comply with) such a ban. They could also include losing out on the numerous potential advantages of autonomous systems of improving decision making on the battlefield, including through avoiding emotion-based response; improving system accuracy, thereby probably minimizing collateral injuries; and possibly limiting human loss of life on both sides and among civilians.

#### Even in the best-case scenario the process of negotiating the AFF takes too long, and bans will have no effect.

Gerry, 16 [Rebekah Gerry is a Faculty of Law at Victoria University of Wellington,2016, accessed on 6-27-2022, Researcharchive.vuw.ac, "MAKING LAWS FOR LAWS: THE LEGALITY OF LETHAL AUTONOMOUS WEAPON SYSTEMS", <http://researcharchive.vuw.ac.nz/xmlui/bitstream/handle/10063/5079/paper.pdf?sequence=1>]

\*\*Card edited for ableist language\*\*

Those calling for a ban on LAWS argue that regulation will not be enough, as there is always the risk of abuse of the technology by groups which do not respect IHL or international human rights law. As Stuart Russell states, “you can’t logically state that well-trained soldiers from civilised nations are so bad a following [IHL] that robots could do better, and state at the same time that rogue states, dictators and terrorist groups are so good at following [IHL] that they will never use robots in a way which doesn’t respect [IHL].”175 A ban would stigmatise the weapon and severely curtail research and development into it, which regulation would not do. A ban is opposed by several theorists,176 and may be inadvisable for multiple reasons. Firstly, as discussed in Part II, the line between LAWS and other, highly automated, systems is extremely blurry. This makes a ban “relatively easy to circumvent and very difficult to enforce”,177 as it will be difficult to “demarcate permissible from impermissible weapon systems.”178 Secondly, an outright ban “trades whatever risks [LAWS] might pose in war for the real, if less visible, risk of failing to develop forms of automation that might make the use of force more precise and less harmful for civilians”.179 A ban could be short-sighted, when research and development into them is only a couple of decades old, and therefore not conclusive.180 The argument to ban LAWS made by the Losing Humanity report are said to “[make] notional and very speculative assumptions about the development, evolution and employment of future technology not yet currently available”.181 Thirdly, Reeves and Johnson argue that a pre-emptive ban is likely to ~~retard~~ the development of more discriminative technology which could be beneficial for the protection of civilians and civilian objects, drawing a historical analogy to the prohibition against aerial bombardment at the turn of the 20th Century.182 That historical prohibition ~~retarded~~ the development of more discriminative technologies for bombing, leading in part to the high levels of civilian casualties sustained in World War Two.183 Finally, treaties take a long time to draft and negotiate, with states needing time to sign and ratify an agreement. It is seen as “unrealistic to suspend all autonomous weapons testing and development until a legal and regulatory framework is created… because the technological advances require a contemporaneous dialogue on the topic”.184 Furthermore, those states who do not wish to be subject to a ban would simply not ratify the treaty. Without ratification, states are not bound by it, under the principle of pacta sunt servanda. 185 This severely limits the utility of ban given that the states most likely to be opposed to a ban are those which will develop or use LAWS in future.

#### Lack of brightline over “human control” makes enforcement null.

Sauer, 16 [Frank Sauer is a senior research fellow and lecturer at Bundeswehr University in Munich, October, 2016, accessed on 6-27-2022, Armscontrol, "Stopping ‘Killer Robots’: Why Now Is the Time to Ban Autonomous Weapons Systems | Arms Control Association", https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2016-09/features/stopping-%E2%80%98killer-robots%E2%80%99-why-now-time-ban-autonomous-weapons-systems]/ISEE

Perspectives for Arms Control The human brain needs time for complex evaluation and decision-making processes, time that it cannot be denied in the interaction between human and machine if the human role is to remain relevant, in other words, if the decision-making process is merely to be supported, not dominated, by the machine. Establishing where to draw that line is shaping up to be the key challenge in Geneva. Arriving at a decision in that regard would also mean producing the first definition of autonomous weapons systems in terms of international law. At the CCW meetings, the almost mantra-like repetition of a shared commitment to retain “meaningful human control” over the use of force by states-parties and civil society actors has become pivotal. Keeping weapons systems under meaningful human control and banning autonomous weapons systems are two sides of the same coin. The concept of meaningful human control introduced at the end of 2013 by Article 36, a member of the Campaign to Stop Killer Robots, has since been taken up by governments. It goes beyond the “appropriate levels of human judgment” approach specified by the 2012 Pentagon directive. Thus, the argument that human control over life-and-death decisions must always be in place in a significant or meaningful fashion, as more than just a mindless pushing of a button by a human in response to a machine-processed stream of information. According to current practice, a human weapons operator must have sufficient information about the target and sufficient control over the weapon and must be able to assess its effects in order to be able to make decisions in accordance with international law. At the same time, modern weapons systems are already highly computerized and automated, a trend that is only accelerating. So, determining how much human judgment can be replaced by algorithms before human control is no longer “meaningful” involves various technical, legal, ethical, and political considerations.

#### Lack of clarity over definitions of LAWs mean that there is no enforcement mechanism for the aff.

CFDS, 21 [Center for Digital Security is a research center under the Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, University of Gadjah Mada, 7-16-2021, accessed on 6-21-2022, Cfds.fisipol.ugm.ac, "A Posthuman Argument to a Human Problem: Discourse on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems : Center for Digital Society", [https://cfds.fisipol.ugm.ac.id/2021/07/16/a-posthuman-argument-to-a-human-problem-discourse-on-lethal-autonomous-weapons-systems/]/ISEE](https://cfds.fisipol.ugm.ac.id/2021/07/16/a-posthuman-argument-to-a-human-problem-discourse-on-lethal-autonomous-weapons-systems/%5d/ISEE)

One product of the development[ii], following Polimpung’s formula, is the incorporation and development of artificial intelligence (AI)—and other disruptive technologies—in the military. The intended result is the hard to define Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (LAWS). Perhaps it is easier to get out of the way of what LAWS is not—yet. They are not Terminators, Decepticons, Ultron, or HAL 9000. They are weapons that can, with the help of AI, identify and engage targets without intervention by a human operator. LAWS can take shape in a drone, a sentry gun, a missile system, etc. The difficulty in defining these types of weapons stem from the degree of separation of humans from the interaction, are they only highly automated, or are they actually autonomous?

### 1NC---Solvency---Human Control

#### No solvency - human control is vague which prevents it from establishing a norm.

**Bode, 2021 - Professor of International Relations at the University of Southern Denmark** [Ingvild June 25, AutoNorms “Reflecting on the Future Norms of Warfare” https://www.autonorms.eu/reflecting-on-the-future-norms-of-warfare-2/ Acc. 5/27/22 TA]

We may therefore continue to have two parallel processes shaping the norms of war and conflict that do not necessarily overlap. Further, even if states agree on setting a legal norm defining a necessary quality of human control, that legal norm is likely going to be ambiguous in character, providing states with a significant amount of leeway. States may therefore continue to engage in use of force practices with AWS in much the same way as before the legal norm was in place. Norms that have emerged as part of practices of designing and using AWS therefore run the risk of undercutting deliberative legal efforts. To counter these dynamics, it is vital that such silent norm-making processes are closely examined closely and publicly expressed. Autonomous weapon systems and an emerging norm of human control The debate about autonomous weapons systems poses fundamental questions to the extent to which the use of force in conflict and warfare, as well as the very application of international law, remains in human hands. At first glance, practically all states parties addressing the Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on emerging technologies in the area of LAWS highlight the importance of maintaining human control over the use of (lethal) force. The most substantial outcome of the GGE yet, the Guiding Principles on LAWS, includes a principle on human-machine interaction. We can therefore observe the potential making of a new legal norm, if states proceed towards a negotiation stage. This option has arguably gathered steam after the ICRC’s clear positioning in favour of new international law around LAWS in May 2021. But any consensus on what quality of human control is appropriate is yet to emerge. Many states favour a long-term view on human control as something that should be present throughout the entire life cycle of a weapon system from design to operation. Further, the US and Australia have argued that autonomous features can enhance human control in specific use of force situations by “effectuating the intent of commanders”. This perspective treats AI as a straightforward extension of human agency. Such thinking downplays the complexity of human-machine interaction and how this challenges the decision-making capacity of humans operating (or working in teams) with AI-driven weapon systems. Indeed, we must consider the extent to which the technology itself, having been designed and conceptualised in a certain way, can itself become a change agent for shaping (new) legal norms.

### 2NC---Solvency---Human Control

#### No solvency – it is easy to circumvent the human control norm – weapons can shift easily from autonomous to non-autonomous.

**Kania 2018 - fellow with the Technology and National Security Program at the Center for a New American Security** [Elsa B. “China’s Strategic Ambiguity and Shifting Approach to Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems” April 17, 2018 <https://www.lawfareblog.com/chinas-strategic-ambiguity-and-shifting-approach-lethal-autonomous-weapons-systems> Acc 12/27/20 TA]

China argues that lethal autonomous weapons are characterized by: lethality; autonomy, “which means absence of human intervention and control during the entire process of executing a task” “impossibility for termination” such that “once started there is no way to terminate the device”; “indiscriminate effect,” in that it will “execute the task of killing and maiming regardless of conditions, scenarios and targets”; and “evolution,” “through interaction with the environment the device can learn autonomously, expand its functions and capabilities in a way exceeding human expectations” (emphasis added throughout). Banning weapons systems with those characteristics could be a symbol, while implicitly legitimizing the development of semi-autonomous or even fully autonomous systems that do not possess such qualities. By such a standard, a weapons system that operates with a high degree of autonomy but involves even limited human involvement, with the capability for distinction between legitimate and illegitimate targets, would not technically be a LAWS, nor would a system with a failsafe to allow for shutdown in case of malfunction. Interestingly, this particular definition is much more stringent than the Chinese military’s own definition of the concept of “artificial intelligence weapon.” According to the dictionary of People’s Liberation Army Military Terminology, an artificially intelligent weapon is “a weapon that utilizes AI to automatically [] pursue, distinguish, and destroy enemy targets; often composed of information collection and management systems, knowledge base systems, assistance to decision systems, mission implementation systems, etc.,” such as military robotics. Because this definition dates back to 2011, the Chinese military’s thinking has evolved as technology has advanced. It is important, therefore, to consider that there may be daylight between China’s diplomatic efforts on autonomous weapons and the military’s approach.

#### No solvency – it is impossible to verify human control

**Horowitz, 2019 - Professor of Political Science, University of Pennsylvania** [Michael C. May 2“When Speed Kills: Autonomous Weapon Systems, Deterrence, and Stability” <https://ssrn.com/abstract=3348356> Acc 12/27/20 TA]

Jervis argues that arms races occur due to a security dilemma when states have the ability to measure each other’s capabilities, but not their intentions.57 LAWS could be especially risky in this regard because of potential opacity about capabilities, in addition to the “normal” opacity that exists about intentions. First, it will be extremely difficult for states to credibly demonstrate autonomous weapon capabilities. The difference between a remotely-piloted system and an autonomous system is software, not hardware, meaning verification that a given country is operating an autonomous system at all would be difficult. Second, uncertainty about the technological trajectory of machine learning and specific military applications means that countries might have significant uncertainty about other countries’ capabilities. Thus, countries might invest a lot in artificial intelligence applications to military systems due to fear of what others are developing.

### 1NC---Solvency---Human Dignity

#### No solvency – ALL weapons violate human dignity – not just autonomous weapons

**Pop, 2018 – diplomat for the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs** [Ariadna April 10 “Autonomous weapon systems: A threat to human dignity?” <https://blogs.icrc.org/law-and-policy/2018/04/10/autonomous-weapon-systems-a-threat-to-human-dignity/> Acc 12/27/20 TA]

Human dignity in anti-AWS arguments As we have seen above, anti-AWS arguments frequently employ Kantian terminology when invoking the concept of human dignity. Unfortunately, however, in none of these arguments do we get an account of how exactly human dignity is violated by the employment of AWS. This is not satisfactory. Unless it can be shown why the concept of human dignity mandates the prohibition of AWS, such a prohibition is not justified. Let us therefore assume that human dignity stands for unconditional, intrinsic value. Let us assume further that this intrinsic value has its source in our autonomy, understood as our ability to make self-determined choices. What can plausibly follow from such an understanding regarding the use of AWS? To be sure, if we are hurt or killed against our will, it severely impacts our ability to make our own choices. Hence, to allow AWS to deliver force is certainly incompatible with the moral value of autonomy. But how are AWS different in this regard from regular weapons? After all, any type of weapon or method of warfare, be it a remote-controlled long-distance missile, a drone, an air strike or conventional ballistic weapon, is designed to seriously harm human beings. What is it about AWS that renders them particularly reprehensible from the point of view of human dignity? I fail to see what the relevant argument could look like and have also not found any satisfactory explanation in the literature. Note that I am not saying that there are no morally questionable aspects in the employment AWS, there certainly are. My point is simply that if the morally significant dimension is taken to be human dignity, and if human dignity is understood as a value that has its source in our capacity for self-determination, then the relevant incompatibility is not restricted to a specific weapon system, but is shared by any type of force that harms our agency.

### 1NC---Solvency---ILAW Fails

#### International law will always be gendered---the 1AC just enables justifications for more violence.

Jones et al. 18 [Emily Jones is a Lecturer in Law at the University of Essex, and Sara Kendall, and Yoriko Otomo, (2018) Gender, War, and Technology: Peace and Armed Conflict in the Twenty-First Century. Australian Feminist Law Journal, 44 (1). pp. 1-8. ISSN 1320-0968.]/ISEE

Finally, the invested role of law appears throughout this terrain. As a field that deals in classification and categorisation, it holds out the promise of permitting and prohibiting certain behaviours, drawing the line between the licit and the illicit across battlefields and populations. It promises to do this through international treaties banning certain methods and weapons of warfare, for example, and by crystallising the norms of acceptable conduct. Yet there are challenges to this ambition on multiple fronts: the field of international law not only notoriously suffers from problems with compliance, but also from the more fundamental issue that it enables violence whilst seeking to constrain it.15 Critical scholars of international law experiencing a nostalgic desire for faith in legal forms might think of the opposition to the 2003 Iraq invasion that was based upon its illegality, when ‘all it would have taken to make the war legal was Security Council authorization’. 16 Our research agenda concerning gender, war and technology, regards law’s role from a standpoint of critical distance: as a vehicle for projecting strong state power and facilitating ‘proportionate’ violence grounded in ‘military necessity’, as well as a possible means of constraining warfare and providing redress. Kazan, for example, suggests that war torts be created in international law to provide some accountability in the case of the use of autonomous weapons systems, at the same time arguing for a radical change to the way in which law thinks about evidence. 17 Arvidsson suggests that the binary-gendered notion of the ‘human’ in IHL (combatant/man, civilian/woman), as well as the privileging of the ‘human’ and human agency in IHL more generally, requires us to rethink the boundaries of accountability where violence is enacted in the course of armed conflict. In the praxis section Clare Brown offers a practitioner’s account the use of ICTs in conflict and peacebuilding situations, including messaging and data collection technologies, in her article ‘The Use of CTs in Conflict and Peacebuilding: A Feminist Analysis’. Brown argues that in spite of the proliferation of new technological forms that are designed to respond to and document armed conflict, many of these ICTs have failed to incorporate the lived experiences of women, let alone feminist perspectives. Even if they were to incorporate feminist perspectives, however, tensions remain between the desire to use technology for change, as in feminist posthumanism and xenofeminism, and the recognition of its embeddedness within both militarism and capitalism.

# \*\*Counterplans\*\*

## Abolish NATO CP

### 1NC---CP---Abolish NATO

#### Text: The North Atlantic Treaty Organization should disband.

#### Solves comparatively better— it allows nations to pursue a *non-violent* path to peace and justice AND turns case.

Ray Acheson 21 is the Director of Reaching Critical Will, the disarmament programme of the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF). They also represent WILPF on the steering group of the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons, the Campaign to Stop Killer Robots, and the International Network on Explosive Weapons. They are author of a forthcoming book about the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, Banning the Bomb, Smashing the Patriarchy., “The patriarchal militarism of NATO’s reflection group ”, Peace research perspectives on NATO 2030 A response to the official NATO Reflection Group Pages 17-25, 2-16-2021 <https://www.no-to-nato.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/peace_research_perspectives_on_nato_2030-1.pdf#page=19>)/maze

The **NATO** reflection group report has a **patriarchy problem**. Given that NATO is primarily a military alliance, this is not surprising. But for a report that is looking ahead for the next decade, it offers retrogressive views not just on human security and the so-called Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) agenda, but also in terms of how it addresses concepts such as “cohesion” what it considers to be the biggest threats to NATO, and how it thinks the alliance should best deal with those challenges. Overall, the report embraces patriarchal approaches to “security”, dissention within NATO and where the alliance should go from here. The recommendations **further entrench NATO members in** a militarist **pursuit of dominance,** rather than true community and cooperation either internally or internationally. NATO members should reject this approach. The **abolition of NATO** would be the most straightforward way to **allow its individual members to pursue** genuine **collective security with others.** In the interim, NATO members that authentically care about peace, justice, international law, human rights and dignity, and cooperation need to renounce the violent masculinities1 espoused in this report, including by rejecting nuclear weapons and working to remove all weapons of mass destruction from NATO’s doctrine. They could also withdraw from NATO and adopt feminist foreign policies, finding common ground with other members of the world community for the **nonviolent pursuit of peace and justice**. NATO, WPS and human security A one-page section in the 67-page report deals with “Human Security and Women, Peace and Security” (WPS). These subjects come across as an afterthought of the report’s authors, who were perhaps seeking to check the ‘gender box’ that is increasingly a staple of checklists within many intergovernmental agencies. This suspicion deepens when reading the text, in which NATO both simultaneously **positions itself as a progressive leader in** respecting “human dignity” while making it clear that any efforts within these agenda items are **exclusively for public point-scoring,** not for serious policy development. The report urges NATO members to promote the alliance’s “work” on human security by including it in public messaging, especially to the “younger generation”. It suggests NATO should “leverage existing partnerships with civil society organisations” in order to “build a group of emissaries for its work in human security and in WPS, including female role models from countries where NATO has made a positive contribution”. It goes on to assert, “The personal stories, experiences, and engagement of such a group would provide NATO with a strong asset in ongoing efforts to raise awareness of the Alliance’s constructive role in promoting stability and addressing drivers of conflict” (p.43). Note that it doesn’t suggest NATO actually address drivers of conflict—just that it should spend more time telling people that it does. However, **NATO does not address root causes of conflict**. NATO members themselves drive many of the ongoing conflicts in the world. Their **individual and collective policies of militarism**, and the violent masculinities these policies reflect and further entrench, are part of the root causes of conflict. Rather than working within the human security and WPS agendas in order to prevent conflict, or seek nonviolent, non-militarised solutions to conflict, NATO reflexively turns again and again to weapons, war, aggression, and threats in order to promote and protect its interests. The challenges posed by institutionalising WPS The WPS agenda has, to a large extent, become about strategically instrumentalising women’s participation in order to legitimise existing practice. Academics Marie Bell and Milli Lake have well-articulated this problem, noting that “Adding certain excluded groups into existing institutions will ultimately reinforce the same patriarchal, capitalist, and militarist logics of hierarchy and exclusion that denied those groups access to power in the first place”.2 While women’s participation—and gender diverse people—is imperative and should be automatic, the way that the WPS agenda has been implemented over the past twenty years unfortunately has reinforced rather than challenged or changed the underpinnings of militarism throughout security discourse and practice. Rather than challenging the patriarchal structures and systems that have created the militarised world order, once inside these systems, most women tend to actively maintain it in order to maintain their positions. Nor do many of these women believe they should have to “carry the burden” of changing policies or structures. In a study from New America about women’s participation in the US nuclear weapon complex, for example, several women interviewed felt they were dismissed by male colleagues on the assumption that they would favour weapon cuts or disarmament. They had to prove, as former NATO Deputy Secretary General Rose Gottemoeller said she sought to do, that “women aren’t afraid of nuclear weapons”.3 As feminist scholar Cynthia Enloe says, “You can militarise anything, including equality”.4 You can also apparently whitewash anything, including NATO’s role as an aggressor in international politics. In its section on human security and WPS, the reflection group’s report asserts that “emphasising the value of human dignity and security differentiates NATO from authoritarian rivals and terrorist groups, which are among the world’s human rights abusers” (p.43). Yet NATO members have led and been involved in bombing raids that have killed civilians and destroyed cities and towns leaving civilians without housing, hospitals, food, schools, or basic water and sanitation.5 NATO members are also, for the most part, hostile towards or lacklustre about the current international political process to end the use of explosive weapons in populated areas, which is essential for protecting civilians and achieving human security.6

### 2NC---CP---Abolish NATO---NATO Bad

#### NATO is violent and functions as a “teaching machine” for hegemonic masculinity – that outweighs

Katharine AM Wright 22, Senior Lecturer in International Politics. Research and teach NATO, gender and security, “Challenging civil society perceptions of NATO: Engaging the Women, Peace and Security agenda”, Sage Publishing Library, 4-18-2022,  [https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/00108367221084561)/maze](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/00108367221084561)/maze)

\*WPS\*=women peace and security agenda\*

Specifically, this article takes a critical feminist approach to conceptualise NATO as an ‘institution of international hegemonic masculinity’ through the way the alliance invokes the masculinist protection logic in its engagement with WPS and acts as a ‘**teaching machine’** shaping the value placed on WPS by NATO members and a growing number of partners (Wright et al., 2019). In this article, I develop this framework through situating civil society within it and, in so doing, contribute something new to understanding how NATO functions through its move to active engagement on the international stage with the WPS agenda. In addition, this framework enables interrogation of how the WPS agenda can become militarised despite civil society engagement. In order to do so, I focus on how civil society engaged in WPS work perceive NATO and, specifically, NATO’s intentions. I seek to understand whether and how NATO’s attempts to engage civil society through the creation of CSAP in 2014 have influenced civil society perceptions of the alliance and in turn whether such engagements have the potential to support transformative understandings of WPS at NATO. My analysis proceeds as follows. First, I introduce my method and approach drawing on an understanding of NATO as an institution of international hegemonic masculinity. Next, I engage with the concept of civil society and the relationship with the WPS agenda, before moving on to interrogate why NATO has until recently remained an outlier in global governance with its lack of formal policy engagement with civil society. The article then moves to introduce the WPS architecture at NATO and specifically the role of the Secretary General’s Special Representative (SGSR) on WPS in relationship building with civil society on WPS. Next, the article turns to examine the motivations for civil society engagement with NATO, before moving to interrogate the value civil society perceive NATO gains from CSAP. Finally, I examine how encounters with **NATO’s bureaucracy and security apparatus shape civil society perceptions of NATO.** NATO as an **institution of international hegemonic masculinity**: method and approach NATO is a political-military alliance built on consensus decision-making. Moving beyond its Cold War origins, the alliance’s remit has expanded significantly beyond a sole focus on collective defence to include crisis management and cooperative security. This has seen NATO’s focus enlarge from a regional one to a global one, with recent engagements in Afghanistan, Libya and Kosovo, for example. Its status as a multilateral institution means it is limited by its members’ priorities and therefore sensitive not to implicate NATO or NATO member states in wrongdoing (Hebert, 2012). In centring NATO as an ‘institution of international hegemonic masculinity’ (Wright et al., 2019), in this analysis, it is possible to shed light on the peculiarities of NATO’s WPS work to date, against which engagement with civil society takes place. This has two co-constituting elements, first, internally, existing gender norms and expectations of masculinity and femininity reflective of a hierarchical military institution are (re)created and (re)enforced through NATO’s engagement with WPS (Wright et al., 2019: 71). For example, men working on WPS at NATO navigate both the **trivialisation and the feminisation of such work a**nd must (re)negotiate their own identities. Yet in so doing they reinforce the importance of men speaking to and listening to other men (rather than women) **reinforcing** the **gendered status quo** (Wright et al., 2019: 93; see also Hurley, 2018a). Second, externally, as a transnational military alliance, NATO acts as a ‘teaching machine’ in which member and partner states learn the value of WPS as a ‘military tool’ through socialisation with each other (Wright et al., 2019; see also Enloe, 1981). This means perpetuating an understanding of WPS as a means to support operational effectiveness through ‘the **role of masculinist protector** which reinforces hegemonic militaristic, masculine ideals and norms’ (Wright et al., 2019: 34). This patriarchal logic puts ‘women and children, in a subordinate position of dependence and obedience’ to justify the waging of war (Young, 2003: 2), for example, NATO’s intervention in Afghanistan (Wright, 2019). It is reinforced through the stories NATO tells internally about its WPS engagement (Hurley, 2018b) and externally in public diplomacy (Wright, 2019) and to support partnerships with other states but also celebrities (Wright and Bergman Rosamond, 2021) and now civil society. Thus, interrogating civil society perceptions of NATO in this context adds an additional dimension to understanding how NATO seeks to legitimise itself as a WPS actor, further constituting its role as an institution of international hegemonic masculinity. It is worth noting here that CSAP was revised in late 2019 following an independent review commissioned by NATO, neither this review, the new Terms of Reference nor full membership have been made public. This reflects some of the challenges to researching NATO, an institution **cloaked in secrecy** by merit of its purpose as a security and defence alliance (see Wright and Hurley, 2017 for a wider discussion). Therefore, the focus of this article is on CSAP as it existed prior to this revision, from the first consultation with civil society on WPS policy in 2014 and the formal establishment of CSAP in 2016 until its 2019 revision which led to a change in membership. This lack of transparency has also necessitated the method. In order to assess civil society perceptions of NATO as a WPS actor, I use a number of sources. First, I conducted 23 semi-structured interviews of varying length with civil society actors working on WPS, including current or former CSAP members. Participants were identified via their membership of CSAP, as prominent civil society actors working on WPS (in line with NATO’s definition) and via snowballing. The interviews took place either remotely or in person in locations across the globe between September 2018 and March 2020. All of the interviews were conducted on the condition of anonymity to enable participants to speak as freely as possible. For this reason, no distinction is made between current and former CSAP members. In addition, the locations of specific interviews have not been revealed (Appendix 1), and this is because the relatively small pool of members means doing so would potentially expose the participants’ identities. Second, I conducted a review of civil society and NATO websites, including features on NATO or CSAP specifically, along with NATO policy documents where available and related content to inform my analysis. I used this information to generate interview questions and also to corroborate interview data where possible.

#### Abolishing NATO is key to *broader demilitarization*

Ray Acheson 21 is the Director of Reaching Critical Will, the disarmament programme of the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF). They also represent WILPF on the steering group of the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons, the Campaign to Stop Killer Robots, and the International Network on Explosive Weapons. They are author of a forthcoming book about the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, Banning the Bomb, Smashing the Patriarchy., “The patriarchal militarism of NATO’s reflection group ”, Peace research perspectives on NATO 2030 A response to the official NATO Reflection Group Pages 17-25, 2-16-2021 <https://www.no-to-nato.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/peace_research_perspectives_on_nato_2030-1.pdf#page=19>)/maze

**Abolish military alliances**, build peace alliances There are ways to achieve collective security that do not necessitate “military prowess” and rely on the threat of massive nuclear violence. This involves building and maintaining real community, which requires reciprocity, trust, and understanding. It requires us to live in relationship with others, not simply to demand that everyone else obey our commands or conform to our way of thinking. Governments that say they believe in the rule of law, in cooperation and dialogue— which is most NATO members—need to embrace plurality rather than unanimity. The reflection group asserts that without “cohesion”, NATO’s members will face all challenges alone. But this is not how the rest of the world operates; it’s not how activists operate. The demand for unanimity is a patriarchal, authoritarian approach to an alliance— and it will ultimately fail. **NATO should be abolished as an institution**. It has been corrupted by the military pursuits of its most aggressive members; its framework of operation, as is made clear in this report, is one of violence, fear, and patriarchy. But the members of NATO could seek to establish a **truly democratic, decolonised denuclearised, and demilitarised global alliance** for collective security if they so wished. They could do by withdrawing from NATO and establishing feminist policies and partnerships with countries **committed to nonviolence, equality, and global justice**. They may find that in such a pursuit, they have more allies around the world—and less threats—than they currently see themselves facing.

#### NATO is conducive with failed interventions and one sided analysis which results in permanent instability

Nicolas Js Davies & Medea Benjamin 21, Nicolas Js Davies is the author of Blood On Our Hands: the American Invasion and Destruction of Iraq. He is a researcher for CODEPINK: Women for Peace, and a freelance writer.;Medea Benjamin is co-director of the peace group CODEPINK. Her latest book is Inside Iran: The Real History and Politics of the Islamic Republic., “Why NATO Needs to Go”, The Progressive, 2-24-2021, https://progressive.org/latest/why-nato-needs-to-go-benjamin-davies-210224/)/maze

[Illegal invasions](http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/3661640.stm) of Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq;

The [**broken agreement**](https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/russia-programs/2017-12-12/nato-expansion-what-gorbachev-heard-western-leaders-early)**over NATO expansion** into Eastern Europe;

[**U.S. withdrawals**](https://www.latimes.com/opinion/story/2020-06-11/trump-trashing-arms-control-treaties)**from** important arms control **treaties;**

[More than 300,000](https://www.strategic-culture.org/news/2018/12/27/bring-troops-home-but-also-stop-bombing/) bombs and missiles **dropped on other countries by the United States** and its allies since 2001;

U.S. **proxy wars** [in Libya](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/oct/26/qatar-troops-libya-rebels-support) and [Syria](https://www.theamericanconservative.com/articles/how-america-armed-terrorists-in-syria/), which plunged both countries into chaos, revived Al Qaeda and spawned the Islamic State;

[U.S. management](https://www.commondreams.org/views/2021/01/14/will-senate-confirm-coup-plotter-victoria-nuland) of the 2014 coup in Ukraine, which led to [economic collapse](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Economy_of_Ukraine), Russian annexation of Crimea, and civil war in Eastern Ukraine; and

The stark reality of the United States’ record as a serial aggressor whose offensive [war machine](https://www.sipri.org/media/press-release/2020/global-military-expenditure-sees-largest-annual-increase-decade-says-sipri-reaching-1917-billion) dwarfs Russia’s defense spending by eleven to one and China’s by 2.8 to one, even without counting other NATO countries’ military spending.

NATO’s failure to seriously examine its own role in what it euphemistically calls “uncertain times” should therefore be more alarming to Americans and Europeans than its one-sided criticisms of Russia and China, whose contributions to the uncertainty of our times pale by comparison.

The short-sighted preservation and expansion of NATO for a whole generation after the dissolution of the U.S.S.R and the end of the Cold War has tragically set the stage for the **renewal of those hostilities** —or maybe even made their revival inevitable.

NATO’s [Reflection Group](https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2020/12/pdf/201201-Reflection-Group-Final-Report-Uni.pdf) justifies and promotes the United States’ and NATO’s renewed Cold War by filling its report with dangerously **one-sided threat analysis**. A more honest and balanced review of the dangers facing the world and NATO’s role in them would lead to a much simpler plan for NATO’s future: that it should be dissolved and dismantled as quickly as possible.

#### NATO military funding is the *roadblock* to meaningful *social and political goals*

Angelo Cardona 21, is a Colombian social entrepreneur, peace and human rights activist. He is representative of Latin America to the International Peace Bureau, “Why should new generations advocate for the abolition of NATO?”, Pressenza New York, 5-16-2021, <https://www.pressenza.com/2021/05/why-should-new-generations-advocate-for-the-abolition-of-nato/>)/maze

The global defense budget exceeded 1.9 trillion dollars in 2019, of which NATO represents 54% of that military expenditure according to the latest report on military spending published by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). Despite the fact that many Alliance member states have not been able to invest at least 2% of their GDP in defense as agreed at the 2014 NATO Summit in Wales, yet NATO’s total military spending represents more than **half of the global defense budget.** Reallocating this military spending could help **us tackle some of the most challenging issues** of this century; such as global **warming,** the health crisis that we are experiencing due to the coronavirus, the **eradication of poverty**, universal access to higher education or fundamentally achieving the Sustainable **Development Goals (SDG).**

The false narrative of security that NATO promotes through its consulting program for politicians and the military is precisely what prevents us from living in a peaceful world. More weapons can only mean more **tension, more war, and more death**. Why are weapons manufactured, sold, and acquired if they are not going to be used? the conflict must exist somewhere so that the arms industry does not go bankrupt.

### 2NC---CP---Abolish NATO---AT: Progress

#### 1.The AFF only defeats one head of the collective hydra of NATO violence- Re militaristic endeavors and other ways to inflict violence on the globe- that are not intrinsic to LAWS – that’s 1NC Acheson

#### 2.Intent of policy is irrelevant when dealing with NATO

Katharine AM Wright 22, Senior Lecturer in International Politics. Research and teach NATO, gender and security, “Challenging civil society perceptions of NATO: Engaging the Women, Peace and Security agenda”, Sage Publishing Library, 4-18-2022, <https://journals.sagjepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/00108367221084561)/maze>

The article finds that’s NATO’s self-legitimisation narrative (see Von Billerbeck, 2019), resting on the assumption that if the intent is right, the outcome is less relevant, can be projected back to the alliance through civil society. Notably, while the ‘good intentions’ of the SGSR were repeatedly noted by interviewees in establishing CSAP, where these intentions were not perceived as good, civil society became less engaged. This is significant for understanding how NATO functions as an **institution of international hegemonic masculinity** given the centrality of both **internal and external storytelling** to reproducing a particular understanding of WPS **within a militarist framework**. This underscores the limits to the transformative potential of civil society engagement with NATO but also other military institutions.

## Baryaktar TB2 Pic

### 1NC---CP---Bayraktar TB2 PIC

#### Text: The United States federal government should \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_[PLAN] with the exception of Bayraktar TB2 drones.

#### Bayraktar TB2 key to combat Russian invasion.

Jankowicz, 22 [Mia Jankowicz is a news reporter at Insider's London office, 6-28-2022, accessed on 6-28-2022, Insider, "Bayraktar firm refuses $20M, says it will donate drones to Ukraine", https://www.businessinsider.com/bayraktar-firm-refuses-20m-says-will-donate-drones-to-ukraine-2022-6]/ISEE

The Turkish defense manufacturer Baykar said it turned down $20 million in crowdfunded cash to buy its drones for Ukraine and would donate three military drones to the country instead. Baykar wrote in a Monday statement that it had learned about a campaign to raise funds to buy its Bayraktar TB2 drones, adding, "Baykar will not accept payment for the TB2s, and will send 3 UAVs free of charge to the Ukrainian war front." UAVs — unmanned aerial vehicles — are more commonly known as drones. "We ask that the funds instead be remitted to the struggling people of Ukraine," Baykar said. The money was raised through a campaign led by the Ukrainian TV personality Serhiy Prytula, the Ukrainian news agency Ukrinform reported. Prytula celebrated reaching the target figure in a June 24 tweet, saying it took under three days. The original plan appears to have been to obtain four of the drones. Baykar manufactures four types of drones, and it's unclear which model it intends to send to Ukraine. Its famed Bayraktar TB2 drones — known popularly as "Bayraktars" — have almost mythical status in Ukraine. The ongoing war against Russia is the first major conflict in which the Bayraktar drones have been deployed. A collage of four screenshots from what Ukrainian forces say is the viewfinder of Bayraktar TB2 drones targeting Russian-controlled assets Ukrainian forces say their Bayraktar drones scored against multiple Russian targets, presenting these videos as evidence. Commander-in-chief of Ukraine Armed Forces/Facebook/Insider Their ability to precisely target slow-moving Russian tank columns was a boost in Ukraine's early-stage defense, and they even inspired a viral folk song. Baykar's Monday statement, referring to Ukrainians, said it was "touched by their solidarity and resolve in the face of seemingly insurmountable challenges." It added, "Baykar prays for a just resolution and lasting peace." Euractiv reported that Selçuk Bayraktar, one of Baykar's codirectors, is related to Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan through marriage to his daughter. Russia has previously objected to Baykar's sale of the drones to Ukraine, but Turkish officials said Baykar is a private company and that these are not state-to-state deals, Reuters reported. Turkey hosted peace talks between Russia and Ukraine in late March, where Mikhail Podolyak, an advisor to President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, posed with another Baykar codirector, Selçuk Bayraktar's brother Haluk Bayraktar. Turkey has ruled out imposing sanctions on Russia, creating favorable conditions for fleeing oligarchs and their superyachts, several of which have been spotted in Turkish waters.

#### Anything to stop Russia should be done. It is an active genocide.

UN, 22 [United Nations, 6-21-2022, accessed on 6-28-2022, Un, "Warning Incitement of Racial, Religious Hatred Can Trigger Atrocity Crimes, Special Adviser Stresses States’ Legal Obligation to Prevent Genocide | Meetings Coverage and Press Releases", https://www.un.org/press/en/2022/sc14939.doc.htm]/ISEE

Russian Federation’s Disinformation Campaign Aimed to Justify Invasion of Ukraine, Several Speakers Stress Advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence is prohibited by law, Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide Alice Nderitu told the Security Council today, stressing that these acts represent potential triggers for the commission of atrocity crimes. “The prevention of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes is a legal obligation for States under international law,” she stressed. The 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide — which emerged from the shadows of the Holocaust — identifies as punishable offenses conspiracy to commit, direct and attempt to commit genocide. In a wide-ranging debate on “incitement to violence leading to atrocity crimes”, organized by Albania, as Council President for June, Ms. Nderitu said that even before the start of the conflict in Ukraine, her office was working with the United Nations country team to support intercommunal dialogue. She said that, because determination of the commission of genocide can only be made by a court of competent jurisdiction, she could only but reiterate the call to end the war, ensure protection of civilians and accelerate diplomatic efforts to make both possible. The Council must do its part by proposing a road map that considers that “peace itself is a process that is not indifferent to injustice”. Liubov Tsybulska, Head of the Centre for Strategic Communication and Information Security, underscored that “Russia wants to destroy Ukraine”, both literally — by killing and raping — and in a broader sense, eliminating its culture, language and history. She recounted Ukraine’s struggle for survival against the Russian Federation’s attempts at conquest — detailing mass famines; the murder and torture of Ukrainian writers, artists and architects in the 1930s; and the mass deportation of Ukrainian dissidents in the 1960s. “This is exactly what is happening now,” she stressed. While such crimes are “the modus operandi of the Kremlin”, the current war is extraordinary, with the Russian army demonstrating “barbarity that is difficult to imagine in the twenty-first century”. She urged the Council to understand that the threat exists not only for Ukrainians but for the entire world. Along similar lines, Jared Andrew Cohen, CEO of Jigsaw and Adjunct Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, said that, for the war on Ukraine, there are more hours of footage uploaded to YouTube, TikTok and other platforms than there are minutes of the conflict. “Like land, air and sea, the Internet has become a critical domain to occupy during war.” Nowhere has this been more evident than Ukraine, he said, where the Russian Federation has deployed distributed denial-of-service, or “DDoS”, attacks that have taken down connectivity by 15 to 20 per cent, and on many occasions, dropped Internet connectivity to zero. His team’s research confirms the ability to leverage disinformation to motivate violence, he added, noting that Russian propaganda that Ukrainians are “Nazis” likely dehumanized Ukrainians in the eyes of Russian soldiers, leading to the many war crimes now alleged against them. In the ensuing debate, several delegates evoked the calamitous consequences of inciting one group of people against another, with many recalling tragedies endured during the Second World War, in Rwanda in 1994, in Srebrenica in 1995 and in Myanmar more recently. Leading the discussion, Albania’s delegate spoke in his national capacity to recall how, in the early 1930s, the Nazis used virulently anti‑Semitic newspapers to incite Germans into persecuting Jews. On the eve of the invasion, Russian President Vladimir V. Putin described Ukraine as an “artificial creation of the Bolsheviks”, he said, stressing that “what begins with dehumanizing words ends in bloodshed”. Lithuania’s representative, speaking also for Estonia and Latvia, said that for years, Ukraine has been a target of Russian disinformation campaigns, aimed at justifying an invasion. “If there is no clear and strong international response to stop it, the aggression against Ukraine will be just the beginning,” he warned, a point echoed by Slovakia’s delegate, who said that the pretexts under which Moscow invaded Ukraine resemble past patterns of framing a targeted group as an existential threat in order to present war as defensive and inevitable. In turn, the Russian Federation’s delegate blamed Ukraine’s propaganda for pushing that country into Nazism. He denounced the demonizing of his country, as well as hatred of everything Russian, introduced year after year, with support from the United States and other Western allies. After the 2014 Maidan coup, the Kyiv regime incited violence against Russian-speaking inhabitants of Ukraine, dubbing all those against it as terrorists, separatist puppets and monsters. The United States delegate, meanwhile, strongly rejected Moscow’s efforts to distort history, noting that the General Assembly rejected its false narrative on Ukraine and neighbouring countries. Pointing out that some have ignored that the Russian Federation illegally invaded its neighbour, he urged the Russian Federation to immediately withdraw its forces and embrace diplomacy. China’s representative countered, urging certain countries to stop forcing others to take sides. The cold war mentality, the logic of hegemony and bloc politics “have long outlived their usefulness”, he added. Offering a word of caution, Ukraine’s delegate warned delegates not to be deceived by Moscow’s anti‑fascist rhetoric, denouncing it as “another manifestation of aggressive mimicry”. Noting that, a week ago, President Putin claimed that “the former Soviet Union was historical Russia”, he asked: “What is next?”

### 2NC---CP---Bayraktar TB2 PIC---Competition

#### BTB2 is a lethal autonomous weapon.

Trager and Luca, 22 [Robert F. Trager and Laura M. Luca, 5-11-2022, accessed on 6-28-2022, Foreign Policy, "Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems Are Here—and We Need to Regulate Them", [https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/05/11/killer-robots-lethal-autonomous-weapons-systems-ukraine-libya-regulation/]/ISEE](https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/05/11/killer-robots-lethal-autonomous-weapons-systems-ukraine-libya-regulation/%5d/ISEE)

Swarms of robots with the ability to kill humans are no longer only the stuff of science fiction. Lethal autonomous weapons systems (LAWS) are here. In Ukraine, Moscow has allegedly deployed an artificial intelligence (AI)-enabled Kalashnikov ZALA Aero KUB-BLA loitering munition, while Kyiv has used Turkish-made Bayraktar TB2 drones, which have some autonomous capabilities. Although it’s always hard to determine whether a weapon’s autonomous mode is used, these technologies have reportedly been employed in at least one conflict: Last year, a United Nations report suggested Turkey used autonomous firing by its Kargu-2 drones to hunt fleeing soldiers in Libya’s civil war (though the CEO of the Turkish company that produced the drone denies it is capable of this). Unlike traditional drones, these systems have the ability to navigate on their own, and some can select targets. Although a human controller can still decide whether or not to strike, such weapons are acquiring ever more autonomous capabilities. Now that militaries and paramilitaries worldwide have taken note, these technologies are poised to spread widely. The world today stands at the very moment before much more advanced versions of these technologies become ubiquitous. So far, at least Israel, Russia, South Korea, and Turkey have reportedly deployed weapons with autonomous capabilities—though whether this mode was active is disputed—and Australia, Britain, China, and the United States are investing heavily in developing LAWS with an ever-expanding range of sizes and capabilities. Already, some LAWS can loiter in an area to find targets that machine-learning algorithms have trained them to recognize, including enemy radar systems, tanks, ships, and even specific individuals. These weapons can look vastly different: For instance, the Turkish Kargu-2 drone, which was introduced in 2020 and used in Libya’s war, is 2 feet long, weighs around 15 pounds, and can swarm in groups. Autonomous systems can also be much larger, such as unmanned AI-driven fighter jets like the modified L-39 Albatros, and much smaller, such as rudimentary commercial drones repurposed with autonomous software. Once these technologies have spread widely, they will be difficult to control. The world thus urgently needs a new approach to LAWS. So far, the international community has done nothing more than agree that the issue needs to be discussed. But what it really needs to do is take a page from the nuclear playbook and establish a nonproliferation regime for LAWS.

### 2NC---CP---Bayraktar TB2 PIC---NB XT

#### The TB2 is vital for Ukrainian resistance against Russian encroachment

**Mittal, 22** [Vikram Mittal is the associate professor at the United States Military Academy in the Department of Systems Engineering, 6-23-2022, accessed on 6-28-2022, Forbes, "The Ukrainian Military Is Changing Its Tactics With Bayraktar TB2 Drones", https://www.forbes.com/sites/vikrammittal/2022/06/23/ukrainian-military-is-changing-its-tactics-with-the-bayraktar-tb2-drones/?sh=3557aa5a1ec0]/ISEE

During the first four months of the Russia-Ukraine war, the “Most Valuable Player” award could readily go to the Bayraktar TB2 drone. This drone provided the Ukrainians with the necessary air power to repel the initial Russian assault and then slow the Russian advances in the Donbas region. Despite the numerous successes of the TB2 drone, reports indicate that their usage in the Donbas region has become limited due to a large number of Russian anti-aircraft systems. The importance of the TB2 drones to the Ukrainians cannot be overstated. According to Oryx, a blog that tracks the destruction of military equipment through open-source reports, these drones are credited with destroying the following: 6 armored fighting vehicles, 5 towed artillery, 1 multi-rocket launcher, 2 anti-aircraft guns, 10 helicopters, 6 naval ships, 3 command posts, 1 communication station, 2 logistics trains, and numerous resupply trucks. The Ukrainian military reportedly started the war with just 30 of these drones and have lost only 8 in combat. Additionally, they recently received a gift of another TB2 drone from the Lithuanians who crowd-sourced funds to purchase one. The Ukrainian military used the TB2 drone to search for and destroy key targets behind enemy lines. In doing so, the TB2 drone has gained worldwide recognition, with several analysts claiming that this family of drones has changed the nature of warfare. Meanwhile, the manufacturers of the drone have stated that the drones are now in high demand from militaries across the world. UNKNOWN LOCATION, BELARUS - FEBRUARY 09: (——EDITORIAL USE ONLY â MANDATORY CREDIT - "BELARUS DEFENSE ... [+] MINISTRY / HANDOUT" - NO MARKETING NO ADVERTISING CAMPAIGNS - DISTRIBUTED AS A SERVICE TO CLIENTS——) S-400 and Pantsir-S air defence systems arrive to participate in the Russian-Belarusian military will start a joint exercise amid tension between Ukraine and Russia at an Unknown location in Belarus on February 9, 2022. According to the Belarusian Ministry of Defense, the joint military exercise "Allied Resolve 2022" will take place from February 10-20. The military units of the Russian Armed Forces from the Eastern Military District and some military units of the Belarusian Armed Forces will in the exercise. (Photo by Belarus Defense Ministruy/Anadolu Agency via Getty Images) Unfortunately for the TB2, the Russian military has focused their offense on the Donbas region. In doing so, they have been able to consolidate their anti-aircraft assets to that region rather than having them spread out across the country. The Russian military has now had the necessary time to repair the systems damaged in the initial invasion, while augmenting their anti-aircraft batteries with systems that were captured or held in reserve. Moreover, the Russian military appears to have learned their lesson from the initial assault, where their anti-aircraft systems were focused primarily on protecting front-line units, allowing the Ukrainians to use the TB2 to target the vulnerable supply lines and command nodes. With more assets and a consolidated region, the Russian military is able to provide coverage to most of their forces including their logistical units. Although much of the anti-aircraft assets are Soviet-era, the Russian military is likely also implementing new technology onto the battlefield, especially given their historical usage of electromagnetic weapons. The Russians first shot down a TB2 drone in mid-March; they have had ample time to study the drone and find vulnerabilities. By identifying the transmission frequencies and other electromagnetic signatures, the Russian military can more effectively detect and target the drones. Furthermore, the Russians could potentially jam the control signals to drone as well. Bayraktar TB-2 Armed Unmanned Aerial Vehicle on runway Given their limited supply of TB2 drones, the Ukrainian military is unlikely to fly them into areas where there is a high potential for them to get shot down, thus they are limiting their usage in the Donbas region. However, this is not a large blow to the Ukrainian forces. Given the close range between the Russian and Ukrainian ground forces, artillery fire can provide similar effects, albeit less accurate. Meanwhile, the TB2 drones can be used elsewhere. Recently, these drones featured heavily on the Ukrainian attempt to reclaim Snake Island, where they destroyed an ammunition depot, a command post, and a vehicle storage building. They were also used in destroying a tugboat in the Black Sea. It is important to note that although the Russians may have shut down the drone strikes in the Donbas region, they have not achieved air superiority. The Ukrainians have been reinforced with new anti-aircraft weaponry from the international community and are deploying them into the Donbas region. With neither side having air-superiority, the war will likely continue to be a slow-moving battle of attrition. As the war continues into its fourth month, the Bayraktar TB2 drone will likely continue to play a role in the conflict. However, it will likely not see the same degree of success that it saw over the past four months, especially in the Donbas region.

## NC3 PIC

### 1NC---NC3 PIC

#### Text: The United States federal government should [PLAN] with the exception of automated NC3 technologies.

#### Leaving nuclear control with humans is disastrous – structural quirks of psychology makes deterrence impossible

King 19 King, Iain. Iain King CBE is Defence Counsellor at the British Embassy in Washington D.C. "What Do Cognitive Biases Mean for Deterrence?" RealClearDefense, 12 Feb. 2019, www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2019/02/12/what\_do\_cognitive\_biases\_mean\_for\_deterrence\_114182.html.

Humans make poor decisions—not just sometimes, but systematically—and new insights into these cognitive biases have implications for deterrence. To illustrate just how important these can be, consider the curious case of Abraham Wald, a respected Columbia academic who, in 1943, was selected by the U.S. War Department for an important task.[1] The United States Army Air Forces were losing too many bombers over Europe to anti-aircraft fire and were considering adding armour plating to the aircraft, but the extra metal made the aircraft heavier, reducing performance and bomb loads. So, armouring the whole plane was impossible. Where could extra armour be placed effectively? Abraham Wald and his study of aircraft armor (Slideshare) Wald researched where the bombers frequently suffered the most damage. After an extensive survey of the squadrons returning to base, Wald discovered most of the damage was to the wings and fuselage, whereas the engines and cockpits seemed to be hit much less. Initially, the War Department assumed the armour plating should protect the wings and fuselage, but Wald explained how they were completely wrong. Armour placement was needed where there was no damage since bombers hit there never returned home to be studied. On Wald’s advice, the armour plating was duly placed around the cockpit and engines. Wald demonstrated that the War Department was making a common mistake now known as survivorship bias.[2] By looking at a skewed sample—in this case, only those bombers surviving enemy fire—the War Department’s logic went awry. Survivorship bias is one of many deep-rooted and systematic flaws in the way humans process information. One might think people take in all the available information and make the best decisions; in fact, however, we tend not to. We make bad decisions for many reasons. For one, thinking takes time and effort, and so we often go for heuristic short-cuts.[3] For another, like pack animals, we follow the herd.[4] Furthermore, we regularly misunderstand the world in systematic ways. We have deep-rooted attachments to what we already own, even when we can have something better.[5] These traits have helped us to adapt and stay alive, and we have inherited them from our ancestors who survived because of them.[6] There are at least fifty of these proven quirks that warp our decision making.[7] One of these is confirmation bias, where we tend to underrate new information that challenges what we already believe. There is also optimism bias, which makes us overestimate our chances of getting away with something.[8] Next to these we have normalcy bias, where we refuse to plan for a disaster that has never occurred.[9] Then there is reactance, a phenomenon is which we do the opposite of what someone wants us to do just to defy a perceived constraint on our freedom of choice.[10] These biases can influence life in many ways, from who we marry to bad budgeting choices. But some of the most profound impacts are on deterrence. Promoted Content Mgid To understand the effect of these systematic mistakes on how we deter unwelcome behaviour, consider one of the oldest forms of deterrence, the threat of jail time to discourage theft. In a rationale calculation, a substantial prison sentence should be enough to deter almost anyone from stealing, but cognitive biases mean this is not necessarily so. Reactance spurs rebellious criminals to steal simply because stealing is outlawed. The normalcy effect makes the ruinous impact of a prison sentence just too hard to contemplate, so it does not factor properly in the criminal mind. Criminals who plan a clever theft and escape tune out ways they might be caught because of confirmation bias. Criminals who know successful thieves and none of the many others who are caught and locked up will suffer from survivorship bias if they calculate their own chances of getting away with crime. And some will suffer from and optimism bias if they just guess. So, every day punishments are in place that should deter every right-thinking individual in the world, but people still try their luck. Every prisoner is proof deterrence can and does fail. These biases affect us all—not just criminals—and they affect us much more than we realise. Almost all of us suffer from a bias blind spot: the proven tendency for people to recognise biases in others more readily than in themselves.[11] Thomas Schelling (EconLib) Proof that cognitive biases are real means several of the assumptions underpinning traditional deterrence theory are wrong. Academics like Thomas Schelling, who led U.S. thinking on nuclear deterrence in the 1950s and 1960s and who was a contemporary of Abraham Wald, simply applied a standard hypothesis from economics at the time: that people knew how to behave in their own best interests.[12] People might make mistakes, went the theory, but they’d soon learn how to correct their behaviour because they would benefit from doing so. Only in the 1970s, with the so-called third wave of deterrence theory, was psychology understood in enough detail to begin to grasp how people make systematic errors.[13] Kremlinology, the study of key figures in the Soviet system and how they behave and interact, became a key part of the West’s approach to nuclear deterrence. People, not weapons, became the central focus of Western defence. The science of cognitive bias has advanced considerably since then. We now know people consistently behave in ways that go against their best interests in almost every field.[14] Indeed, in the last decade many governments have set up so-called nudge units, playing on these behavioural quirks to achieve policy goals, from increasing pension contributions to enforcing traffic laws.[15] In military matters, even though the stakes are usually much higher, cognitive errors are still rife. Indeed, history is packed with examples of wars that might have been deterred were it not for strong cognitive biases affecting decision makers. Consider Argentina in 1982, which might not have invaded the Falkland Islands if it had a less distorted view of the United Kingdom’s resolve and capacity to respond. Or consider France in 1870, where military groupthink tipped Napoleon III into a disastrous war with Prussia. And Europe in the summer of 1914 was a cauldron of cognitive biases, as countries—Austria-Hungary, Serbia, Russia, Germany, France, and Britain—made a succession of poor judgments about the deterrence posture of rivals, rivals who, in turn, provided misleading signals themselves, ultimately leading to a catastrophe that spread around the world.[16] Mgid Signals Of Lung Cancer Learn More→ According to one study, the weaker power initiates conflict in some 33% of observations, suggesting military might fails to deter as much as a third of the time.[17] Perhaps the attackers suffered from restraint bias—the tendency for people and groups to underestimate how easily they succumb to temptation? Perhaps groupthink infected the highest levels of combatants’ government and armed forces? Perhaps the parties to conflict missed important signals from an enemy because confirmation bias meant they were not looking for them? Whatever the reason, chances are cognitive biases were involved. These tragic examples of conventional wars contrast with a much better record in nuclear matters where deterrence has, so far, been entirely successful. Nuclear conflict has been deterred for more than seven decades, partly because cognitive bias has been almost entirely squeezed out of it. This suggests the calculus governing our nuclear deterrent, and the strategic weapons of those who may oppose us, is as protected from human shortcomings as it can be, thus keeping the world safe. We still need to watch for normalcy bias, though. No nuclear weapons have been used in war since 1945, but it is folly to presume that will always be the case.

#### Moral hazard causes human error and miscalc—LAWs are net better

Umbrello, et al, 20—Institute for Ethics and Emerging Technologies, University of Turin (Steven, with Phil Torres, Project for Future Human Flourishing, and Angelo De Bellis, University of Edinburgh, “The future of war: could lethal autonomous weapons make conflict more ethical?,” AI & Society, 35, 273–282 (2020), dml)

Yet, we would argue, such positions are predicated on an unfounded fear that taking control away from humans will enable robotic weaponry to demolish current, human-involved warfare practices. Extrapolating techno-development trends into the future, it is reasonable to expect future robotic weapons to acquire the capacity to reliably and accurately differentiate between combatants and noncombatants (Sharkey 2012; Egeland 2016); this could even occur in the near future (see Guizzo 2016). Indeed, Ronald Arkin (2008) anticipates such technologies—in particular, recognition software—to not only be developed but surpass human performance capabilities (see also O’Meara 2011; Egeland 2016). As he writes, “we must protect the innocent non-combatants in the battlespace far better than we currently do. Technology can, must, and should be used toward that end.” Like Nadeau, Arkin believes that moral LAWs would act in an ethically superior way to humans in war, saying that: The commonplace occurrence of slaughtering civilians in conflict over millennia gives rise to my pessimism in reforming human behaviour yet provides optimism for robots being able to exceed human moral performance in similar circumstances (Arkin 2015). One must also take into account the consequences of humans personally engaging in warfare. Historical records, including those of concurrent military engagements, recount numerous acts of barbarism as a result of the harsh conditions that combatants are exposed to (Arkin 2015). In fact, Lin et al. (2008) discuss how one of the most attractive prospects of LAWs is their inability to be affected by emotions on the battlefield (Lin et al. 2008). It is the emotional distress that often causes combatants to mistreat the enemy and commit war crimes. Hence, the introduction of LAWs that are unaffected by such emotional stress serves as an incentive for continued development (Klincewicz 2015).3 Second, the emotional and physical pressures that human combatants must endure during wartime have performance costs. The fatigue of a long and drawn-out battle affects the ability of individual soldiers to perform optimally, and thus affects the accuracy of their shots (Burke et al. 2007; Nibbeling et al. 2014). LAWs are naturally unaffected by similar physical pitfalls and can always—as long as the physical infrastructure is designed optimally from the start—permit the LAWs to continually perform accurately and as expected. The ability for LAWs to engage in unwavering, precise combat also resolves some ethical issues that arise from human-waged war. In light of the fact that LAWs do not possess emotions to guide their behaviors or personal stakes that affect their combat approaches, LAWs will always perform duties accurately under even the most physically—or to a human, emotionally—stressful conditions, thus enabling them to, at least more often than not, kill in a more humane manner. LAWs can be programmed to only engage targets in manners deemed most ethical based on the dynamics of war at the time of combat: the changing environment, the weapons being used by both the aggressor and the defender, and the characteristics of the target (human, robot, or physical structure). Already, computerized weapons platforms can engage targets far more accurately than any human counterpart can (Geibel 1997; Shachtman 2007; Katz and Lappin 2012; United States Navy 2017). Strong arguments can be levied that LAWs outfitted with such weapons platforms could engage in otherwise normal wartime duties but in a means that is far more accurate and thus ethical4 as a consequence of LAWs’ technological superiority. Part of this ethical prowess exhibited by LAWs is not only because they never tire, but because they are impervious to the psychological shortcomings of humans. Though a contentious topic, several high-profile cognitive psychologists suggest that humans fabricate reasons for their actions after committing them (Davidson 1982; Nadeau 2006). Thus, it is human to be irrational, to make unreasoned decisions toward an action that is then validated after carrying through. Such is not the nature of a robot. As mentioned, LAWs do not have any particular affinity to or personal interests in surviving battle; they do not have any drive to exhibit particular harshness against enemies of a certain culture; and they do not, outside of their goals, worry about winning the war and heading back home after using any unsavory methods to do so. What they do mind is their particular set of rules, their value-laden code that dictates how they are to conduct themselves in an ethical manner during combat.

#### History and the structure of the nuclear architecture makes human nuclear use inevitable

Scarry 18 Elaine Scarry is a professor at Harvard University and the author of numerous books, including The Body in Pain: The Making and Unmaking of the World. Her most recent book is titled Thermonuclear Monarchy: Choosing between Democracy and Doom. "In the United States, Just 1 Person Has the Power to Kill Millions of People." Nation, 26 Feb. 2018, www.thenation.com/article/archive/in-the-united-states-just-1-person-has-the-power-to-kill-millions-of-people.

Even more central to our discussion: The second feature of the nuclear arsenal is that this capacity for unthinkable levels of injury resides in the hands of a solitary person, or a small handful of persons, in the United States as well as in the other nuclear states. Nuclear weapons strategy in the United States is designed around “presidential first use,” an arrangement that enables one man, the president, to kill and maim many millions of people in a single afternoon. The key features of nuclear architecture are, then, this unthinkably magnified level of injury at one end of the weapon and at the other end of the weapon, an unthinkably small number of men who determine our collective fate and the fate of the planet. What remains to be seen is whether the people of our own country—and more generally the people of the earth—will permit these weapons and these arrangements for presidential first use to remain in place. And then there is a second key question: If the people of this country do not wish these arrangements to remain in place, are there legal and constitutional tools that can help dismantle those arrangements? Support Progressive Journalism If you like this article, please give today to help fund The Nation’s work. It will be helpful to keep in mind that the nuclear architecture is a physical architecture, but the physical architecture is accompanied by a mental architecture and it is this mental architecture that keeps the physical architecture in place. Let me say a few words about each. Click to enlarge. (Graphic: Nagasaki University, Research Center for Nuclear Weapons Abolition) As for the physical architecture, we can see from this chart that 93 percent of the world’s total arsenal is possessed by the United States and Russia. The small wedge at one o’clock is the portion of the arsenal owned by the other seven nuclear states. North Korea has, by the most accurate estimates, fissile material for fewer than 20 warheads. (Here and there estimates have come in as high as 60 warheads, but Hans Kristensen at the Federation of American Scientists—over time the single most reliable voice on weapons count—judges 20 or fewer to be still the best estimate.) The legend on the chart tells us that each icon represents five warheads. To get an accurate picture of the world arsenal, we need to multiply the field of icons fivefold. In attempting to comprehend the vast scale of the United States arsenal, we are assisted by The New York Times, which recently provided a compelling set of graphics. It calculated what portion of the US stockpile would be needed to “decimate” Libya, what portion to “decimate” North Korea, what portion to “decimate” Syria, Iraq, Iran, China, Russia, and then showed how many weapons would be left over after we had killed one-fourth of the population in those seven countries. Their answer: Seventy percent of the US arsenal would remain. It takes thousands of painstaking small steps to put a physical arsenal into place, and 99 percent of those steps have already been completed. We’re not waiting for something to start; we’re very late, as the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists’s 2 ½-minutes-to-midnight tells us. Only the last of the thousand steps—the launch itself—remains. For example, specific cities all over the world have specific targets assigned to them. Weapons are assigned not just to our opponents but to our potential opponents, and even to our non-opponents. During the most-recent Bush administration, Vice President Cheney became curious about how many are assigned to each city: “Tell me, I said to the planners, how many warheads are going to hit Kiev under the current plan. It was a difficult question to get an answer to because I don’t think anybody had ever asked it before, but I finally got a report back that under the current targeting plan, we had literally dozens of warheads targeted on this single city.” Until the Clinton administration, the longitude and latitude of those cities were programed into the missiles before they were loaded into the Ohio-class submarines. Out of fear that a hacker would initiate a launch, this practice was changed so that instead of the geographical coordinates of cities, the longitude and latitude of uninhabited regions of ocean were programed into the missiles. It is noteworthy that this ethical change was brought about not by the application of moral reasoning—not by the demands of the citizenry or councils of government—but by the very real possibility of a hacker. Throughout this enlightened shift to open-ocean targeting, what never changed was the assignment of specified weapons to specified cities. What about the mental architecture that has kept this physical architecture in place? Support our work with a digital subscription. Get unlimited access: $9.50 for six months. The mental architecture requires first and foremost that little information be given to the citizenry. In turn, attempts of the citizenry to protest can be silenced by pointing out that they are speaking without knowledge or information. This blackout of information imperils citizenship in the same way that in earlier centuries depriving people of the art of reading and writing imperiled citizenship. It has acted as a firm piece of social control. Many Americans believe that our nuclear weapons will be used only in response to a nuclear attack by another country. Nothing could be further from the truth. We have had first-use arrangements and a first-use policy throughout the 70 years of the nuclear age. Most Americans believe that the only time following Hiroshima and Nagasaki that the United States came close to launching a nuclear weapon was during the Cuban missile crisis. We now know that Eisenhower twice considered using an atomic weapon in the Taiwan Straits in 1954 and again in Berlin in 1959; that the Kennedy administration, according to Robert McNamara, three times came within “a hair’s breadth” of war with Russia; that Lyndon Johnson considered using a nuclear weapon against China to prevent that country from getting a bomb; and that Nixon, by his own account, four times contemplated using a nuclear weapon. The record stops there because only after a 30-year-time-lag when presidential papers are released do we learn what our leaders planned. Our current president, President Trump, is for many of us in the country and for many people throughout the world a particularly reckless figure. Yet the presidential first-use structure is catastrophic even in the hands of the best of men. Yes, it is wildly dangerous if someone is openly reckless and irrational; but it continues to be fatal even in the hands of those who are nominally rational because it is itself a deeply irrational and reckless architecture.

#### Automation solves NC3 instability – it produces redundant tech and self-healing networks that adaptively respond to cyber attacks and shore up deterrence in a crisis

Horowitz et al 19 [Michael C. Horowitz is Professor of Political Science and Associate Director of Perry World House at the University of Pennsylvania. Paul Scharre is Senior Fellow and Director, Technology and National Security Program at the Center for a New American Security. Alexander Velez-Green is a defense analyst based in Washington, DC. "A Stable Nuclear Future? The Impact of Autonomous Systems and Artificial Intelligence." https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1912/1912.05291.pdf]

Automation could also be used to enhance defenses – physical or cyber – against attacks on nuclear early warning, command-and-control, delivery, and support systems, thereby enhancing deterrence and fortifying stability. It could also be used to bolster the resilience of vulnerable NC2 networks. For instance, long-endurance uninhabited aircraft that act as pseudo-satellites (“pseudo-lites”) to create an airborne communications network could increase NC2 resilience by providing additional redundant communications pathways in the event of satellite disruption. Automation could even enable autonomously self-healing networks – in physical or cyberspace – in response to jamming or kinetic attacks against command-and-control nodes, thereby sustaining situational awareness and command and control and enhancing deterrence.

#### Nuclear AI is difficult, not impossible, new innovations prove

Lowther, PhD, and McGiffin. 2X MA, 19

(Adam, Director of Research and Education at the Louisiana Tech Research Institute, Curtis, School of Strategic Force Studies, at the Air Force Institute of Technology and an adjunct professor for Missouri State University’s Department of Defense and Strategic Studies where he teaches strategic nuclear deterrence theory and NC3 education https://warontherocks.com/2019/08/america-needs-a-dead-hand/)

There is a fourth option. The United States could develop an NC3 system based on artificial intelligence. Such an approach could overcome the attack-time compression challenge. DARPA’s Knowledge-directed Artificial Intelligence Reasoning Over Schemas program is an example of how an American NC3 system based on artificial intelligence might function. Fusing the contextual and temporal events of a nuclear attack into an analytic-based artificial intelligence capability may ensure rapid comprehension and in turn generate associated and prompt actionable responses. The biggest challenge for such a system is its ability to learn and adapt. Unlike the game of Go, which the current world champion is a supercomputer, Alpha Go Zero, that learned through an iterative process, in nuclear conflict there is no iterative learning process. Thus, a fully empowered “general” artificial intelligence system that learns may be far more difficult to design than a “narrow” artificial intelligence system that engages in limited analysis and decision-making. Artificial intelligence is perhaps best poised to assist humans when it comes to the dimensions of detecting a nuclear attack and deciding which planned option best meets the criteria designed by programmers. Here, artificial intelligence may, to a small degree, mitigate the tyranny of attack-time compression and accelerate wartime decision-making. However, when a president may have, at most, six minutes to make a decision, time compression still poses a fundamental problem. Artificial intelligence is already being used for target identification, controlling autonomous platforms, pattern recognition, and a number of other wartime tasks. It is capable of processing vast amounts of information very quickly and assessing the pros and cons of alternative actions in a thoroughly unemotional manner. According to Vincent Boulanin: Recent advances in artificial intelligence could be leveraged in all aspects of the nuclear enterprise. Machine learning could boost the detection capabilities of extant early warning systems and improve the possibility for human analysts to do a cross-analysis of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) data. Machine learning could be used to enhance the protection of the command and control architecture against cyberattacks and improve the way resources, including human forces, are managed. Machine learning advances could boost the capabilities of non-nuclear means of deterrence: be it conventional (air defence systems), electronic (jamming) or cyber. However, artificial intelligence is no panacea. Its failures are numerous. And the fact that there is profound concern by well-respected experts in the field that science fiction may become reality, because artificial intelligence designers cannot control their creation, should not be dismissed. For the United States, every option presents significant risk and uncertainty. Reality, however, is progressing to a point where the United States must address the challenge we outlined above. Russia and China are not constrained by the same moral dilemmas that keep Americans awake at night. Rather, they are focused on creating strategic advantage for their countries.

## Patriot PIC

### 1NC---CP---Patriot PIC

#### Text: The United States federal government should \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_[PLAN] with the exception of the Phased Array Tracking Radar to Intercept of Target missile system.

#### Patriot key to US military defense and to deter invasion.

Stracqualursi, 3/10 [Veronica Stracqualursi is a CNN Politics writer covering breaking news in Washington, DC, 3-10-2022, accessed on 6-27-2022, CNN, "These are the missile defense systems the US sent to Poland", https://www.cnn.com/2022/03/10/politics/us-patriot-missile-defense-system-explainer/index.html]/ISEE

The two missile defense systems that the US delivered to Poland this week are part of a weapons system upon which the US military has heavily relied for nearly 40 years. The deployment, announced Thursday by Vice President Kamala Harris, is intended to deter Russia and boost Poland's security amid western concerns that the Ukraine conflict could spill into NATO-aligned nations. The Patriot air defense missile system -- Patriot stands for "Phased Array Tracking Radar to Intercept of Target" -- is designed to counter and destroy incoming short-range ballistic missiles, advanced aircraft and cruise missiles. The battery includes missiles and launching stations, a radar set that detects and tracks targets, and an engagement control station, according to the Missile Defense Advocacy Alliance. The US, seeking to avoid direct involvement in Ukraine -- which is not a member of NATO and therefore not subject to the pact's collective defense agreement, in which an attack on one aligned nation is considered an attack on all -- has repeatedly stressed that the deployment is only for defensive purposes. "This defensive deployment is being conducted proactively to counter any potential threat to U.S. and Allied forces and NATO territory," Capt. Adam Miller, spokesman for US European Command, said in a statement Tuesday. "This is a prudent force protection measure that underpins our commitment to Article Five and will in no way support any offensive operations." The Pentagon's deployment of the Patriot missiles to Poland "wasn't precipitated by one single moment or one single issue or one single act by the Russians," US Defense Department press secretary John Kirby said on Wednesday. The Patriot missiles had been moved from Germany for what Kirby described as a "temporary deployment." Retired US Army Gen. Wesley Clark, a former NATO commander, called the deployment of the two batteries "prudent" and said the Patriot system would be able to intercept many of the missiles Russian President Vladimir Putin has deployed in Russia and Belarus, which borders Poland. "So if there were to be a launch in some provocative way by Mr. Putin to attempt to intimidate us, these missiles have a very good probability of intercepting a Russian missile," Clark, now a CNN military analyst, told CNN's Brianna Keilar. He added that the deployment of the equipment "gives reassurance to the Poles. It also tells Putin that he's not going to be necessarily so successful in trying to blackmail us with nuclear weapons." See the US weapons being used in Ukraine 'Fire and forget': See the US weapons being used in Ukraine 02:56 A longtime mainstay of US military operations The Patriot missile system has undergone several improvements and upgrades since it was first deployed in 1982. Its first combat use was in the Gulf War, which was also the first time that an air defense system had destroyed a hostile tactical ballistic missile. The Patriot system was also deployed in 2003 during Operation Iraqi Freedom and was successful in hitting nine incoming missiles, but also were involved in several friendly fire incidents. In recent years, the US has sent Patriot missiles to Saudi Arabia and Iraq to counter threats posed by Iran and its proxies and to the Pacific region to deter North Korea. Earlier this year, the US military, along with the United Arab Emirates, used the Patriot missiles to intercept attacks by Houthi militants on a military airbase where Americans were stationed and while the Israeli President was visiting the UAE. A 2019 Pentagon missile defense review reported that eight battalions with 33 batteries were stationed in the United States while seven battalions with 27 batteries were stationed overseas. More than a dozen US **allies**, including Germany, Japan, and Israel, have also purchased the US missile defense system.

### 2NC---CP---Patriot PIC---Competition

#### Yes competition---patriot is a lethal autonomous weapon.

Bartneck et al., 20 [Christoph Bartneck, Christoph Lütge, Alan Wagner and Sean Welsh, August 12, 2020, accessed on 6-27-2022,"Military Uses of AI", https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-030-51110-4\_11#:~:text=Systems%20such%20as%20the%20Patriot,11.1).]/ISEE

War is inherently controversial. Many military uses of AI and robotics are likewise contentious. Perhaps the most controversial aspect of this topic is the development and use of lethal autonomous weapons systems capable of autonomously making life and death decisions regarding human targets. Some argue that cruise missiles are a form of lethal autonomous weapons system. Systems such as the Patriot missile system, AEGIS naval weapons system, Phalanx weapons system, and Israeli Harpy weapons system are examples of lethal autonomous weapons systems currently in use. The Patriot system, AEGIS, and the Phalanx system are generally considered defensive weapons (Fig. 11.1).

### 2NC---CP---Patriot PIC---AT: Unsafe

#### Its been tested, its safe!

Raytheon, 15 [Raytheon Missiles & Defense leadership team consists of experts from across the defense industry., 2015 (Last mentioned Date), accessed on 6-27-2022, Raytheonmissilesanddefense, "", [https://www.raytheonmissilesanddefense.com/what-we-do/counteruas/sensors/global-patriot-solutions]/ISEE](https://www.raytheonmissilesanddefense.com/what-we-do/counteruas/sensors/global-patriot-solutions%5d/ISEE)

Since it was first fielded, Patriot has been used by five nations in more than 250 combat engagements against manned and unmanned aircraft, cruise missiles, and tactical ballistic missiles. Since January of 2015, Patriot has intercepted more than 150 ballistic missiles in combat operations around the world; more than 90 of those intercepts involved the low-cost Raytheon Missiles & Defense-made Guidance Enhanced Missile family of surface-to-air missiles. Those engagements were possible because Patriot is built on a foundation of more than 3,000 ground tests and over 1,400 flight tests. Each and every time Patriot is tested or live fired, engineers uncover new ways to further improve or enhance the system. The improvements are necessary because the threat is constantly changing and becoming more sophisticated.

### 2NC---CP---Patriot PIC---NB---Interoperability

#### Patriot key to NATO interoperability.

NATO, 22 [NATO Allied Air Command Public Affairs Office, 4-19-2022, accessed on 6-27-2022, ac.nato.int, "Allies integrate PATRIOT missile defence system during NATO exercise in Slovakia", https://ac.nato.int/archive/2022/allies-integrate-patriot-missile-defence-system-during-slovakian-exercise-]/ISEE

During an Integrated Air and Missile Defence (IAMD) exercise in Sliač, Slovakia, from April, 19 to 21, 2022, Allies will train with the deployed PATRIOT missile defence system to enhance Alliance cohesion and interoperability. The exercise will involve increasingly complex scenarios, with the combined German-Netherlands PATRIOT battery on the ground working closely with the Slovakian and U.S. Air Forces. The Slovakian Air Force is contributing to the exercise with one MIG-29, the U.S. Marine Corps with F-18s from Łask Air Base, Poland and the U.S. Air Force with EA-18G Growler fighter aircraft from Spangdahlem, Germany. The defensive deployment of the PATRIOT system to Slovakia, which borders Ukraine, is being conducted to enhance the protection of Slovakian populations and territory "The defensive deployment of the PATRIOT system to Slovakia, which borders Ukraine, is being conducted to enhance the protection of Slovakian populations and territory", said Lieutenant General Pascal Delerce, Deputy Commander of the Headquarters Allied Air Command. "This joint exercise will demonstrate NATO's ground-to-air defence capabilities and promote the PATRIOT's integration into the networked system that assures the safety and integrity of NATO airspace", Lieutenant General Delerce added. During the exercise, staff will test Command Post tactics, techniques and procedures to build robust communications between ground and airborne assets. They will execute a range of realistic scenarios including simulations of Cruise Missile attacks and multiple hostile inbound aircraft. All systems defending against airborne targets will be integrated and closely coordinated with NATO IAMD. It is essential to steadily train and practice procedures while coordinating IAMD processes among Allies to optimize Allied cohesion and improve readiness. The Russian invasion of the Ukraine has increased the requirement for a robust 24/7/365 collective defence posture. NATO IAMD exercises in the East present crew training opportunities in conjunction with strengthening the Alliance's defence posture.

#### Patriot is key to US deterrence.

**Perkovich and Vaddi, 21** [George Perkovich PhD, University of Virginia is the Ken Olivier and Angela Nomellini Chair and vice president for studies at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, overseeing the Technology and International Affairs Program and Nuclear Policy Program, and Pranay Vaddi was a fellow in the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, January 21, 2021, accessed on 6-27-2022, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, "Ballistic Missile Defenses - Proportionate Deterrence: A Model Nuclear Posture Review", https://carnegieendowment.org/2021/01/21/ballistic-missile-defenses-pub-83582]/ISEE

U.S. missile defenses, like nuclear forces, come in various forms, with different capabilities, objectives, costs, and reactions from allies and adversaries. The capabilities and footprint of U.S. missile defense have expanded continually over the past twenty years. Today, they have attained a global reach, increased technological capability, priority in defense budgets, and adoption by U.S. allies. (Appendix B contains a record of U.S. missile defense tests for Aegis and Ground-Based Midcourse Defense systems, perhaps the most relevant defensive systems to adversary nuclear postures.) Still, the technical functionality of missile defenses against modern missile forces is unknown. The United States has not used missile defenses against a nuclear-armed adversary. Nor have Israel’s vaunted air defenses been used against advanced cruise or ballistic missiles. Forward-deployed missile defenses—interceptors based on land and on ships with warning and communications assets—play a role in regional deterrence, defending allies and partners, U.S. forces, and critical military and civilian installations on foreign territory. The United States uses basing arrangements and foreign military sales to encourage interoperability and information-sharing among allies to improve the effectiveness of their missile defenses.1 Missile defenses on and near U.S. territory are supposed to defend the U.S. homeland from ballistic missile attacks of the scale that North Korea might be able to launch. In both scenarios, U.S. missile defense can contribute to defeating and deterring conventionally and nuclear-armed missile attacks, whether targeted at American cities or U.S. nuclear and military forces. Because the focus of this review is nuclear policy, its analysis and recommendations focus on three conundrums that missile defenses could pose to managing and reducing nuclear threats. U.S. regional missile defense arrangements include theater missile defense systems, such as Patriot and THAAD (Terminal High Altitude Area Defense), that are designed for terminal and “point” defense. These systems are better suited for protecting smaller areas where important military installations and critical infrastructure may be located. Longer-range systems, such as Aegis, also contribute to regional missile defense architectures, operating off the coasts of U.S. allies in Europe and Asia. In Europe, NATO allies host a radar site in Turkey, a command center in Germany, and an Aegis Ashore site where Aegis SM-3 interceptors are deployed on land in Romania with a planned second site in Poland, as part of the European Phased Adaptive Approach.2 In Asia, the United States has deployed THAAD radars and launchers in Guam, Hawaii, and South Korea.3 All of these systems are intended to protect U.S. allies as well as U.S. forces stationed on allied territories. Notwithstanding the primary missions of deterring and countering North Korean and Iranian missile threats, U.S. military planners and contractors also envision these systems’ potential role in interdicting Russian or Chinese conventional and nuclear attacks on targets in Europe and East Asia. For instance, the 2019 Missile Defense Review (MDR) states that “missile defense is an element of the U.S. effort to counter A2/AD [antiaccess/area denial] strategies that seek to deter or prevent the United States from supporting allies in contested regions,” implicitly suggesting that missile defense will blunt Russian and Chinese attacks associated with their strategies for regional conflicts.4 The November 2020 test of the SM-3 against an ICBM target deepened Russia’s and China’s suspicions that U.S. missile defenses will be directed against them.5 As the presence of Aegis ships and land installations increase, Russia and China may further lose confidence in the efficacy of their ballistic missiles. In 2017, China reacted harshly (including an economic boycott) to the deployment of THAAD radars in South Korea, claiming the system could help target Chinese ICBMs. These dynamics raise two conundrums at the regional level. First, the United States has insisted that regional defenses intended to deter or block North Korean or Iranian attacks do not pose threats to Russian and Chinese strategic nuclear deterrents. But Moscow and Beijing profess not to believe these statements. To the extent that Russia and/or China add offensive capabilities to counter such defenses, would the benefits of defenses against regional Iranian and/or North Korean missiles outweigh the costs? Second, the United States also seeks increased capabilities to defend its forward-deployed forces and allies and partners from Russian and Chinese regional missiles. These capabilities are especially important in East Asia, where China has steadily increased its arsenal of short- to medium-range conventionally armed and dual-capable missiles. Here the major conundrum is that it is easier and cheaper for China to add missiles of this range than it is for the United States to add defenses to feasibly counter them. Moreover, kinetic and perhaps cyber capabilities to target Chinese missiles and their command and control systems could intentionally or inadvertently attack (or be perceived to attack) Chinese nuclear command and control. This could exacerbate risks of escalating a regional conventional war into a nuclear one. That concern notwithstanding, such antimissile capabilities also could strengthen deterrence. The third set of conundrums involves U.S. homeland defenses against ballistic missiles, and the likelihood that they drive Russia and China to increase their arsenals of long-range missiles and warheads. When the United States withdrew from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty in June 2002, the stated reason was the need to develop and deploy systems that could defend the U.S. homeland from attack by future North Korean and Iranian ballistic missiles. This reasoning remains the stated objective of homeland missile defenses. Although Iran still does not possess missiles that could reach the United States, North Korea has tested several types of missiles that could improve its capabilities.6 For its part, to potentially counter this threat, the United States still deploys only a little more than half the number of missile interceptors on its territory that it would have been allowed had it remained under the ABM Treaty’s maximum of 100. The Ground-Based Midcourse Defense System (GMD) centered on these interceptors in Alaska and California cannot singlehandedly defeat a concerted missile attack from Russia or China. The 2019 MDR acknowledges this fact, stating “the United States relies on deterrence to protect against large and technically sophisticated Russian and Chinese intercontinental ballistic missile threats to the U.S. homeland.”7 Yet the MDR also states “in the event of conflict, it [GMD] would defend, to the extent feasible, against a ballistic missile attack upon the U.S. homeland from any source.”8 Russia is already developing and deploying new long-range nuclear delivery systems to defeat current and expected future U.S. missile defense capabilities. A major question is whether Chinese leaders genuinely perceive such defenses to threaten the viability of their growing strategic deterrent force of around 180 missiles, after that force has been attacked by U.S. conventional or nuclear weapons. If the answer is “yes,” then the conundrum is whether the benefits of maintaining or adding to such defenses are greater than the costs of doing so, in terms of both expense and the increased likelihood that Russia and China would counter by greater numbers of and/or more capable missiles and countermeasures. There are no clear or easy answers to these conundrums. Since its withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, the United States has acted as if the benefits of pursuing defenses outweigh the risks of arms racing with Russia and China and escalation of regional conflict. These posited benefits, which will vary based on the actual performance of defense systems, include strengthening deterrence, limiting the damage adversaries can inflict, and reassuring U.S. allies and partners in Europe, the Middle East, and East Asia. Advocates of missile defense do not fully acknowledge that their programs drive Russia and China to develop and deploy offensive countermeasures. Instead, they cite the modernization of Russian and Chinese offensive nuclear forces as justifications for development of even more modern U.S. missile defenses and offensive weapons, continuing the action-reaction cycle. However, the unintended consequences—especially those that impact U.S. nuclear deterrence relationships with each major adversary—are equally important to consider. Many of the Russian and Chinese nuclear capabilities that U.S. nuclear policymakers and politicians decry are, in part, responses to U.S. missile defense programs and their future potential capabilities. Russia’s much-vaunted new hypersonic weapons, including the intercontinental-range Avangard HGV and the regional-range Kinzhal ALBM, are notable not for their speed but their maneuverability, which may more easily circumvent U.S. defenses than traditional ballistic missiles. Similarly, the “exotic” Burevestnik nuclear-powered cruise missile and Poseidon nuclear-powered torpedo could evade interception and reinforce Russia’s second-strike capabilities. Russian Iskander deployments in and near Europe, now more than ten years old, were in response to U.S. and NATO Aegis Ashore plans. For its part, China has developed ballistic missiles capable of delivering multiple warheads and penetration aids, including its newest DF-41 ICBM and the still in-development JL-3 SLBM, and an HGV-equipped medium-range missile, the DF-17. China’s growing numbers of warheads and dual-capable (nuclear and conventional) missiles and development of hypersonic boost glide systems reflect a determination to improve the survivability of the country’s relatively small nuclear arsenal against U.S. offensive strikes and defensive interceptions. Perhaps paradoxically, as Russia and China develop maneuverable hypersonic weapons and other capabilities to bypass U.S. homeland missile defenses, they may solve (at least partially) the deterrence and instability challenges that U.S. ballistic missile defenses pose. North Korea and Iran are not (yet) capable of deploying such sophisticated offensive systems. Thus, U.S. homeland defenses predicated on ballistic missiles of the number that North Korea (and perhaps someday Iran) could deploy would not threaten forces as maneuverable as Russia’s or China’s. However, Moscow and Beijing would still worry and plan against future U.S. defense technologies, especially space-based ones. Current U.S. missile defense policy will suffice if policymakers believe that unconstrained competition in offensive and defensive weapons is preferable to potential agreements that would provide transparency and potentially some limits on U.S. missile defense in exchange for possible Russian and Chinese concessions. However, U.S. interests and those of allies and the rest of the world would be better served by exploring what possible trade-offs could be negotiated between transparency and potential limitations on some U.S. missile defense capabilities, on one hand, and Russia and Chinese reductions and/or constraints on some of their current and prospective offensive capabilities, on the other. The most promising way to assess these possibilities would be to explore whether and how regional and/or homeland missile defenses could be designed and deployed to protect against a lesser scale of missile threats (such as those posed by Iran and North Korea) without creating the realistic prospect that the United States could successfully negate a Russian or Chinese deterrent of U.S. first strikes against either Russia or China.

## Regulations CP

### 1NC---CP--- Regulations—K Version

**Text: The United States federal government should increase security cooperation with NATO through increasing development of technology including lethal autonomous weapons under a regulated framework.**

#### Their ban reifies the violent dichotomy between humans and machines that prevents solvency---the aff prevents the appropriation of technology for feminist end points

Jones, 21 [Emily Jones is a Lecturer in Law at the University of Essex, 2018, Human Rights Clinic at the University of Essex, accessed on 6-21-2022, “A Posthuman-Xenofeminist Analysis of the Discourse on Autonomous Weapons Systems and Other Killing Machines” http://repository.essex.ac.uk/21540/7/E.%20Jones%2C%20posthumanxenofeminist%20autonomous%20weapons.pdf]/ISEE

Despite current trends in military technologies and the ways in which machines are already helping to make life/death decisions, neither algorithmic ‘independence’, nor AI which decides to kill, nor any type of superhuman soldier would be covered under a pre-emptive ban of autonomous weapons. On the other hand, a posthuman approach to autonomous weapons would recognise the connections between the human and the machine. Such an approach would not fixate on autonomy but would instead work to break down the false dichotomies between autonomy-automation and human-machine, instead focusing on the ethical implications of killer systems across these lines.147 As noted above, whilst xenofeminism and posthuman feminism understand the dangers as well as the potentials of technology, xenofeminism in particular does not account for the power of militarism and the militarism-capitalism assemblage. It seems, therefore, that the risks of the technologymilitarism-capitalism assemblage need to be further read into xenofeminism to ensure that it stays true to its own aims of using and appropriating technology to construct an intersectional feminist future. Braidotti’s posthumanism pays attention to death and modes of dying while promoting an affirmative posthuman era in the face of the necropolitical.148 In contrast to the necropolitical politics of death itself,149 Braidotti proposes ‘a politics of life itself’150 which chooses to tackle the obstacles of the posthuman condition as they come. She thus states: It is a constant challenge for us to rise to the occasion, to be ‘worthy of our times’, while resisting them, and thus to practise amor fati affirmatively. It is quite demanding to catch the wave of life’s intensities in a secular manner and ride on it, exposing the boundaries or limits as we transgress them... Death is the ultimate transposition, though it is not final, as zoe carries on, relentlessly.151 It seems hard, however, to read autonomous weapons in the affirmative when weapons technologies kill people in ever more removed and de-personalised ways. Autonomous weapons, are/will be the child of the military economy. As Braidotti notes, however, to analyse in the affirmative is not to deny the horror of our times. Affirmation ‘proposes a different way of dealing with’ such horrors.152 I propose that xenofeminism provides an affirmative blueprint for embracing the current times. I have noted how xenofeminist method works to appropriate technology and existing political structures, bending them to feminist aims. 153 While the current form of xenofeminism does not fully account for the links between technology and militarism, this does not mean that xenofeminism cannot accommodate such concerns. Xenofeminist method is an affirmative approach in that it notes the contradictions and risks in the posthuman condition and works to deconstruct them. Thus, taking an affirmative posthuman-xenofeminist perspective, one which understands the ways in which the human and the machine are deeply interconnected, I wish to use xenofeminist method – the appropriation of technology for feminist aims – to propose a posthuman-xenofeminist discourse on autonomous weapons. While the XFM does not explicitly address the threat to life technology could pose, the wish to define and use technology for feminist aims, I have already suggested, inherently includes the wish to ensure that technology remains ethical. Taking this further, it is important to note that anti-militarism is a key part of the feminist project as exemplified by the Women’s Peace Conference of 1915, to the feminist activism of Greenham Common to the ways in which Haraway, in her early foundational works, highlighted anti-militarism as a key feminist project.154 While there are many feminists who do not promote an anti-violence stance, choosing to fight as part of their feminism, for example, this does not preclude an anti-militarism stance in the realm of military technologies.155 Neither does an anti-militarism stance in this area wish to judge those who engage in fighting as part of their feminist project as ‘not feminists’, nor to associate feminism inherently with peace. Rather, in noting the history of anti-militarism within the international feminist project, I wish to suggest that there is a need to promote an ethics of anti-militarism at the international structural level. This is precisely because of the ways in which militarism structures the global order, working to structure technological innovation and development alongside forces such as capitalism, colonialism and other power structures. Such a stance must therefore be contrasted to more contextual scenarios, where fighting may indeed be the best form of feminist response. In this sense, anti-militarism must be distinguished from an anti-violence position, with anti-militarism aiming to challenge the industrial, technologically crafted, capitalist driven military complex and with an antiviolence position calling more broadly for peace and non-violence. It thus follows, given the links between militarism, technological advancements and capitalism, that xenofeminism, as a project aiming to appropriate technology for feminist aims, must have regard for antimilitarism. A xenofeminist appropriation of technology must therefore include the desire to ensure that the technology of the now and future cannot be used either for military gains or for the taking of human or nonhuman life.156 Xenofeminist method provides an affirmative method for dealing with the current times and the issue of military technologies. Drawing on the will to appropriate technology for feminist aims and to create the future from the present, manipulating, hacking and coding the system, it seems that the appropriation of technology includes ensuring that technology can only be developed in ethical ways. Technology is dependent on a set of programming choices which will shape machine intelligence as technology advances. What choices are made now, what programming choices are made in these current times, could structure the entire future of technology and machine intelligence. There is a need for feminist posthuman perspectives and xenofeminist infiltrations now. The xenofeminists know well that it matters who makes those programming choices. As Haraway puts it, ‘it matters which figures figure figures, which systems systematize systems’.157 Noting that ‘technology isn’t inherently progressive’, the xenofeminists call for an intervention in these choices.158 While intelligent machines could indeed be the end of humanity, such machines may not make such choices. It is important to get the now right in the hope of working towards a future where the machine-human can work together ethically. As Haraway notes, ‘the machine is use, our processes, an aspect of our embodiment. We can be responsible for machines: they do not dominate or threaten us. We are responsible for boundaries; we are they’.159 The XFM advocates the infiltration of multiple discourses.160 I propose this could include law. I have argued that the discourse on autonomous weapons needs to be made posthuman, emphasising the links between the machine and the human and the ways in which seeing the autonomous weapon as the machinic other is a fallacy. Xenofeminist method calls for the appropriation of technology to promote, in Braidotti’s terms, affirmative aims: constructing the future from the now. While many of the groups calling for a legal ban of autonomous weapons may be overlooking some of the nuances in the debate and definitions, their larger goal – to seek legal frameworks to regulate these systems – is an aim which can remain useful. After all, legal regulation is a core manner in which profit-making tech creators may be forced to shape their innovations in ethical ways. In other words, a xenofeminist method may include not only the appropriation of technology itself but also the frameworks which regulate it. These frameworks are key in structuring future developments of technology, and thus work to appropriate technology through structuring the creation of technology from the outset. In line with xenofeminist method, therefore, I propose that a legal framework is needed to ensure that feminist ethics of anti-militarism, justice and intersectionality remain central to technological innovation. A feminist posthuman understanding of technology is required here: to ensure that the dark sides of technology are evaded whilst technology’s positive, subjectivity challenging and capitalism destroying potential is maintained. There is a need to focus on the regulation of all technologies, given the real possibility that killer machines may be created in multiple ways. There have been steps in other contexts towards creating broader ethical regulations for technology. This can be seen in the example of the European Parliament resolution of 16 February 2017, which makes recommendations to the Commission on Civil Law Rules on Robotics.161 The resolution is well thought out, considering a variety of issues around the legal regulation of technology and noting issues around liability, care robots, autonomous vehicles and privacy issues.162 The resolution calls for the urgent need to regulate technologies.163 While the resolution opens up debate on these issues, it is non-binding and seeks to regulate non-military technologies, thus upholding a false binary between military and civil technologies despite the clear cross-overs. As noted above, many civil technologies are originally created for military purposes, and there also remains a risk that civil intelligent technologies may decide to kill or may be easily adapted to make them kill.164 In addition, the resolution does not consider human enhancement technologies despite emerging developments in this area. This trend towards focusing on the immediate present and towards categorising military and non-military technologies separately is repeated throughout legal and policy attempts to regulate these technologies. There is an urgent need for a posthumanxenofeminist infiltration of the discussions around the legal regulation of technology, working to promote a future-facing feminist posthuman perspective which understands the cross-overs between civil and military technologies, the human and the machine, and autonomy and automation. While technology may be largely controlled at present by a capitalist elite with strong ties to militarism, this does not mean this technology will inevitably remain in their hands and under their control. By ensuring that basic ethical principles are applied now, through the application of laws to regulate programming choices and technological innovation in the present, technology can be shaped, working towards a post capitalist, fairer, more ethical and just, feminist world.

### 1NC---CP---Regulations---Policy

#### Text: The United States federal government should increase its security cooperation with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization by regulating lethal autonomous weapons systems per Lewis ’15.

**Regulation solves**

**Lewis ‘15**

(John, JD from Yale, the San Francisco Affirmative Litigation Project, and the International Refugee Assistance Project, Senior Counsel at Democracy Forward. John has filed multiple cases under the Administrative Procedure Act, other federal statutes, and the U.S. Constitution. In particular, John has represented or co-counseled with governments and non-profit organizations in cases involving immigration, civil rights, health care, education, veterans’ affairs, and other issues., frmr executive editor on the Yale Law Journal and a member of the Supreme Court Clinic, “The Case for Regulating Fully Autonomous Weapons,” pg online @ <https://www.yalelawjournal.org/comment/the-case-for-regulating-fully-autonomous-weapons> //40)

III. DEVELOPING A REGULATORY SCHEME

**I**nternational **law** already regulates a category of weapons systems that share important similarities with FAWs: landmines. While several commentators have hinted at these similarities,55 scholars have yet to consider whether FAWs might be regulated much as landmines are.56 This lacuna is striking because the similarities between FAWs and landmines speak directly to core questions of distinction and proportionality under international law.

A. Drawing from the Amended Protocol

Landmines and FAWs share several essential features that affect the level of risk they pose to civilians. First, once activated, landmines and FAWs both possess the capacity to “target” and kill without further human input. For instance, anti-tank landmines possess a rudimentary capacity to discriminate between targets, in the sense that they explode only when a large vehicle travels over them.57 Like FAWs, landmines not only react to an external signal but also potentially possess the ability to distinguish among signals. The extent to which a weapons system can make such distinctions in a given set of circumstances is essential to determining whether it complies with international law.

Second, both landmines and FAWs are used, and threaten individuals, within certain defined parameters.58 Landmines are placed in a particular location. FAWs would also be deployed with a specific set of instructions, which may include limitations on the areas within which they can operate. These qualities affect the likelihood that any system will target (or harm) civilians. In this respect, landmines and FAWs implicate similar questions of distinction.

Landmines and FAWs are also similar in the sense that their permissibility turns on technical characteristics. Landmines can be made with detectable or undetectable materials; they can be triggered by different stimuli; they can be delivered remotely or by hand; and they can be set to deactivate after a certain amount of time has passed. Similarly, FAWs could have better or worse sensors or targeting software, could carry lethal or non-lethal ordinance, and could be mobile or static, among other traits. These features create ample opportunity for the international community to supply **specific rules** regarding how these weapons can be designed, with the intention of rendering them compliant with international law.

At the same time, FAWs and landmines are dissimilar in ways that render an Ottawa Treaty-style ban inappropriate. Unlike landmines, FAWs will likely be subject to tracking and remote deactivation by design.59 The “temporal indiscriminateness” of landmines, which can kill many years after they are placed,60 is therefore almost non-existent with respect to FAWs. Moreover, FAWs may develop in ways that make them capable of distinguishing between civilians and combatants. Landmines, on the other hand, cannot make this distinction. No inherent feature of FAWs renders these weapons categorically impermissible under international law—within some parameters, they may even perform better than human soldiers. Compared to landmines, then, FAWs present a better case for regulation.

Given the parallels between these weapon systems, the Amended Protocol provides a suitable framework for regulating FAWs. The Protocol, first negotiated in 1980 and amended in 1996 in response to concerns about the proliferation of landmines, provides specific rules governing how landmines may be used.61 Specifically, the Amended Protocol focuses on geographic and spatial criteria for determining whether the deployment of mines is permissible.62 First, as a threshold matter, the Protocol does not apply to anti-ship mines,63 suggesting a recognition that—much like in the robot case discussed above64—the use of these weapons at sea raises less problematic issues under international law. Second, the Protocol makes clear that the definition of “indiscriminate” use, a concept from the Geneva Conventions,65 applies to how landmines are placed. The Protocol requires landmines to be deployed around military objectives and requires states to presume that locations “normally dedicated to civilian purposes”—for example, homes and schools—do not constitute legitimate military objectives.66 Relatedly, Section 9 of the Amended Protocol provides that distinct military objectives cannot be treated as one objective, and this, in effect, requires states to deploy landmines only in precisely defined areas.67 The Protocol also requires additional protections in order to place certain weapons in areas containing a concentration of civilians and no active military engagement.68

The emphasis on how landmines are deployed stems from features that landmines share with FAWs. The Protocol focuses on commander decision-making because landmines do not require human action to kill once activated. Under the Amended Protocol, commanders may deploy landmines only within certain parameters, defined by how likely they are to contain civilians. These parameters provide a more precise instantiation of what distinction requires.69 The Protocol does not completely foreclose the use of landmines, but rather allows states with legitimate military purposes to deploy them in a limited fashion.70 By limiting how a commander may deploy landmines, the Amended Protocol implicitly attempts to curb the risk of civilian harm from their use.71 The Amended Protocol thus grapples with the same normative challenges that FAWs pose. In this respect**, it provides a particularly apt model for regulation of FAWs**.

The Amended Protocol for landmines also establishes a framework for the use of a highly technical weapons system, and in this sense it provides precedent for the regulation of weapons like FAWs. The Protocol contains several technical restrictions on landmines and provides other important protections. Several articles of the Protocol, for instance, provide detailed requirements for which characteristics landmines must have and which they may not.72 Article 3, Section 8 prohibits any method of delivery that cannot distinguish between military objectives or that would lead to excessive loss of civilian life.73 The Amended Protocol also contains a catch-all provision requiring states to take all “feasible precautions” against risk of harm to civilians.74 By analogy, **a regulation for FAWs could establish specific technical limits**, including, for example, baseline requirements for sensory or computational ability and shut-off capabilities. Given that the Amended Protocol set out to answer many concerns similar to those raised by FAWs, it makes sense to draw from this framework in developing a comparable regulatory scheme.

B. A Model Framework for FAWs

The international community should negotiate—or nations should develop—**an instrument for FAWs** that is **analogous to the Amended Protocol for landmines**. These rules would focus on delineating parameters under which FAWs can be used consistently with the principle of distinction. Such parameters would be defined by the need to reduce the risk of civilian casualties. These might minimally include:

· Characteristics of the FAW. As they develop, FAWs may vary widely in their ability to determine whether individuals are civilians or combatants. A regulatory framework could include technical details, such as the quality of the onboard camera and the FAW’s ability to make more difficult, contextual assessments of intention and behavior.75 In the future, the rule might consider the machine’s capacity to learn from encounters, which may improve its capacity to distinguish but may also create a risk that the weapon will exceed its programming.

· Characteristics of the environment. A remote battlefield is unlikely to pose much risk of civilian harm. But a well-trafficked urban area should require the use of a FAW with a heightened capacity to assess targets.76 At the moment, until FAW technology develops further, this may mean that the deployment of FAWs in densely populated areas should be per se illegal. More generally, commanders should also refrain from deploying FAWs near locations that are frequented by civilians, like schools and places of worship. Above all, this regulatory factor would focus on the relative concentration of combat forces and civilians.

· Characteristics of the opposing force. Whether enemy forces wear uniforms or insignia or instead blend into the civilian population may make a difference in terms of how well a FAW can distinguish between combatants and civilians. Regulations should include this factor and should require commanders to consider countermeasures used by opposing forces to evade detection. This factor may be dispositive depending on how significantly the opposing force’s evasion techniques affect the FAW’s ability to distinguish.

· Level of residual human control. The degree to which a human operator supervises and is able to override decisions or shut down the FAW is relevant, even if the machine operates in a fully autonomous capacity. The constant supervision of an operator, who can cancel targeting decisions in real time, may strongly point in favor of a weapon’s permissibility. Depending on the other features of the weapon and how they affect its ability to distinguish, oversight might even be explicitly required.

· Other factors.Other factors that affect whether a FAW may permissibly be used could include weather conditions, ordnance strength (and lethality/non-lethality), whether the weapon is stationary or mobile, whether it is offensive or defensive, and the risk that it will exceed any limitations (for instance, by traveling out of a designated zone).

An international agreement providing rules to govern FAW usage would also need to address the issue of accountability. The Amended Protocol requires states to impose sanctions against individuals who wrongfully use landmines.77 This reflects the intuition that the commander’s decision to deploy is the proper focus of responsibility. We should evaluate responsibility in the context of FAWs the same way. If a commander knowingly deploys a FAW with weak targeting software in the middle of a city, and it kills dozens of civilians, most would likely agree that the commander has committed a crime, or at least should be subjected to sanctions of some kind.78 The standards developed to regulate FAWs should aim to provide commanders with more specific guidance regarding lawful usage, not only to encourage proper use, but also to enable authorities to judge when a commander has used weapons unlawfully.

In this respect, **regulation is an attempt** not only to limit the harm of war, but also **to bolster the rule of law**. The commander is liable for his own unlawful act of deployment, like a commander who recklessly orders that artillery be fired in a populated urban area.79 To ensure compliance, states should train commanders in the legitimate use of FAWs.80 If a commander knowingly uses FAWs in a way conducive to harming civilians, he should be punished.

**CP solves – regulations will prevent cheating and encourage buy-in and spill-over to eventual full bans, but an attempt at a full ban initially causes cheating and lack of compliance that guts the aff**

**Lewis ‘15**

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Opponents of FAWs invoke each of these critiques to argue in favor of an absolute, preemptive ban on FAWs.24 In their view, once nations have developed FAW technology, it will be difficult to get them to stop.25 The time to act is now, before the military utility of FAWs has been demonstrated and before other countries develop FAW technology in response. These arguments resonate with apocalyptic images, replete in pop culture, of killer robots run amok—think Terminator.26 Yet they also exaggerate the danger posed by FAWs and underappreciate regulation’s potential to respond to the threats that FAWs do pose.

II. THE ARGUMENT FOR REGULATION, RATHER THAN PROHIBITION

This Comment begins from the proposition that the purpose of international humanitarian law is to minimize harm understood in terms of suffering—primarily to civilians, but also to combatants.27 Many have argued that public policy should be guided by consequentialist aims, given, among other things, the differences between individuals and states28 and the inevitability of trade-offs in policymaking.29 Gabriella Blum contends that the argument for consequentialism is particularly strong in the case of armed conflict, which “is about committing evils and choosing between evils.”30 Following Blum’s logic, this Part brackets the deontological critique of FAWs—understood as the view that the use of FAWs is wrong independently of its consequences—and focuses on the possibility of regulatory regimes that minimize suffering in practice. While the deontological critique of FAWs presents a serious challenge, it loses much of its force if the responsible use of FAWs can reduce harm.31

A consequentialist approach focused on minimizing harm also makes less compelling the objection that the use of FAWs reduces accountability. While the “autonomous” nature of FAWs appears to distance decision makers from the harms they inflict, commanders remain responsible for the initial use of FAWs. A commander must give the order to deploy a FAW and set parameters for its use—for example, by instructing that a FAW has X mission and must operate within Y area. In this sense, there is no such thing as a fully autonomous weapon. Any weapon will require human intervention at some point, if only to activate it. The commander is ultimately responsible for using a FAW within its programming and within legal limits. If humans must remain an integral part of the decision to take a life in order for a weapon to fulfill the condition of accountability, then FAWs satisfy this requirement.

I focus, therefore, on the question whether, as a legal matter, FAWs can be regulated in ways that minimize the suffering that they cause. This Comment argues that they can, for two reasons. First, **FAWs are highly amenable to regulation**. As quasi- but never fully autonomous systems, FAWs are ripe for a regulatory scheme that provides standards for permissible usage and holds commanders accountable. Second, given the potential military utility of FAWs, **states are more likely to comply with regulations than** with an **absolute prohibition**. This point matters because, even if the critics are correct that FAWs will always violate international law, they **are wrong** to think that prohibition will avert these harms.

A. FAWs May Be Used Lawfully

Whether FAWs can be deployed lawfully depends in part on whether they can be used in a manner that avoids civilian casualties. Given the pace of technological development, it is too early to say that a FAW could never make the contextual and difficult decisions that soldiers must make when distinguishing between combatants and civilians.32 As George R. Lucas, Jr. argues, the critical question is not whether FAWs can “be ethical,” but whether they can perform at the level of a human soldier.33 Human soldiers aren’t perfect.34 Indeed, robots may have a number of advantages over humans, including superior sensory and computational capabilities, a lack of such emotions as fear and anger, and the ability to monitor and report unethical behavior on the battlefield.35 A robot might also have access to greater information about the value of a target, and hence may be able to make a better determination on an issue like proportionality in the heat of the moment. Even if robots lack quintessentially human characteristics like empathy,36 they may nonetheless be able to respect the rules of combat.

Whatever we might think about the capabilities of FAWs as a general matter, in some circumstances the use of FAWs will be wholly unproblematic. Imagine a robotic submarine operating in an isolated undersea environment, far from any civilians.37 Here the risk of the submarine violating international humanitarian law is exceedingly low. This is a best-case scenario, but it illustrates a broader point: the efficacy and legitimacy of FAWs will depend on the circumstances. In this regard, FAWs are unlike some weapons that have been banned by the international community, like non-detectable fragments and blinding laser weapons, which cause unnecessary suffering no matter how they are used.38 In the future, FAWs may have the ability to patrol an urban area and seek out combatant targets; for now, perhaps they are best left to operate in isolated environments or in a purely defensive capacity. In either case, the need for clear guidelines is not an argument for an outright ban. Rather than prohibiting FAWs writ large, **i**nternational **law** should recognize that in some circumstances, they may permissibly be used—bolstering the case for regulation.

Regulating FAWs would also help to resolve issues of **compliance** and **accountability.** International law sets out fairly broad standards: weapons must distinguish between civilians and combatants, they may not cause disproportionate collateral damage, and so on. Yet in any given case, there is ambiguity about what the relevant standard requires, and this ambiguity hinders effective compliance and accountability. For instance, a commander, in the heat of battle and with incomplete information, may not know whether a particular use complies with abstract concepts such as distinction or proportionality. Defining the bounds of permissible conduct more precisely **via regulation** can minimize these concerns.39

For this reason, various actors have recognized the need for guidance regarding FAWs. In 2009, the Department of Defense issued a directive on autonomous weapons, thereby taking a strong first step toward regulation. That directive primarily addresses mechanisms for approving the development of new weapons systems, though it does also consider both the levels of autonomy present in a given system and the purposes for which systems may be used.40 The directive also generally dictates that commanders using automated weapons should apply “appropriate care” in compliance with international and domestic law.41 An ideal regulatory scheme would develop beyond this Directive: it would be international in nature, would focus more heavily on use, and would provide greater specificity regarding how and when particular systems may be used. A complete regulatory scheme would also tackle other thorny issues, including research, testing, acquisition, development, and proliferation.42 In these early stages, the project of regulation ought to begin with the issue of permissible usage, given that it presents difficult—yet familiar—questions under international law.

B. **States Are More Likely To Comply with Regulations**

In the previous section, I suggested that not all FAWs present an unacceptable risk of civilian casualties, and, as such, that these weapons are not wholly impermissible. Yet, even if FAWs ought to be categorically rejected, **it is not clear that a ban would actually be effective**. Robotic weaponry in the form of unmanned drones has already begun to revolutionize the ways in which nations fight wars. At least one military analyst has suggested that fully autonomous weapons will represent the biggest advance in military technology since gunpowder.43 Other commentators have argued that it would be unrealistic to expect major world powers to ban FAWs altogether, especially if some states refused to sign on and continued to develop them.44 FAWs may have significant military utility, and in this respect, they are unlike many other weapons that the international community has banned.45 **Even if a ban were** successful, moreover, **nations might interpret the terms of the ban narrowly to permit further development of FAWs**46 or violate the prohibition in ways that escape detection.47 The better approach to ensure compliance overall would be to establish minimum limitations on FAW technology and specific rules governing use.

Two cases, landmines and cluster munitions, help to illustrate this point. The Ottawa Treaty formally banned landmines in 1997. However, several states, including the United States, China, Russia, and India, declined to sign the treaty, invoking military necessity.48 Nations that have refused to sign the Ottawa Treaty have generally complied with the more modest regulations of the Amended Protocol.49 In a similar pattern, several states, invoking claims of military necessity, have declined to sign the Oslo Convention of 2008, which banned cluster weapons.50 However, these nations have signaled that they would be willing to negotiate a set of regulations under the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons.51 These cases suggest that nations are unlikely to accept a full ban on weapons that they frequently use. Among those states that are inclined to use FAWs, a more modest attempt to regulate these weapons may result in higher initial buy-in, as well as higher overall compliance with the principles of distinction and proportionality.

**The counterplan establishes a standard for LAWS regulation that ensures liberal democratic norms --- failure allows China to set the global model --- undermines effective democratic governance**

**Imbrie et al ‘20**

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Initiative 9: Shape global norms and standards for AI. The United States has a vested interest in setting the rules of the road for **a**rtificial **i**ntelligence. Western countries have already taken the lead in developing principles governing the application of artificial intelligence. China has produced its 32 Center for Security and Emerging Technology own set of principles and engages actively in international bodies, such as the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) and the 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP), to establish standards for mobile network technologies and the future governance of AI. By assuming leadership in AI, the United States and its allies face risks and opportunities. The risks are twofold. On the one hand, standard setting could become a casualty of geopolitical competition as leading countries precipitate a race to the bottom. On the other hand, China already asserts its principles and standards through a variety of multilateral fora. The opportunity is that the United States and its allies can act now to **set global standards** for AI reflecting and supporting human rights and **liberal democratic values**, while addressing critical questions **surrounding the rollout of 5G**, **facial recognition for surveillance**, automated cyber exploitation and defense, and **a**utonomous **w**eapons **s**ystems. A Japanese official responding to the CSET survey noted that the United States and its allies should adopt a citizen-centric AI strategy. Such citizen-centric strategies would seek to develop and deploy AI for the benefit of **democratic societies,** including strengthened data privacy standards and respect for civil liberties; economic empowerment of citizens **within rules-based market economies**; greater access to education, precision medicine, energy efficiency, and more inclusive social service provision. The United States should lead a multilateral effort with allies and partners **to set international rules of conduct for AI**. This effort should build on and extend the OECD Principles on AI and the International Organization for Standardization working group initiatives on standards for data and AI safety and security. The United States and its allies could establish a standing platform to coordinate policies on standard-setting in multilateral fora. This is likely an area for productive dialogue, as partners are eager to coordinate policies and share **best practices around norms and standards**. In fact, all surveyed officials were extremely or very interested in this avenue for international collaboration. Longer term, the United States and its allies should explore the conditions for a common AI market, including standards for testing, verification, and validation of AI technologies, as well as common practices for certifying companies that support liberal democratic values and privacy.87 This common market would create incentives for other countries to abide by these principles in the development and deployment of safe and reliable AI. As one EU representative observed, if the West could offer a viable way of doing AI that respects privacy and fundamental rights, developing (and democratic) countries would be more **inclined to follow the Western model**.

**Democratic governance stops nuclear transition wars with Russia and China AND drives global technological innovation---extinction.**

**Kolodziej ’17** [Edward; May 19; Emeritus Research Professor of Political Science at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign; EUC Paper Series, “Challenges to the Democratic Project for Governing Globalization,” https://www.ideals.illinois.edu/bitstream/handle/2142/96620/Kolodziej Introduction 5.19.17.pdf?sequence=2&isAllowed=y]

The Rise of a Global Society

Let me first sketch the global democratic project for global governance as a point of reference. We must first recognize that globalization has given rise to a global society for the **first time** in the evolution of the human **species**. We are now **stuck with each other**; **seven and half billion** people today — nine to **ten** by **2050**: all **super connected** and **interdependent**. In greater or lesser measure, humans are mutually dependent on each other in the pursuit of their most salient values, interests, needs, and preferences — concerns about personal, community, and national **security**, sustainable economic **growth**, protection of the **environment**, the equitable **distribution** of the globe’s material wealth, human **rights**, and even the validation of their personal and social identities by others. Global **warming** is a metaphor of this morphological social change in the human condition. **All** humans are **implicated** in this looming Anthropogenic-induced **disaster** — the exhausts of billions of automobiles, the methane released in fracking for natural gas, outdated U.S. coal-fired power plants and newly constructed ones in China. Even the poor farmer burning charcoal to warm his dinner is complicit.

Since interdependence surrounds, ensnares, and binds us as a human society, the dilemma confronting the world’s diverse and divided populations is evident: the **expanding scope** as well as the **deepening**, **accumulating**, and **thickening** interdependencies of globalization urge global government. But the Kantian ideal of universal governance is beyond the reach of the world’s disparate peoples. They are **profoundly divided** by religion, culture, language, tribal, ethnic and national loyalties as well as by class, social status, race, gender, and sexual orientation. How have the democracies responded to this dilemma? How have they attempted to reconcile the growing interdependence of the world’s disputing peoples and need for global governance?

What do we mean by the governance of a human society?

A working, **legitimate government** of a human society requires simultaneous responses to three competing imperatives: Order, Welfare, and Legitimacy. While the forms of these OWL imperatives have differed radically over the course of human societal evolution, these constraints remain predicable of all human societies if they are to replicate themselves and flourish over time. The OWL imperatives are no less applicable to a global society.

1. Order refers to a society’s investment of awesome material power in an individual or body to arbitrate and resolve value, interest, and preference conflicts, which cannot be otherwise resolved by non-violent means — the Hobbesian problematic.

2. The Welfare imperative refers to the necessity of humans to eat, drink, clothe, and shelter themselves and to pursue the full-range of their seemingly limitless acquisitive appetites. Responses to the Welfare imperative, like that of Order, constitute a distinct form of governing power and authority with its own decisional processes and actors principally associated either with the Welfare or the Order imperative. Hence we have the Marxian-Adam Smith problematic.

3. Legitimacy is no less a form of governing power and authority, independent of the Order and Welfare imperatives. Either by choice, socialization, or coerced acquiescence, populations acknowledge a regime’s governing authority and their obligation to submit to its rule. Here arises the Rousseaunian problematic.

The government of a human society emerges then as an evolving, precarious balance and compromise of the ceaseless struggle of these competing OWL power domains for ascendancy of one of these imperatives over the others. It is against the backdrop of these OWL imperatives — Order, Welfare, and Legitimacy — that we are brought to the democratic project for global governance.

The Democratic Project

For Order, open societies constructed the global democratic state and, in alliance, the democratic global-state system. Collectively these initiatives led to the creation of the United Nations, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the World Trade Organization, and the European Union to implement the democratic project’s system of global governance.

The democratic global state assumed all of the functions of the Hobbesian Westphalian security state — but a lot more. The global state became a Trading, Banking, Market, and Entrepreneurial state. To these functions were added those of the Science, Technology and the Economic Growth state. How else would we be able to enjoy the **Internet**, **cell phones** and iPhones, or **miracle cures**? These are the products of the **iron triangle** of the global democratic state, academic and non-profit research centers, and corporations. It is a **myth** that the Market System did all this **alone**. Fueled by increasing material wealth, the democratic global state was afforded the means to become the **Safety Net** state, providing **ed**ucation, **health**, **social security**, leisure and recreation for its population. And as the global state’s power expanded across this broad and enlarging spectrum of functions and roles, the global state was also constrained by the social compacts of the democracies to be bound by popular rule. The ironic result of the expansion of the global state’s power and social functions and its obligation to accede to popular will was a Security state and global state-system that vastly outperformed its principal authoritarian rivals in the Cold War. So much briefly is the democratic project’s response to the Order imperative.

Now let’s look at the democratic project’s response to the Welfare imperative. The democracies institutionalized Adam Smith’s vision of a global Market System. The Market System trucks and barters, Smith’s understanding of what it means to be human. But it does a lot more. The Market System facilitates and fosters the free movement of people, goods and services, capital, ideas, values, scientific discoveries, and best technological practices. Created is a vibrant global civil society oblivious to state boundaries. What we now experience is De Tocqueville’s Democracy in America on global steroids.

As for the imperative of Legitimacy, the social compacts of the democracies affirmed Rousseau’s conjecture that all humans are free and therefore equal. Applied to elections each citizen has one vote. Democratic regimes are also obliged to submit to the rule of law, to conduct free and fair elections, to honor majority rule while protecting minority rights, and to **promote** human rights at home and **abroad**.

The Authoritarian Threat to the Democratic Project

The **democratic project** for **global governance** is now at **risk**. Let’s start with the challenges posed by authoritarian regimes, with Russia and China in the lead. Both Russia and China would **rest global governance** on Big Power spheres of influence. Both would assume **hegemonic status** in their respective regions, asserting their versions of the **Monroe Doctrine**. Their regional hegemony would then **leverage** their claim to be global **Big Powers**. Moscow and Beijing would then have an equal say with the United States and the West in sharing and shaping global governance. **The** Russo-Chinese global **system** of Order would ascribe to Russia and China governing privileges not accorded to the states both aspire to dominate. Moscow and Beijing would enjoy **unconditional** recognition of their state **sovereignty**, territorial integrity, and non-interference in their domestic affairs, but they would reserve to themselves the right to **intervene** in the domestic and foreign affairs of the states and peoples under their tutelage in pursuit of their hegemonic interests. President Putin has announced that Russia’s **imperialism** encompasses the **millions** of Russians living in the former republics of the Soviet Union. Russia contends that Ukraine and Belarus also fall under Moscow’s purported claim to historical sovereignty over these states. Forceful re-absorption of **Crimea** and control over eastern **Ukraine** are viewed by President Putin as Russia’s historical inheritances. Self-determination is not extended to these states or to other states and peoples of the former Soviet Union. Moscow rejects their right to freely align, say, with the European Union or, god forbid, with NATO.

In contrast to the democratic project, universal in its reach, the Russo-Chinese conception of a stable global order rests on more **tenuous** and **conflict-prone ethno-national foundations**. Russia’s proclaimed enemies are the United States and the European Union. Any means that undermines the unity of these entities is viewed by Moscow as a gain. The endgame is a **poly-anarchical** interstate system, potentially as **war-prone** as the Eurocentric system **before** and **after World War I**, but now populated by states with **nuclear weapons.**

Global politics becomes a **zero-sum game**.

Moscow has **no compunctions** about **corrupting** the **electoral processes** of democratic states, conducting threatening **military exercises** along NATO’s east border, or violating the more than 30-year old treaty to ban the deployment of Intermediate-Range **missile launchers**, capable of **firing nuclear weapons**. Nothing less than the **dissolution** of the democratic project is Moscow’s solution for global Order.

China also seeks a revision of the global Order. It declares sovereignty over the **South China Sea**. Rejected is The Hague Tribunal’s dismissal of this claim. Beijing continues to build artificial islands as military bases in the region to assert its control over these troubled waters. If it could have its way, China would decide which states and their naval vessels, notably those of the United States, would have access to the South China Sea.

Where Moscow and Beijing depart sharply are in their contrasting responses to the Welfare imperative. Moscow has **no solution** other than to use its oil and gas resources as instruments of **coercive diplomacy** and to weaken or **dismantle** existing Western **alliances** and international economic **institutions**. China can ill-afford the dismantling of the global market system. In his address to the Davos gathering in January of this year, Chinese President Xi asserted that “any attempt to cut off the flow of capital, technologies, products, industries and people between economies, and channel the waters in the ocean back into isolated lakes and creeks is simply not possible.” Adam Smith could not have said it better. Both Moscow and Beijing have been particularly assiduous to legitimate their regimes. President Putin’s case for legitimacy is much broader and deeper than a pure appeal to Russian nationalism. He stresses the spiritual and cultural unity of Russianspeaking populations spread across the states of the post-Soviet space. A central core of that unity is the Russian Orthodox Church, a key prop of the regime. Reviled is Western secularism, portrayed as corrupt and decadent, viewed by Putin as an existential threat to the Russian World. The Chinese regime, secular and atheistic, can hardly rely on religion to legitimate the regime. Beijing principally rests its legitimacy on its record of economic development and nationalism. The regime’s success in raising the economic standards of hundreds of millions of Chinese reinforces its claim to legitimacy in two ways. On the one hand, the Communist Party can rightly claim to have raised hundreds of millions of Chinese from poverty within a generation. On the other hand, the Communist Party insists that its model of economic growth, what critics scorn as crony capitalism, is superior to the unfettered, market-driven model of the West. Hence capitalism with Chinese characteristics is more effective and legitimate than the Western alternative.

Where Moscow and Beijing do **converge** is in fashioning their responses to the Legitimacy imperative. They **repudiate Western liberal democracy**. Both reject criticisms of their human rights abuses as interventions into their domestic affairs. Dissidents are harassed, incarcerated, or, in some instances, assassinated. Journalists are co-opted, selfcensored, silenced, or imprisoned. Social media is state controlled. Both the Putin regime and the Chinese Communist Party monopolize the public narratives evaluating governmental policy. Transparency and accountability are hostage to governmental secrecy. Civil society has few effective avenues to criticize governmental actions. Moscow adds an ironic twist to these controls in manipulating national elections to produce an elected authoritarian regime.

Whether either of these authoritarian responses to the Legitimacy imperative will survive **remains to be seen**. Beijing’s use of economic performance and nationalism to underwrite its legitimacy is a double-edged sword. If economic performance falters, then legitimacy suffers. Whether top-down nationalism will always control nationalism from the bottom-up is also problematic. In resting legitimacy on nationalism, dubious historical claims, and crypto-religious beliefs, Moscow is spared Beijing’s economic performance test. That said, there is room for skepticism that in the long-run Russians will exchange lower standards of living for corrupt rule in pursuit of an elusive Russian mission antagonistic to the West. The implosion of the Soviet Union, due in no small part to its retarded economic and technological development, suggests that the patience of the Russian people has limits. Demonstrations in March 2017 against state corruption in 82 Russian cities, led largely by Russian youth, reveal these limits. They are an ominous omen for the future of the Putin kleptocracy. Meanwhile, neither Russia nor China offers much to solve the Legitimacy imperative of global governance.

**And, it turns the case --- Spread of authoritarianism LAWS risks digital militarization---extinction.**

**Orts ’18** [Eric; June 27; Guardsmark Professor in the Wharton School at the University of Pennsylvania; LinkedIn Pulse, “Foreign Affairs: Six Future Scenarios (and a Seventh),” https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/foreign-affairs-six-future-scenarios-seventh-eric-orts]

7. Fascist Nationalism. There is another possible future that the Foreign Affairs scenarios do not contemplate, and it’s a dark world in which Trump, Putin, Xi, Erdogan, and others construct regimes that are **authoritarian and nationalist**. Fascism is possible in the United States and elsewhere if big business can be seduced by promises of riches in return for the institutional keys to democracy. Perhaps Foreign Affairs editors are right to leave this dark world out, for it would be very dark: **nationalist wars** with risks of **escalation into global nuclear conflict**, further **digital militarization** (even Terminator-style scenarios of smart **military robots**), and **unchecked climate disasters**.

The global challenges are quite large – and the six pieces do an outstanding job of presenting them. One must remain optimistic and engaged, hopeful that we can overcome the serious dangers of tribalism, nationalism, and new fascism. These "isms” of our time **stand in the** way of solving some of our biggest **global problems**, such as the risks of **thermonuclear war** and global **climate catastrophe**.

### 2NC---CP---Regulations---Policy---AT: PDCP

**Perm do the CP severs out of the aff’s ban: “Ban” is complete – excludes restriction/regulation.**

**California Second District Court of Appeals 12**

(COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. ALTERNATIVE MEDICINAL CANNABIS COLLECTIVE et al., Defendants and Appellants, No. B233419) BW

**We must give the words of the statute their usual and ordinary meaning; accord significance**, if possible, **to every word,** phrase and sentence; **and construe the words in context, bearing in mind the statutory purpose, and attempting to harmonize** statutes or statutory **sections relating to the same subject matter** to the extent possible. (McCarther, supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 110.) We disagree with County that in using the phrases “further restrict the location or establishment” and “regulate the location or establishment” in section 11362.768, subdivisions (f) and (g), the Legislature intended to authorize local governments to ban all medical marijuana dispensaries that are otherwise “authorized by law to possess, cultivate, or distribute medical marijuana” (§ 11362.768, subd. (e) [stating scope of section's application] ); the Legislature did not use the words “ban” or “prohibit.” Yet County cites dictionary definitions of “regulate” (to govern or direct according to rule or law); “regulation” (controlling by rule or restriction; a rule or order that has legal force); “restriction” (a limitation or qualification, including on the use of property); “establishment” (the act of establishing or state or condition of being established); “ban” (to prohibit); and “prohibit” (to forbid by law; to prevent or hinder) to attempt to support its interpretation. County then concludes that “the ordinary meaning of the terms, ‘restriction,’ ‘regulate,’ and ‘regulation’ are consistent with a ban or prohibition against the opening or starting up or continued operation of [a medical marijuana dispensary] storefront business.” We disagree. **The ordinary meanings of “restrict” and “regulate” suggest a degree of control or restriction falling short of “banning,” “prohibiting,” “forbidding,” or “preventing.”** Had the Legislature intended to include an outright ban or prohibition among the local regulatory powers authorized in section 11362.768, subdivisions (f) and (g), it would have said so. Attributing the **usual and ordinary meanings** to the words used in section 11362.768, subdivisions (f) and (g), construing the words in context, attempting to harmonize subdivisions (f) and (g) with section 11362.775 and with the purpose of California's medical marijuana statutory program, and bearing in mind the intent of the electorate and the Legislature in enacting the CUA and the MMP, we conclude that the phrases “further restrict the location or establishment” and “regulate the location or establishment” in section 11362.768, subdivisions (f) and (g) do not authorize a per se ban at the local level. The Legislature decided in section 11362.775 to insulate medical marijuana collectives and cooperatives from nuisance prosecution “solely on the basis” that they engage in a dispensary function. To interpret the phrases “further restrict the location or establishment” and “regulate the location or establishment” to mean that local governments may impose a blanket nuisance prohibition against dispensaries would frustrate both the Legislature's intent to “[e]nhance the access of patients and caregivers to medical marijuana through collective, cooperative cultivation projects” and “[p]romote uniform and consistent application of the [CUA] among the counties within the state” and the electorate's intent to “ensure that seriously ill Californians have the right to obtain and use marijuana for medical purposes” and “encourage the federal and state governments to implement a plan to provide for the safe and affordable distribution of marijuana to all patients in medical need of marijuana.”

### 2NC---CP---Regulations---Policy---AT: Cheating

**Regulations solve the problem of cheating and secret development while bans ensure underground development --- prefer the cp --- our evidence is *comparative***

**Bento ‘15**

(Lucas Bento is a lawyer in New York specializing in international dispute resolution, President of the Brazilian American Lawyers Association, a Fellow of the Chartered Institute of Arbitrators, and a Visiting Scholar at Columbia Law School., Fellow of the Royal Society of Arts, in recognition of his contributions to the Legal Profession in both the UK and the U.S. He is a Solicitor Advocate with rights of audience in the higher courts (civil and criminal) of England & Wales. Mr. Bento has taught courses on International Arbitration and Dispute Resolution at New York University and Transnational Dispute Resolution at INSPER in São Paulo, Brazil. He has also spoken on international legal issues at the United Nations, pg online @ <https://thediplomat.com/2015/02/killer-robots-need-regulation-not-a-ban/> //40)

Technology can be both disruptive and transformative. It can disrupt the status quo and it can also transform the way we see how things can be done.

States around the world have showed great interest in developing autonomous robots for military purposes. These robots, also called “killer robots” in some circles, would be able to select and engage targets without human intervention. The implication of ceding human control for machine discretion has led some organizations to call for an outright ban of the technology. In a 2012 report entitled ‘Losing Humanity,’ Human Rights Watch recommended the ratification of an international treaty prohibiting the “development, production, and use” of robotic weapons because they would be incapable of discriminating between combatants and civilians on the battleground. Other coalitions, such as the Campaign to Stop Killer Robots, have formed around similar policy goals.

Although the prospect of delegating lethal powers to robots may evoke a dystopian vision of the future, **the pessimism is arguably misplaced**, and misunderstands the potential of artificial intelligence. Whatever the moral merits or precautionary logic of a complete ban, **total prohibition of autonomous robots is undesirable for a number of reasons**.

First, **a ban would be unworkable in practice**. It would ignore the practical complexities of international cooperation. Without the ratification of major military powers, a ban would be impossible to enforce. The **temptation for states to cheat is also obvious**. Given the sensitive nature of military technology, states may, despite a ban, preemptively develop **a**utonomous **w**eapon**s** just to stay in the race. This of course is a classic example of the prisoner’s dilemma, and explains why a state would likely not cooperate with a ban, but instead heavily arm itself.

This dynamic is particularly true in this day and age where non-state actors, such as terrorist organizations, are increasingly powerful and active on the international stage. As technology becomes more affordable and technical skill readily accessible, it is only a matter of time before non-state actors use **a**utomated **w**eapon**s**. U.S. authorities have already uncovered terrorist plans of drone attacks, and the New York Police Department is also taking these threats seriously.

In their upcoming book The Future of Violence, Professor Gabriella Blum and Benjamin Wittes argue that advances in cyber technology and robotics could mean more people than ever before have access to potentially dangerous technologies. The trend towards the dissemination of open source software, which could make a killer robots’ software widely available, coupled with the increased affordability and versatility of hardware makes that scenario all the more plausible.

Second, **a toothless ban would undermine a more realistic alternative: to regulate** the use and application of **a**utonomous **w**eapon**s** **through law and best practices**. International humanitarian law (IHL) already regulates the means and methods of warfare. In order to comply with IHL, an autonomous robot would need to be able to distinguish between combatants and civilians and use force proportionally. These requirements are all within the ambit of technological possibility.

Unlike a human being, a robot can be programmed to comply with rules and codes free from fear, prejudice, and fatigue. It may thus be able to better process information, identify targets, and protect civilians. It could tap into big data to further improve its decisions. As an added method of accountability, robots could be required to wear a camera in order to monitor compliance with IHL.

Terminator-like robots are unlikely to be deployed on the battlefield anytime soon. Autonomous robots will likely first be used on very specific missions, thus controlling their scaling and impact, and will be developed iteratively, thus facilitating feedback and future improvements.

Finally, autonomous weapon systems can provide major benefits to international peace and security. Given the potential for machine learning, autonomous robots could be more precise, discriminate, and effective than other weapons. Alternative configurations of these systems could also **be used in peacekeeping missions around the world**. They may help **safeguard humanitarian convoys**, protect refugee camps, and assist hostage rescue missions.

To ban now what we do not yet fully understand would stifle efforts to develop potentially beneficial technologies. Alan Turing, one of the pioneers of artificial intelligence, may have preferred a trial and error approach. “One must experiment with teaching [a] machine and see how well it learns … There is an obvious connection with this process and evolution,” wrote Turing in a 1950 paper. An encouraging prognosis from the man who built a code-breaking machine that helped the Allies win the Second World War.

**Ban results in cheating and underground development --- regulation ensures careful development that reduces deaths and solves the impact to prolif**

**Anderson and Waxman ‘13**

(professor at Washington College of Law, American University; a visiting fellow of the Hoover Institution; and a non-resident senior fellow of the Brookings Institution. He writes on international law, the laws of war, weapons and technology, and national security, law professor at Columbia Law School, where he co-chairs the Program on Law and National Security. He is also co-chair of the Cybersecurity Center at Columbia University’s Data Science Institute, as well as Adjunct Senior Fellow for Law and Foreign Policy at the Council on Foreign Relations. He previously served in senior policy positions at the State Department, Defense Department, and National Security Council, “Killer Robots and the Laws of War in Monday's Wall Street Journal,” pg online @ <https://www.lawfareblog.com/killer-robots-and-laws-war-mondays-wall-street-journal> //40)

We began writing in this area before the ban campaign was launched, initially urging the Department of Defense to be more transparent about the standards of legal review being applied to weapon systems as they became increasingly automated and might ultimately raise questions about who or what was actually in control of firing decisions. After the ban campaign was launched, we pivoted to include arguments as to why an international ban was deeply mistaken. Our arguments are for careful, granular reviews and regulation of weapon technologies incorporating increasingly automated or even autonomous capabilities. Nothing in our positions says that these machines should be anything other than carefully regulated. But we also think that there is a moral obligation to seek to try and develop new technologies that might increase the precision of weapons and reduce harms on the battlefield; sweeping, preemptive bans, not just on "use" but "development" **will not be effective** and they might well impede emergence over time of new technologies that make war less harmful. So we're delighted to announce "Killer Robots and the Laws of War." Here is a short excerpt:

[A] ban is unlikely to work, especially in constraining **states or actors most inclined to abuse these weapons**. Those actors **will not respect such an agreement**, and the technological elements of highly **a**utomated **w**eapon**s** will proliferate. Moreover, because the automation of weapons will happen gradually, it would be nearly impossible to design or enforce such a ban. Because the same system might be operable with or without effective human control or oversight, the line between legal weapons and illegal autonomous ones will not be clear-cut.

If the goal is to reduce suffering and protect human lives, a ban could prove counterproductive. In addition to the self-protective advantages to military forces that use them, autonomous machines may reduce risks to civilians by improving the precision of targeting decisions and better controlling decisions to fire. We know that humans are limited in their capacity to make sound decisions on the battlefield: Anger, panic, fatigue all contribute to mistakes or violations of rules. Autonomous weapons systems have the potential to address these human shortcomings. No one can say with certainty how much automated capabilities might gradually reduce the harm of warfare, but it would be wrong not to pursue such gains, and it would be especially pernicious to ban research into such technologies.

That said, **a**utonomous **w**eapon**s** warrant careful regulation. Each step toward automation needs to be reviewed carefully to ensure that the weapon complies with the laws of war in its design and permissible uses. Drawing on long-standing international legal rules requiring that weapons be capable of being used in a discriminating manner that limits collateral damage, the U.S. should set very high standards for assessing legally and ethically any research and development programs in this area. Standards should also be set for how these systems are to be used and in what combat environments.

### 2NC---CP---Regulations---Policy---Spillup

#### The CP makes it easier to implement future bans

**Lewis ‘15**

(John, JD from Yale, the San Francisco Affirmative Litigation Project, and the International Refugee Assistance Project, Senior Counsel at Democracy Forward. John has filed multiple cases under the Administrative Procedure Act, other federal statutes, and the U.S. Constitution. In particular, John has represented or co-counseled with governments and non-profit organizations in cases involving immigration, civil rights, health care, education, veterans’ affairs, and other issues., frmr executive editor on the Yale Law Journal and a member of the Supreme Court Clinic, “The Case for Regulating Fully Autonomous Weapons,” pg online @ <https://www.yalelawjournal.org/comment/the-case-for-regulating-fully-autonomous-weapons> //40)

In response to this claim, opponents of regulation make a slippery-slope argument, stressing that once nations invest in FAW technology, it will be difficult to encourage compliance with even modest regulations.52 Alternatively, there is some evidence from the case of landmines that an absolute prohibition can establish a norm against a weapons system that buttresses other, more modest regulatory schemes.53 This may be true, but if FAWs turn out to revolutionize warfare, then states may continue to develop them regardless. Furthermore, **the causality may work the other way**—**”soft law” norms, like nation-specific codes of conduct, can often ripen into “hard law” treaties**.54 If a ban turns out to be necessary, then it may be easier to build on **an existing set of regulations** and norms rather than to create one from scratch. For these reasons, it is important to consider the components of an effective regulatory scheme.

**Counterplan is a piecemeal approach --- ensures restrictions are in-place and builds slow consensus for the ban**

**Sullivan ‘19**

(Taylor Sullivan, intern for the International Institutions and Global Governance program at the Council on Foreign Relations, “Laying Down the LAWS: Strategizing Autonomous Weapons Governance,” pg online @ <https://www.cfr.org/blog/laying-down-laws-strategizing-autonomous-weapons-governance> //pa-ef)

If agreeing upon a working definition of LAWS proves too challenging, **proponents of restrictions on the weapons could switch to a piecemeal rather than comprehensive approach**. That is, they could establish specific instruments for specific uses of pertinent technologies, through the CCW or other processes (such as restricting interactions between autonomous technologies and, say, nuclear weapons). Once the conversation is narrowed, either through establishing a working definition or laying the groundwork for a piecemeal approach, states and other actors seeking to restrict LAWS could begin to make real progress in governing autonomous weapons.

### 2NC---CP---Regulations---Policy---NB

**Development inevitable and irreversible --- a ban is unenforceable and regulations build U.S. AI leadership while locking-in U.S. dominance**

**West and Karsten ‘19**

(Darrell, Vice President and Director - Governance Studies Senior Fellow - Center for Technology Innovation, Jack, Senior Research Analyst, Center for Technology Innovation - The Brookings Institution “It’s time to start thinking about governance of autonomous weapons,” pg online @ <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/techtank/2019/05/10/its-time-to-start-thinking-about-governance-of-autonomous-weapons/> //40)

From machine learning intelligence insights to autonomous drones, AI has the potential to significantly improve the goals and tasks of U.S. military operations at almost all levels. The U.S. military is focused on more than just operational gains though—it is keeping pace with growing state investment in AI from major powers such as China and Russia. This shifting landscape reveals a pressing need to develop appropriate governance structures that enhance the benefits and manage the risks of military uses of AI.

CHINESE AND RUSSIAN INVESTMENT IN AI

In 2017, the State Council in China announced that they plan to be the world leaders in AI by 2030. That same year, Chinese venture capital firms spent $4.9 billion on AI companies, surpassing U.S. firms’ $4.4 billion total. Over the coming decade, the largest state-owned venture capital firm in China is expected to invest more than $30 billion in order to reach its 2030 leadership goal. Similarly, Russia is making significant investments in this area, pouring nearly $719 million into AI research and development in by 2021. As Vladimir Putin stated in 2017, “[AI] is the future, not only for Russia, but for all of humankind.” With this speech, Putin committed Russia to a state-led initiative to develop AI competencies and compete for international superiority.

Even with new Chinese and Russian investments, the U.S. maintains an advantage in the **r**esearch **and** **d**evelopment of AI. Recent U.S. investment in AI has been largely driven by the private sector, but with the growing national interest in the emerging technology, the government is positioning itself to play a key role. In 2019, the Trump administration issued an executive order that declares a national interest in “maintaining American leadership in artificial intelligence”, citing the economic, social, and national security benefits of AI. By maintaining technical excellence, the U.S. can use AI as a tool to advance national interests and ideals at a global scale. This executive order, paired with the creation of JAIC and its $208 million in funding, show an effort to challenge Chinese and Russian initiatives to claim superiority in AI.

GOVERNANCE OF AUTONOMOUS WEAPONS

Although many activists have called for the outright ban of **a**utonomous **l**ethal **w**eapon**s**, a total **ban would be difficult to enforce**. The integration of AI as a core part of national defense strategies in the U.S., China, Russia, and other nations will also be hard to reverse. Given these circumstances, it is important to consider what meaningful international and domestic governance of autonomous weapons looks like. There are five main areas of focus where regulations could help us capture the benefits of AI in defense and protect against potential harms:

Transparency in technology performance to allow for proper oversight and accountability:

With more robust performance measures around testing, defense agencies could offer a meaningful degree of transparency prior to deploying a technology.

Maintaining human-in-the-loop systems that permit human decision making:

Autonomous systems are subject to failure. Requiring systems that allow for human intervention would preserve human agency with new technology in the case of failures, unexpected actions, or other needs.

Hiring and training appropriate personnel to ensure worker competencies:

Humans engaging with emerging military technology must maintain technical literacy by updating their knowledge relevant to their post.

Regulations on technology transfer to prevent malicious use of advanced technology:

How and with whom we trade weapons becomes increasingly important given the sophistication of emerging technologies. We must consider who should control data, algorithms, and hardware during technology transfer.

Strong prioritization of cybersecurity to protect digital intelligence, infrastructure, and services:

The more we digitize our military systems, the more we expose to cyber vulnerabilities. It is important that the defense agencies continuously maintain the highest established standards for cybersecurity.

These principles for AI deployment in defense could allow us to not only build better accountability and oversight, but also better capture the benefits of AI while reducing unintended harms. Then we could begin asking important outcome-based questions, such as: Does this technology actually mitigate collateral damage? Are we building better national security practices, even with increased potential cyber vulnerabilities? Are humans effectively able to maintain control to make important defense decisions? Through transparency and meaningful discussions, there can be more assurance for the positive impacts of AI in defense.

## UN CP

### 1NC---CP---UN

#### The United States federal government should increase security cooperation with the United Nations Security Council to ban lethal autonomous weapons.

#### The United Nations ought to enter a binding consolation with UN Member States requiring the regulation of Lethal Autonomous Weapons

#### The UN is best to create a global norm for human control because it builds on its principles from the CCW. UN Leadership would restore the credibility of global governance

**Bolton, 2021 - professor of political science at Pace University** [Matthew with Matilda Byrne, Ryan Gariepy, Emilia Javorsky, Volker Lehmann, and Laura Nolan, January “Addressing The Threat Of Autonomous Weapons Maintaining Meaningful Human Control” http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/iez/17215.pdf Acc 5/27/22 TA]

The 2019 Meeting of High Contracting Parties to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) adopted 11 »Guiding Principles affirmed by the Group of Governmental Experts (GGE ) on Emerging Technologies in the Area of Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems.« (see Box 1). Some 40 UN Member States belonging to the »Alliance for Multilateralism« are now championing these 11 Guiding Principles and calling on States to contribute actively to the clarification and development of a normative and operational framework.2 The civil society-led Campaign to Stop Killer Robots is working for a preemptive ban on the development, production, and use of fully autonomous weapons. Similarly, UN Secretary- General António Guterres as well as his High Representative for Disarmament, Izumi Nakamitsu, have called for LAWS to be banned by international law.3 A growing number of Member States have also called for a prohibition of LAWS. At a minimum, there seems to be broad agreement that it is necessary that States have an obligation to maintain meaningful human control over the lethal use of force. Member States, with the support and active participation of the United Nations and other international organizations, civil society and the private sector, quickly need to reach common understandings on how to ensure human beings retain control over the use of force. Improving communication between policymakers and scientific and technical experts is crucial given the dual-use nature of artificial intelligence. Indeed, a prohibition on weapons outside of human control would not be counterproductive to technological development. Rather, there is a need to fully harness technological progress while maintaining and advancing international law that safeguards humanitarian protections, human rights and international peace and security. Therefore, in September and October 2020, the Friedrich- Ebert-Stiftung New York Office (FESN Y) launched the »New Alliances for Meaningful Human Control« project aimed at building on the 11 Guiding Principles on LAWS and moving them to the next level, towards international legal instruments that regulate high-tech weapons and prohibit LAWS. Linked to the UN 75 Global Governance Forum,4 FESN Y convened three discussions with representatives of governments, the United Nations, academia, civil society and the private sector to discuss the moral, ethical, legal and humanitarian challenges posed by LAWS (see Annex I for list of participants). Participants, speaking under Chatham House Rule, offered many diverse viewpoints, representing different perspectives on LAWS and pathways to addressing the risk they pose. 5 This paper is rooted in the discussions facilitated by FESN Y. While it summarizes the agreements between the co-authors, who participated, it does not purport to represent the views of all members of the discussions. For instance, participants disagreed on the precise meaning, scope and value of the 11 Guiding Principles. However, a significant majority agreed that good faith interpretation of the 11 Guiding Principles – particularly paragraphs b), c) and d) (see Box 1) – required progress toward negotiation of a legally-binding multilateral instrument mandating a positive obligation to maintain meaningful human control over the use of force, at the level of individual attacks. Given the contested international political environment, progress toward negotiating a legally-binding instrument would also demonstrate the potential for effective global governance, as currently spearheaded by the Alliance for Multilateralism. Towards this end, the subsequent paper argues that a potential venue for negotiating such a mandate could be within the CC W, in the form of a new protocol on meaningful human control. While positive obligations would be the most suitable starting point, a new protocol should also entail principles about technologies not to be developed and deployed. In what follows, two main issues will be addressed to help States as they move toward negotiations on a treaty to ensure meaningful human control: First, meaningful positive obligations, and second, legally-binding control.

#### Regulate solves *comparatively better* – accesses the benefits of LAWS AND maintains balance of power

John Williams 21, is Professor of International Relations in the School of Government and International Affairs at Durham University, UK. His research addresses ethical, regulatory, and security issues associated with new and emerging military technologies, “Effective, Deployable, Accountable: Pick Two’: Regulating Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems”, E-International Relations, 8-12-2021, https://www.e-ir.info/2021/08/12/effective-deployable-accountable-pick-two-regulating-lethal-autonomous-weapons-system/)/maze

Secondly, I assume efforts to **ban** the development and **deployment of LAWS will fail**. Despite a large coalition of NGOs, academics, policymakers, scientists, and others (e.g. [ICRAC](https://www.icrac.net/members/), [iPRAW](https://www.ipraw.org/), [Future of Life Institute 2015](https://futureoflife.org/open-letter-autonomous-weapons/?cn-reloaded=1)) LAWS development is more likely than not. Amandeep Singh Gill ([2019](https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/ethics-and-international-affairs/article/abs/artificial-intelligence-and-international-security-the-long-view/4AB181EAF648501422257934982A4DD5), 175), former Indian Ambassador to the UN Conference on Disarmament and former Chair of the Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on LAWS at the UN Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW), stresses how:

The economic, political and security drivers for mainstreaming this suite of technologies [AI] into security functions are **simply too powerful** to be rolled back. There will be plenty of persuasive national security applications – minimizing casualties and collateral damage …, defeating terrorist threats, saving on defense spending, and protecting soldiers and their bases – to provide counterarguments against concerns about runaway robots or accidental wars caused by machine error.

Appeals to the inherent immorality of allowing computers to make life and death decisions about human beings, often framed in terms of human dignity (e.g. [Horowitz 2016](https://direct.mit.edu/daed/article/145/4/25/27111/The-Ethics-amp-Morality-of-Robotic-Warfare); [Heyns 2017](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/02587203.2017.1303903); [Rosert and Sauer 2019](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1758-5899.12691)), will fall in the face of ostensibly unstoppable forces across multiple sectors making **incorporating AI into ever more aspect of our daily lives almost inevitable**. From ‘surveillance capitalism’ ([Zuboff 2019](https://profilebooks.com/work/the-age-of-surveillance-capitalism/)) to LAWS, human beings are struggling to find ways to effectively halt, or even dramatically slow, AI’s march (e.g. [Rosert and Sauer 2021](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13523260.2020.1771508)).

Effective

LAWS’ potential military effectiveness manifests at strategic, operational, and tactical levels. Operating at ‘machine speed’ means potentially outpacing adversaries and acquiring crucial advantages, it enables far faster processing of huge quantities of data to generate new insights and spot opportunities, and it means concentrating military effect with greater pace and accuracy (e.g. [Altmann and Sauer 2017](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00396338.2017.1375263); [Horowitz 2019](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01402390.2019.1621174); [Jensen et al 2020](https://academic.oup.com/isr/article-abstract/22/3/526/5522301?redirectedFrom=fulltext)). Shifts, even temporary, in **delicate strategic balances between rival powers may appear as unacceptable risks,** meaning that for as long as adversaries are interested in and pursuing this technology, their peer-rivals will feel compelled to do so too (e.g. [Maas 2019](https://brill.com/view/journals/ihls/10/1/article-p129_129.xml), 141-43). Altmann and Sauer ([2017](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00396338.2017.1375263), 124) note, ‘**operational speed** will reign supreme’. The ‘security dilemma’ looms large, reinforcing amongst leading states the sense **they dare not risk being left behind in the competition to research and develop LAWS** (e.g. [Altmann and Sauer 2017](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00396338.2017.1375263); [Scharre 2021](https://tnsr.org/2021/06/debunking-the-ai-arms-race-theory/)). Morgan et al ([2020](https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR3139-1.html), xvi) argue the US, for example, has no choice but to, ‘… stay at the forefront of military AI capability. … [N]ot to compete in an area where adversaries are developing dangerous capabilities is to cede the field. That would be unacceptable’. Things likely look the same in Moscow and Beijing. Add concerns about potential proliferation to non-state actors (e.g. [Dunn 2015](https://academic.oup.com/ia/article-abstract/89/5/1237/2417187?redirectedFrom=fulltext)), and the security dilemma’s powerful logic appears inescapable.

Of course, other weapons technologies inspired similar proliferation, strategic destabilization, and conflict escalation concerns. Arms control – a key focus for current regulatory debate – has slowed the spread of nuclear weapons, banned chemical and biological weapons, and prohibited blinding laser weapons before they were ever deployed (e.g. [Baker et al 2020](https://www.e-ir.info/2020/04/15/introducing-guiding-principles-for-the-development-and-use-of-lethal-autonomous-weapon-systems/)). International regulation can **alter the strategic calculus** about what weapons do and do not appear effective and persuade actors to deny themselves the systems in the first place, or limit their acquisition and deployment, or give them up as part of a wider deal that offers a better route to strategic stability. LAWS present specific arms control challenges because they incorporate AI and robotics technologies offering many non-military opportunities and advantages that human societies will want to pursue, potentially bringing major benefits in addressing challenges in diverse fields. Key breakthroughs are at least as likely to come from civilian research and development projects as from principally military ones. That makes definitions, monitoring, and verification harder. That is not a reason not to try, of course, but it does mean effective LAWS may take many forms, incorporate inherently hard to restrict technologies, and offer possibly irresistible benefits in what the security dilemma presents as an inescapably competitive, militarized, and uncertain international environment (e.g. [Sparrow 2009](https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/4799404); [Altmann 2013](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs10676-013-9314-5); [Williams 2015](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1758-5899.12203); [Garcia 2018](https://academic.oup.com/isr/article-abstract/20/2/334/5018660?redirectedFrom=fulltext); [Gill 2019](https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/ethics-and-international-affairs/article/abs/artificial-intelligence-and-international-security-the-long-view/4AB181EAF648501422257934982A4DD5)).

#### Shifts in power causes Russia-China War—that outweighs

Lowry 22 – Rich Lowry is editor of National Review and a contributing editor with Politico Magazine. ("The Isolationists Are Wrong: The Pax Americana Is Worth Defending," 2-24-2022, https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2022/02/24/isolationists-are-wrong-pax-americana-worth-defending-00011448, Accessed 6-25-2022, LASA-SC

Vladimir Putin’s war against Ukraine doesn’t just herald a new era in European security, it underlines a growing threat to the American-led international order.

Pax Americana, the post-World War II system that has created the conditions for peace and prosperity in Europe and elsewhere, is entering a great period of testing, with the revanchist powers of Russia and China seeking to overturn it.

It is imperative that the United States, as the leader of the West and the only nation capable of maintaining what it has built over the last seven decades, rises to the challenge, even though its leadership role is increasingly contested at home. The left has long argued that the U.S. is not the benign influence abroad that it likes to believe, and the order that it created is a corrupt scam, not worth the cost of preserving.

Now elements of the right say much the same thing. This sentiment ranges from Senate candidate J.D. Vance pointedly declaring that he doesn’t care what happens in Ukraine to right-wing commentator Candace Owens saying we are at fault for the conflict. Undergirding it all is a sense that the U.S. needs to mind its own business, and perhaps even treat China as a “civilizational equal.”

But Pax Americana isn’t an act of charity. It holds distinct advantages for the United States. We’d be less safe, prosperous, and free without it.

What we are witnessing is, in broad brush, a civilizational challenge. China and Russia don’t have a formal alliance and their current cooperative arrangement may well break down over time, but they share the same interest in ending the long era of Western preeminence.

Russia can punch above its weight, but fundamentally represents a regional threat, in particular to a NATO alliance that has been a keystone of Western security. Moscow seeks to divide European countries from one another and diminish U.S. influence in Europe, toward the end of reversing the post-Cold War settlement that was the fruit of the West’s triumph over the Soviet Union.

What Putin seeks is consequential, but not nearly as sweeping as Beijing’s goal of supplanting the United States at the top of the hierarchy of nations. China wants nothing less than to restore itself as the Middle Kingdom, owed the respect and obeisance of the rest of the world.

What unites Russia and China is that they are two civilizations that feel they were humiliated and trampled by the West (Russia at the end of the Cold War, China from the middle of the 19th century to the middle of the 20th) and need to regain their rightful place in the sun. There is an ideological element to the growing challenge, as these two authoritarian regimes confront the democratic world, but the crux of the matter is cultural—neither Russia nor China has ever been a liberal democracy and each country is reacting against international norms they’ve never embraced.

Can’t we just make way for a more ambitious Russia and China? Within limits, but their maximal demands are an obvious threat to our interests.

Through our system of alliances, we have been, in effect, sponsoring international peace. Should, say, NATO unravel, there is no reason that Europe would not eventually once again become red in tooth and claw, as it has been through much of its history. Even if we could ignore or at least stay out of any future conflict, the loss of a vast zone of free, prosperous and allied counties would be a blow.

If it is expensive and burdensome to underwrite the security of countries around the world, it would be even more expensive and burdensome if a global U.S. exit or diminishment created the conditions for a major war, or if some other power—i.e., China—replaced us at the apex of world power.

There are so many advantages to our preeminent position that we take for granted. In an essay titled “After Hegemony,” former Trump official Elbridge Colby notes some of them: “Think how the American-born internet supported Silicon Valley, and vice versa, leading to a World Wide Web governed by formal laws and informal norms almost entirely of American design. Think how the desire for access to American capital markets gives American regulators de facto control over global accounting standards, or how the need to transact with American institutions allows U.S. Treasury officials to freeze the assets of designated targets anywhere in the world. Think how Americans take for granted that English is the universal language and that everyone accepts dollars. Think how the American university degree has become the preeminent global academic credential, with searching implications for everything from global educational standards to measures of professional success.”

The American order has also been, in the main, just. It is based on the sovereignty of borders and democracy as a norm, and hence has been a boon to self-governing peoples around the world. We can be overbearing and even bullying—as well as greedy, shortsighted, and wrong-headed—but U.S. leadership hasn’t been based on coercion. By and large, our allies trust us, and find our model more congenial than anything else on offer.

The previous hegemonic power, Britain, had a soft landing because Pax Britannica was replaced by Pax Americana, run by a partner that shared similar values and mindsets. The same wouldn’t be true if we hand the baton over to China.

Consider the seas. As the navalist Jerry Hendrix notes, the U.S. Navy has made the seas safe and free over the last 70 years in a way they never had been before. It’s no accident that there’s been a surge of global trade over the course of these decades that has made countries around the world more prosperous. Russia and especially China are a threat to this system, seeking greater control of the seas for their own purposes.

China wants to define a swath of the Western Pacific and the Indian Ocean as its territorial waters. If the U.S. lacks the resources or will to resist this Chinese aggrandizement, the rules of the road of international commerce will change drastically in China’s favor. An enormous proportion of global trade flows through the South China Sea and East China Sea. With control of the key choke points, China would be in a position to create restrictions and fees for everyone else’s trade and privileged status for its own. Imagine a kind of perpetual supply-chain crisis imposed by China as a matter of policy.

Indeed, China doesn’t want to be a leading country among other leading countries. It wants to have its system of government considered superior to liberal democracy. It wants free access to markets, while constraining everyone else. It wants to dominate the setting of technical standards, and so influence how new technologies are developed to suit its own interests. The Belt and Road Initiative is a reflection of its vision, with China at the center and other countries in a subsidiary role.

If China achieves mastery in Asia and a position of global predominance, it won’t leave us alone to enjoy tending our garden at home. “Building upon such economic advantages,” Colby writes, “it could intrude into and shape our national life, using its position to coerce, bribe, and cajole companies, individuals, and governments to do its will, diminishing our economic vitality and, through that, our freedoms.”

Resisting these growing civilizational challenges will require continued engagement around the world and the return in certain respects to a Cold War footing, especially when it comes to the chronically underfunded defense budget. Ducking our leadership role will, eventually, mean inevitable decline and the creation of a more hostile world. Countries don’t become more prosperous and secure on their way down.

### 2NC---CP---UN---NB---Treaties

**A UN mandate for Human Control would effectively ban LAWs – it sets the stage for future treaties.**

**International Panel on the Regulation of Autonomous Weapons, 2021** [(iPRAW) coordinated by: German Institute for International and Security Affairs, July “Building Blocks for a Regulation on LAWS and Human Control Updated Recommendations to the GGE on LAWS” https://www.readkong.com/page/building-blocks-for-a-regulation-on-laws-and-human-control-8617434 Acc 2/27/22 TA]

General Obligations: A regulation of LAWS, e.g. a CCW Protocol, could consist of a general obligation to maintain human control over the use of force when deploying conventional weapons. The GGE Guiding Principles adopted in 2019 could lay the groundwork to further shape a future regulation. The Guiding Principles emphasize that IHL continues to fully apply to LAWS. Furthermore, they stress that human responsibility for the decision to use LAWS must be retained since accountability cannot be transferred to machines. This aspect should be considered throughout the entire life-cycle of a LAWS. They also stipulate that human-machine interaction must be in compliance with international law and refer, among others, to questions relating to accountability, weapon reviews, and risk assessments, including the development stage of weapon systems. In addition, other principles that were not explicitly mentioned in the Guiding Principles but found entry into other documents adopted by the GGE could also supplement a future regulation. Examples are the principle of predictability, reliability, and transparency. Specific Obligations: Specific obligations and more nuanced rules on the concept of human control could play a pivotal role in a future treaty focusing on human control. It could entail concrete rules stipulating that human control encompasses both situational understanding and the option to intervene, enabled by design and in use. The term situational understanding could be elaborated in more detail by stipulating that it refers to the ability to monitor information about the environment, the target and the weapon system. The human operator shall monitor the system and the operational environment to the extent necessary in a specific operation. Furthermore, the different modes of operation should allow the human operator to intervene if necessary. All people in the chain of command are equally obliged to abide by the rules of international law and should be held accountable for any violations of the law. These and other obligations could be an integral part of “specific obligations” in a future treaty on LAWS. The ICRC mentions two specifics that would call for tighter restrictions, namely AWS with unpredictable effects and the anti-personnel use of AWS.

#### UN regulation via arms control treaties (akin to Ottawa) is key prevent outsourcing to countries not included in the ban

Zachary Kallenborn 21, is an author and analyst who specializes in WMD terrorism, unmanned systems, drone swarms, and homeland security., “Applying arms-control frameworks to autonomous weapons”, Brookings.Edu 10-5-2021, <https://www.brookings.edu/techstream/applying-arms-control-frameworks-to-autonomous-weapons/>)/maze

The global community must now resolve the tension of fear between arms-control and military advocates. That means serious debate on which types of autonomous weapon offer the most military value and which present the most risk to civilians and noncombatants. Weapons with high risk to civilians and low military value should form the **basis of conversations around risk reduction.**

**Existing arms control treaties offer models** to address these complexities. The Ottawa Convention on Anti-Personnel Landmines narrowly focuses on anti-personnel landmines, excluding anti-vehicle landmines that require high pressure to detonate. An autonomous weapon treaty might focus on anti-personnel weapons using machine learning, given the challenges of distinguishing farmers from soldiers. A more precise treaty may allow military powers to separate weapons they fear giving up from the weapons arms control advocates fear proliferating. This may make getting an okay from those powers easier.

Autonomous weapons might also be tiered based on characteristics that make them more or less risky, akin to the [Chemical Weapons Convention’s schedules](https://www.opcw.org/chemical-weapons-convention/annexes/annex-chemicals/annex-chemicals). The convention divides chemical agents into three schedules, based on their historical use as chemical weapons and use for civilian purposes. Chemicals in each schedule have different restrictions placed upon them. Autonomous weapons could also be tiered **based on the risk the weapons pose**, particularly the risk to civilian populations if the weapon errs and the likelihood of an error. Defensive turrets used at sea to defend against incoming missiles would likely be of lowest risk, while offensive weapons targeting people using machine learning would be a higher tier. Autonomous chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons are the highest risk, and should never be used.

Debate is needed on the best policy approaches to stem the proliferation of the highest risk weapons, and reduce broader global risks. Existing global discussion has focused on whether international treaties should ban the weapons, but that’s just a start. **Even if autonomous weapons are banned in whole**, in part, or not at all, governments must consider how to ensure they are not **inadvertently exported to states not party to** the **ban**. Restricting access to terrorist groups is an extra, different problem as autonomous weapons are simple enough to be made as a classroom project. And if a new international treaty is established, an obvious question is: How can it be given teeth? If a state uses a banned autonomous weapon, should they suffer retaliatory diplomatic or economic sanctions? When, if ever, should the United Nations Security Council endorse military action?

The era of killer robots is here. What comes next is up to the world.

### 2NC---CP---UN---NB---Global Governance

**CCW action on AI weapons would demonstrate the potential for global governance.**

**Bolton, 2021 - professor of political science at Pace University** [Matthew with Matilda Byrne, Ryan Gariepy, Emilia Javorsky, Volker Lehmann, and Laura Nolan, January “Addressing The Threat Of Autonomous Weapons Maintaining Meaningful Human Control” http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/iez/17215.pdf Acc 5/27/22 TA]

The Guiding Principles therefore are not a ceiling, but a steppingstone towards a more legally binding agreement that ensures binding human control, has meaningful positive obligations, and respects IH L and IHR L. In this regard, it is good news that the Principles’ political visibility increased after the endorsement of the Alliance for Multilateralism. Member States of the Alliance should therefore use this political momentum and lead the effort to negotiate an additional protocol to the CC W. After the November 2020 meetings of the GGE had to be cancelled due to Covid-19, attention is now on the next meeting of the High Contracting Parties to the CC W and the CC W Review Conference scheduled for 2021. Tangible progress by then is sorely needed to achieve some form of arms regulation in an area of rapid technological development. Moreover, progress toward new international law would demonstrate the potential for effective global governance, called for by the Alliance for Multilateralism. The Alliance itself is still in a phase of self-definition and is a rather loose collection of states. In fact, among the countries who supported the Alliance’s Guiding Principles, there are also 20 countries that have explicitly endorsed the call for a ban on LAWS. Progress on an additional protocol with meaningful obligations for human control of LAWS would demonstrate the bridge-building capacity of the Alliance and would increase its standing as an actor for effective global governance.

### 2NC---CP---UN---Solvency---Generic

#### Jurisdiction is with the UN---conventional weapons convention is normal means for a ban.

**Dawes, 21** [James Dawes is a Professor of English at Macalester College, 12-20-2021, accessed on 6-24-2022, The Conversation, "UN fails to agree on 'killer robot' ban as nations pour billions into autonomous weapons research", https://theconversation.com/un-fails-to-agree-on-killer-robot-ban-as-nations-pour-billions-into-autonomous-weapons-research-173616]/ISEE

Autonomous weapon systems – commonly known as killer robots – may have killed human beings for the first time ever last year, according to a recent United Nations Security Council report on the Libyan civil war. History could well identify this as the starting point of the next major arms race, one that has the potential to be humanity’s final one. The United Nations Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons debated the question of banning autonomous weapons at its once-every-five-years review meeting in Geneva Dec. 13-17, 2021, but didn’t reach consensus on a ban. Established in 1983, the convention has been updated regularly to restrict some of the world’s cruelest conventional weapons, including land mines, booby traps and incendiary weapons. Autonomous weapon systems are robots with lethal weapons that can operate independently, selecting and attacking targets without a human weighing in on those decisions. Militaries around the world are investing heavily in autonomous weapons research and development. The U.S. alone budgeted US$18 billion for autonomous weapons between 2016 and 2020. Meanwhile, human rights and humanitarian organizations are racing to establish regulations and prohibitions on such weapons development. Without such checks, foreign policy experts warn that disruptive autonomous weapons technologies will dangerously destabilize current nuclear strategies, both because they could radically change perceptions of strategic dominance, increasing the risk of preemptive attacks, and because they could be combined with chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear weapons themselves. As a specialist in human rights with a focus on the weaponization of artificial intelligence, I find that autonomous weapons make the unsteady balances and fragmented safeguards of the nuclear world – for example, the U.S. president’s minimally constrained authority to launch a strike – more unsteady and more fragmented. Given the pace of research and development in autonomous weapons, the U.N. meeting might have been the last chance to head off an arms race.

**UN action solves for the case – it establishes global norms, provides flexibility, and serves as a clearinghouse for information even without a formal treaty.**

**Sauer, 2021 - Senior Research Fellow at Bundeswehr University** [Frank serves on the International Panel on the Regulation of Autonomous Weapons IRRC No. 913 March “Stepping back from the brink: Why multilateral regulation of autonomy in weapons systems is difficult, yet imperative and feasible” https://international-review.icrc.org/articles/stepping-back-from-brink-regulation-of-autonomous-weapons-systems-913 Acc 4/5/22 TA]

Fostering norm development in the CCW LAWS keep steadily gathering media attention around the globe.104 With mounting public pressure and increased scrutiny, there will be a strong incentive for CCW States Parties to produce tangible results for the 2021 Review Conference. The “aspects of the normative and operational framework” that are to be further developed over the course of 2021 could take a more concrete shape in three steps. First, consensus seems achievable on shared language that adopts the by now widely accepted functionalist view of weapon autonomy as well as a common understanding that some form of positive obligation and affirmation of the principle of human control over weapons systems is required.105 The CCW's guiding principle (b) already points this way in stating that “[h]uman responsibility for decisions on the use of weapons systems must be retained since accountability cannot be transferred to machines”.106 The Forum for Supporting the 2020 GGE on LAWS conducted in April 2020 as a webcast by the German Federal Foreign Office, with 320 registered participants representing sixty-three CCW States Parties, underlined the importance of further conceptualizing the human element. Controllability of weapons is arguably a proto-norm already,107 and a shared terminology – be it “meaningful human control” or some other formulation – could be found to stipulate in a general sense when humans and when machines are to be performing which function in the targeting cycle. The ICRC and the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) recently presented a conceptual framework that can support this effort of operationalizing human control – that is, of clarifying the “who, what, when and how” of controlling weapons and limiting their autonomy.108 Second, since there is no one-size-fits-all standard of meaningful human control, the sharing of best practices and, more importantly, of case studies of specific weapons systems and operational scenarios could allow CCW States Parties to develop a deeper, shared conceptual grasp of the intricacies involved with implementing human control in design and use. The GGE is uniquely suited to facilitate these sorts of deep dives with analyses from multiple stakeholders and a sharing of legal, ethical and operational views. Smaller expert groups such as the International Panel on the Regulation of Autonomous Weapons (iPRAW) and the commission on the responsible use of technologies in the Franco-German Future Combat Air System are already beginning to organize their research toward that end. Third, a differentiated implementation scheme could be developed that conceives of human control as being exercised in a context-dependent way – that is, contingent on the weapons system, its mission environment, “target profiles”109 and additional factors such as mission duration.110 This human control scheme could prescribe minimum standards for controllability by design, for example regarding the ergonomics of human–machine interfaces, and determine “levels of human supervisory control”111 in use – that is, the tactics, techniques and procedures required to keep human control and responsibility intact during the system's operation. It currently seems unlikely that the CCW process, even if it were to complete these three steps, will end up yielding more than “soft law”, such as a consensual political declaration or a catalogue of best practices. In fact, a complete breakdown of the CCW process in Geneva is also within the realm of possibility. But even if the CCW turns out not to be the venue from which a legally binding regulation for weapon autonomy emerges, it has already served as an information hub and norm incubator for the last six years – and will continue to do. Especially considering the effect of the COVID-19 crisis on meeting schedules around the globe, it is currently too early to tell if other fora – and if so, which ones – can and should pick up the ball on regulation where the CCW leaves it in 2021, in order to further develop and codify the human control norm as binding international law.

### 2NC---CP---UN---Solvency---Human Contrpl

**UN action through the CCW would establish the human control norm and reduce the instability and escalation from AI weapons**

**International Panel on the Regulation of Autonomous Weapons, 2021** [(iPRAW) coordinated by: German Institute for International and Security Affairs, July “Building Blocks for a Regulation on LAWS and Human Control Updated Recommendations to the GGE on LAWS” https://www.readkong.com/page/building-blocks-for-a-regulation-on-laws-and-human-control-8617434 Acc 2/27/22 TA]

iPRAW recommends that the principle of human control should be internationally recognized within the CCW and possibly other documents of international law and be the basis from which requirements can be developed as part of a norm-shaping process. The elements presented below could be helpful to shape a regulation, be it legally binding or not. What is important though is to create a normative framework and operational guidance around the (development and) use of weapon systems with autonomous functions. For example, the ICRC presented one approach to such a framework by calling for a prohibition of unpredictable and anti-personnel AWS and a regulation of other AWS that considers the specific operational context. As iPRAW’s scenario-based discussions about the adequate type and level of human control illustrated, a definition of human control that adequately considers the operational context requires many details about technical capabilities and indicators for the targets. Hence, a ‘one-size-of-control-fits-all’ solution does not exist. Rather, a combination of minimum requirements and individual solutions is necessary. Individual solutions based on a case-by-case assessment will ultimately lead to different levels of granularity when it comes to formulating human control in a regulatory framework, e.g. a rather abstract declaration or treaty and more granular best practices and manuals. These could inform a regulation of LAWS and human control by creating the normative baseline and align with recommendations from other actors. As for example the ICRC discussed, it is crucial to link specific regulatory elements to the challenges raised by LAWS. Within the CCW such a regulation could cover:  military considerations: fulfilling the operational objective and translating the commanders intent to the battlefield,  legal concerns: abide by IHL principles, especially the principle of precaution by avoiding unpredictable effects, ensure human judgment to take legal decisions,  ethical concerns: retain moral agency. A CCW regulation entailing an obligation to maintain human control may also mitigate security challenges, such as conflict escalation, even though the CCW does not address them explicitly. Further important aspects, such as technology diffusion, will most likely not be addressed in a future regulation on LAWS but would have to be addressed in other fora. iPRAW’s model discussed below is not meant to read in opposition to the ICRC propositions on a prohibition and regulation of AWS but rather as an additional perspective with the same objective to keep human control in the use of force.

### 2NC---CP---UN---Solvency---Modeling

**The UN establishes a global model because it brings together the experience and information from many states.**

**International Panel on the Regulation of Autonomous Weapons, 2021** [(iPRAW) coordinated by: German Institute for International and Security Affairs, July “Building Blocks for a Regulation on LAWS and Human Control Updated Recommendations to the GGE on LAWS” https://www.readkong.com/page/building-blocks-for-a-regulation-on-laws-and-human-control-8617434 Acc 2/27/22 TA]

SOFT LAW Best Practices: States Parties to a CCW Protocol (or any other regulatory instrument) could meet regularly with the specific purpose of sharing experiences that were already made at the domestic level regarding the design, development, acquisition, deployment, and use of weapon systems with autonomous functions (under the assumption that the use of such weapons is lawful, meaning that human control is maintained). Especially States with significant experience in this area could provide knowledge and information about regulating LAWS and could show how human control is maintained in practice. Such experiences could serve as exemplary model for other States. Best practices are also a helpful instrument to establish additional standards on the design, development, acquisition, deployment, and use of LAWS based on cooperation, transparency, trust, and confidentiality. The sharing of best practices could promote the adoption of domestic laws on LAWS, ensuring that human control is maintained as required by military, legal, and ethical considerations.

**The UN can build consensus over time for a global norm.**

**Sauer, 2021 - Senior Research Fellow at Bundeswehr University** [Frank serves on the International Panel on the Regulation of Autonomous Weapons IRRC No. 913 March “Stepping back from the brink: Why multilateral regulation of autonomy in weapons systems is difficult, yet imperative and feasible” https://international-review.icrc.org/articles/stepping-back-from-brink-regulation-of-autonomous-weapons-systems-913 Acc 4/5/22 TA]

Conclusion A multilateral regulation of autonomy in weapons systems – that is, codifying a legally binding obligation to retain meaningful human control over the use of force – is difficult yet imperative to achieve. Severe strategic as well as ethical mid- and long-term risks, such as unintended conflict escalation at machine speed and the violation of human dignity, outweigh any short-term military benefits. This analysis has illustrated how regulating weapon autonomy is feasible, presenting a three-step process to facilitate stepping back from the brink: step one, foster the emerging consensus on the notion that a positive obligation to retain human control over weapons systems is prudent and urgently required; step two, further develop the insight that there is no one-size-fits-all standard of meaningful human control; and step three, devise differentiated, context-dependent human control schemes for weapons systems. Given the current geopolitical landscape and the lack of political will to engage in arms control efforts, the taking of these steps will resemble a marathon, not a sprint. After all, the perceived military value of weapon autonomy is exceptionally high, and the issue itself is elusive, requiring an innovative, qualitative approach to arms control. But history clearly suggests that great powers are not devoid of sensitivity to the accumulation of collective risks – otherwise arms control on nuclear, chemical and biological weapons would never have seen the light of day. The emerging technologies of the twenty-first century present humankind with the opportunity to demonstrate that it has learned from history before the risks have manifested themselves to their full extent. Humans do terrible things to each other in war, and there is no technological fix for that. But the international community can at least set rules to curb against uncontrolled escalation and the crossing of fundamental moral lines. If we fail to do so, we will not only lose the breathing room to ponder and deliberate responses,112 an essential requirement of political conflict management, as the Cuban Missile Crisis strongly suggests;113 we will also allow “the ultimate indignity” of war turning into “death by algorithm”.114

# \*\*Disadvantages\*\*

## Terrorism DA

### 1NC---DA---Terror--Generic

#### Terrorism decreasing now

**Gavin 22** [Jerome Gavin (Masters student of International Security at the University of Sydney specializing in Peace and Conflict Studies), 2022, "Trends in Terrorism 2022," Vision of Humanity (Subset of the Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP), by staff in our global offices in Sydney, New York, The Hague, Harare and Mexico. Alongside maps and global indices, we present fresh perspectives on current affairs reflecting our editorial philosophy), <https://www.visionofhumanity.org/trends-in-terrorism/>] // st

According to the latest Global Peace Index, peace in the world has deteriorated for the third year running. Peace has deteriorated for the eleventh time in the last 14 years. This has occurred, in-part, because the fallout from COVID-19 and the escalating security crisis in Ukraine. Despite this decline in peacefulness, one area that has recorded a significant improvement, is terrorism.¶ Of all the indicators of global peace, terrorism impact recorded the third largest improvement. 86 countries recorded an improvement, while 18 countries recorded deteriorations. This represents a long-term trend in which the total deaths from terrorism have been falling steadily since 2015.¶ There are several multifaceted reasons why these changes have occurred, and the result is that terrorism is globally at its lowest level in the history of the GPI. This change is represented by several notable global and regional trends.¶ Chart

Description automatically generated¶ Geographical Trends¶ The epicentre of terrorism has shifted out of the Middle East and North Africa, and into South Asia, with countries such as Afghanistan and Pakistan recording poor scores in the terrorism impact indicator. The impact of terrorism has increased in the sub-Saharan African region, especially in the Sahel where armed conflict has become a key driver of terrorist activity.¶ Terrorism in the Sahel has risen sharply over the last five years and attacks have become more frequent and more deadly. IS and its affiliates have shifted their focus away from the Middle East as the Syrian conflict has subsided and this has been a key driver in the increase in terrorism in the Sahel. Terrorism in the Sahel accounted for 35% of the total of terrorism deaths globally in 2021, an enormous increase from only 1% in 2007.¶ Ideological Trends¶ IEP’s definition of terrorism suggests that: The act must be aimed at attaining a political, economic, religious or social goal.¶ IEP groups terrorist organisations and ideologies into three broad categories: political, nationalist/separatist, and religiously motivated terrorism. While all acts of terrorism are inherently political, the major point of difference between the types of terrorism is the goal. For example, far-right terrorism is classified as a form of political terrorism, whereas when the goal or motivation is explicitly religious, the act is defined as religious terror.¶ Difficulty arises when attempting to delineate between the types of terrorism, as there is a great deal of intersectionality between these categories. However, most terrorist groups have a primary purpose and self-understanding that fits into at least one of these three groups.¶ Over the past decade, religious terrorism has been the deadliest form of terrorism. Islamist groups or lone actors have been responsible for 528 deaths in the West since 2007, representing 60% of deaths. This reached a peak of 457 deaths in the two years between 2015 and 2017. 2021 recorded the lowest number of attacks and deaths attributed to religious terrorism since 2013.

#### Terrorists acquiring LAWs seems fictional in the squo because government LAWs are serving as modes of deterrence. But the plan ensures terrorists are the only actors who can use LAWS.

**Scharre 17** [Paul Scharre (The vice president and director of studies at the Center for a New American Security. From 2009-2012, Scharre led the Defense Department's working group that resulted in the DoD policy directive on autonomy in weapons) , 12-22-17, "Why You Shouldn’t Fear “Slaughterbots”," IEEE Spectrum, <https://spectrum.ieee.org/why-you-shouldnt-fear-slaughterbots>] // st

Killer drones in the hands of terrorists massacring innocents. Robotic weapons of mass destruction breeding chaos and fear. A video created by advocates of a ban on autonomous weapons would have you believe this dystopian future is right around the corner if we don't act now. The short video, called “Slaughterbots," was released last month coinciding with United Nations meetings on autonomous weapons. The UN meetings ended inconclusively, but the video is getting traction. It's gotten over 2 million views and has sparked dozens of news stories. As a piece of propaganda, it works great. As a substantive argument for a ban on autonomous weapons, the video fails miserably.¶ Obviously, a world in which terrorists can unleash swarms of killer drones on innocent civilians would be terrible, but is the future the video depicts realistic? The movie's slick production quality helps to gloss over its leaps of logic. It immerses the viewer in a dystopian nightmare, but let's be clear: It's very much science fiction.¶ The central premise of “Slaughterbots" is that in the future militaries will build autonomous microdrones with shaped charges that can fly up to someone's head and detonate an explosive, killing the person. In the film, these “slaughterbots" quickly fall into the hands of terrorists, resulting in mass killings worldwide.¶ The basic concept is grounded in technical reality. In the real world, the Islamic State has used off-the-shelf quadcopters equipped with small explosives to attack Iraqi troops, killing or wounding dozens of Iraqi soldiers. Today's terrorist drones are largely remotely controlled, but hobbyist drones are becoming increasingly autonomous. The latest models can navigate to a fixed target on their own, avoid obstacles, and autonomously track and follow moving objects. A small drone equipped with facial recognition technology could potentially be used to autonomously search for and kill specific individuals, as “Slaughterbots" envisions. It took me just a few minutes of searching online to find the resources necessary to download and train a free neural network to do facial recognition. So while no one has yet cobbled the technology together in the way the video depicts, all of the components are real.¶ I want to make something very clear: There is nothing we can do to keep that underlying technology out of the hands of would-be terrorists. This is upsetting, but it's very important to understand. Just like how terrorists can and do use cars to ram crowds of civilians, the underlying technology to turn hobbyist drones into crude autonomous weapons is already too ubiquitous to stop. This is a genuine problem, and the best response is to focus on defensive measures to counter drones along with surveillance to catch would-be terrorists ahead of time.¶ “There is nothing we can do to keep that underlying technology out of the hands of would-be terrorists. Just like how terrorists can and do use cars to ram crowds of civilians, the underlying technology to turn hobbyist drones into crude autonomous weapons is already too ubiquitous to stop."¶ The “Slaughterbots" video takes this problem and blows it out of proportion, however, suggesting that drones would be used by terrorists as robotic weapons of mass destruction, killing thousands of people at a time. Fortunately, this nightmare scenario is about as likely to happen as HAL 9000 locking you out of the pod bay doors. The technology shown in the video is plausible, but basically everything else is a bunch of malarkey. The video assumes the following:¶ Governments will mass-produce lethal microdrones to use them as weapons of mass destruction;¶ There are no effective defenses against lethal microdrones;¶ Governments are incapable of keeping military-grade weapons out of the hands of terrorists;¶ Terrorists are capable of launching large-scale coordinated attacks.¶ These assumptions range from questionable, at best, to completely fanciful.¶ Of course, the video is fictional, and defense planners do often use fictionalized scenarios to help policymakers think through plausible events that may occur. As a defense analyst at a think tank and in my prior job as a strategic planner at the Pentagon, I used fictional scenarios to help inform choices about what technologies the United States military should invest in. To be useful, however, these scenarios need to at least be plausible. They need to be something that could happen. The scenario depicted in the “Slaughterbots" video fails to account for political and strategic realities about how governments use military technology.¶ First, there is no evidence that governments are planning to mass-produce small drones to kill civilians in large numbers. In my forthcoming book, Army of None: Autonomous Weapons and the Future of War, I examine next-generation weapons being built in defense labs around the world. Russia, China, and the United States are all racing ahead on autonomy and artificial intelligence. But the types of weapons they are building are generally aimed at fighting other militaries. They are “counter-force" weapons, not “counter-value" weapons that would target civilians. Counter-force autonomous weapons raise their own sets of concerns, but they aren't designed for mass targeting of civilians, nor could they be easily repurposed to do so.¶ Second, in the video, we're told the drones can defeat “any countermeasure." TV pundits scream, “We can't defend ourselves." This isn't fiction; it's farce. Every military technology has a countermeasure, and countermeasures against small drones aren't even hypothetical. The U.S. government is actively working on ways to shoot down, jam, fry, hack, ensnare, or otherwise defeat small drones. The microdrones in the video could be defeated by something as simple as chicken wire. The video shows heavier-payload drones blasting holes through walls so that other drones can get inside, but the solution is simply layered defenses. Military analysts look at the cost-exchange ratio between offense and defense, and in this case, the costs heavily favor static defenders.¶ In a world where terrorists launch occasional small-scale attacks using DIY drones, people are unlikely to absorb the inconveniences of building robust defenses, just like people don't wear body armor to protect against the unlikely event of being caught in a mass shooting. But if an enemy country built hundreds of thousands of drones to wipe out a city, you bet there'd be a run on chicken wire. The video takes a plausible problem—terrorist attacks with drones—and scales it up without factoring in how others would respond. If lethal microdrones were built en masse, defenses and countermeasures would be a national priority, and in this case the countermeasures are simple. Any weapon that can be defeated by a net isn't a weapon of mass destruction.

### 1NC---DA---Nuke Terror

#### Terrorism decreasing now

**Gavin 22** [Jerome Gavin (Masters student of International Security at the University of Sydney specializing in Peace and Conflict Studies), 2022, "Trends in Terrorism 2022," Vision of Humanity (Subset of the Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP), by staff in our global offices in Sydney, New York, The Hague, Harare and Mexico. Alongside maps and global indices, we present fresh perspectives on current affairs reflecting our editorial philosophy), <https://www.visionofhumanity.org/trends-in-terrorism/>] // st

According to the latest Global Peace Index, peace in the world has deteriorated for the third year running. Peace has deteriorated for the eleventh time in the last 14 years. This has occurred, in-part, because the fallout from COVID-19 and the escalating security crisis in Ukraine. Despite this decline in peacefulness, one area that has recorded a significant improvement, is terrorism.¶ Of all the indicators of global peace, terrorism impact recorded the third largest improvement. 86 countries recorded an improvement, while 18 countries recorded deteriorations. This represents a long-term trend in which the total deaths from terrorism have been falling steadily since 2015.¶ There are several multifaceted reasons why these changes have occurred, and the result is that terrorism is globally at its lowest level in the history of the GPI. This change is represented by several notable global and regional trends.¶ Chart

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#### US LAWs are counter-terrorism. Without them, LAWs are proliferated to terrorist organizations

Yoo and Rabkin 17 [John Yoo (A professor of Law at UC Berkeley) and Jeremy Rabkin {A professor of Law at George Mason University), 9-1-2017, "‘Killer Robots’ Can Make War Less Awful," American Enterprise Institute - AEI, <https://www.aei.org/articles/killer-robots-can-make-war-less-awful/>] // st

Robots won’t bring perfection to the use of force, but they can reduce mistakes, increase precision and lower overall destruction compared with their human counterparts. Some worry that autonomous weapons might prompt leaders to turn more readily to conflict. But decisions about war and peace have much more to do with political leaders and their choices than with the technology available to them. Presidents George W. Bush and Barack Obama had roughly the same military at their disposal, but they used it very differently. The greater risk today isn’t that the U.S. will intervene impulsively but that it won’t intervene at all, allowing serious challenges to intensify. Robotic weapons can ease the dilemma. In World War II, the Allies leveled cities, at enormous human cost, to destroy Axis transportation and manufacturing facilities. Drones today can strike an arms factory, pick off terrorists or destroy nuclear-weapons sites while leaving neighboring structures and civilians untouched. Robotic weapons can reduce the costs that discourage the U.S. and its allies from intervening in humanitarian disasters or civil wars. Even if we shared the apocalyptic worries of Mr. Musk and his allies, it isn’t at all clear that arms control could begin to deal with the problem. Arms control has mostly failed to prevent weapons innovation, from the crossbow to the nuclear bomb. Nations have had more success in imposing rules of warfare, especially to protect civilians, than in restricting specific weapons. Robotics and AI will be even harder to control. Countries already hide their nuclear-weapons programs behind claims of scientific research or energy production. The technology involved in autonomous weapons is a classic instance of “dual use,” with obvious peaceful applications. The same technology that can produce a self-driving car can also drive an autonomous tank. A drone can just as easily deliver a bomb as a box from Amazon . A ban on military development would be almost impossible to verify. Such limits would also be a serious handicap for the U.S. The new technology is most likely to benefit countries with the technical dynamism and the innovative drive to deploy them broadly. Restraining their development seems likely to cancel an American advantage over our authoritarian rivals and terrorist enemies. Tech executives may worry that consumers will come to associate their products with war. But responsible governments buy weapons and wage wars for good reasons, such as self-defense, coming to the assistance of allies, pursuing terrorists and alleviating humanitarian disasters. If force is misused, we should blame our elected leaders, not the weapons.

#### Results in nuclear terrorism and extinction

Hayes, PhD, 18

(Peter, Energy+Recpurces@Berkeley, ProfIR@RMIT, 1-18, https://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-special-reports/non-state-terrorism-and-inadvertent-nuclear-war/)

Nuclear terrorism post-cold war: trigger for inadvertent nuclear war? The possible catalytic effect of nuclear terrorism on the risk of state-based nuclear war is not a simple linkage. The multiple types and scales of nuclear terrorism may affect state-nuclear use decisions along multiple pathways that lead to inadvertent nuclear war. These include: Early warning systems fail or are “tripped” in ways that lead to launch-on-warning Accidental nuclear detonation, including sub-critical explosions. Strategic miscalculation in crisis, show of force Decision-making failure (such as irrational, misperception, bias, degraded, group, and time-compressed decision-making) Allied or enemy choices (to seek revenge, to exploit nuclear risk, to act out of desperation) Organizational cybernetics whereby a nuclear command-control-and communications (NC3) system generates error, including the interplay of national NC3 systems in what may be termed the meta-NC3 system. Synchronous and coincident combinations of above.[4] Exactly how, where, and when nuclear terrorism may “ambush” nuclear armed states already heading for or on such a path to inadvertent nuclear war depends on who is targeting whom at a given time, either immediately due to high tension, or generally due to a structural conflict between states. Nuclear armed states today form a complex set of global threat relationships that are not distributed uniformly across the face of Earth. Rather, based on sheer firepower and reach, the nine nuclear weapons states form a global hierarchy with at least four tiers, viz: Tier 1: United States, clear technological supremacy and qualitative edge. Tier 2: Russia, China, global nuclear powers and peers with the United States due to the unique destructive power of even relatively small nuclear arsenals, combined with global reach of missile and bomber delivery systems, thereby constituting a two-tiered global “nuclear triangle” with the United States. Tier 3: France, UK, NATO nuclear sharing and delivery NATO members (Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Turkey) and the NATO and Pacific nuclear umbrella states (Japan, South Korea, Australia) that depend on American nuclear extended deterrence and directly and indirectly support US and US-allied nuclear operations even though they do not host nor deliver nuclear weapons themselves. Tier 4: India, Pakistan, Israel, DPRK. The first two tiers constitute the global nuclear threat triangle that exists between the United States, Russia, and China, forming a global nuclear “truel.” Each of these states targets the others; each represents an existential threat to the other; and each has a long history of mutual nuclear threat that is now a core element of their strategic identity. Tier three consists of states with their own nuclear force but integrated with that of the United States (even France!) that expand the zone of mutual nuclear threat over much of the northern and even parts of the southern hemisphere; and states that host American nuclear command, control, communications, and intelligence systems that support US nuclear operations and to whom nuclear deterrence is “extended” (if, for example, Australia’s claim to having an American nuclear umbrella is believed). The fourth tier is composed of smaller nuclear forces with a primarily regional reach and focus. Between most of these nuclear armed states and across the tiers, there are few shared “rules of the road.” The more of these states that are engaged in a specific conflict and location, the more unpredictable and unstable this global nuclear threat system becomes, with the potential for cascading and concatenating effects. Indeed, as the number of nuclear states projecting nuclear threat against each other increases, the notion of strategic stability may lose all meaning. The emergence of a fifth tier—of non-state actors with the capacity to project nuclear threat against nuclear-armed and nuclear umbrella states (although not only these states)—is a critically important possible catalytic actor in the new conditions of nuclear threat complexity that already exist today. Such a layer represents an “edge of chaos” where the attempts by nuclear armed states to exert absolute “vertical” control over the use of nuclear weapons confront the potential of non-state entities and even individuals (insiders) to engage in “horizontal” nuclear terrorism, presenting radically different control imperatives to the standard paradigm of organizational procedures, technical measures, and safeguards of various kinds. This tier is like the waves and tides on a beach that quickly surrounds and then causes sand castles to collapse. In 2010, Robert Ayson reviewed the potential linkages between inter-state nuclear war and non-state terrorism. He concluded: “…[T]hese two nuclear worlds—a non-state actor nuclear attack and a catastrophic interstate nuclear exchange—are not necessarily separable. It is just possible that some sort of terrorist attack, and especially an act of nuclear terrorism, could precipitate a chain of events leading to a massive exchange of nuclear weapons between two or more of the states that possess them.”[5] How this linkage might unfold is the subject of the next sections of this essay. Are non-state actors motivated and able to attempt nuclear terrorism? A diverse set of non-state actors have engaged in terrorist activities—for which there is no simple or consensual definition. In 2011, there were more than 6,900 known extremist, terrorist and other organizations associated with guerrilla warfare, political violence, protest, organized crime and cyber-crime. Of these, about 120 terrorist and extremist groups had been blacklisted by the United Nations, the European Union and six major countries.[6] Some have argued that the technical, organizational, and funding demanded for a successful nuclear attack, especially involving nuclear weapons, exceeds the capacity of most of the non-state actors with terrorist proclivities. Unfortunately, this assertion is not true, especially at lower levels of impact as shown in Figure 1; but even at the highest levels of obtaining authentic nuclear weapons capabilities, a small number of non-state actors already exhibit the motivation and possible capacity to become nuclear-armed. Ellingsen suggests a useful distinction that nuclear terrorists may be impelled by two divergent motivations, as shown in Figure 2, creating “opportunistic” and “patient” profiles.[7] The requirements for an opportunist non-state nuclear terrorist tend towards immediate use and the search for short-term payoffs with only tactical levels of commitment; whereas the patient non-state nuclear terrorist is able and willing to sustain a long-term acquisition effort to deal a strategic blow to an adversary in a manner that could be achieved only with nuclear weapons. In turn, many factors will drive how a potential nuclear terrorist non-state organization that obtains nuclear weapons or materials may seek to employ them, especially in its nuclear command-and-control orientations. Blair and Ackerman suggest that the goals, conditions, and capacity limitations that shape a possible nuclear terrorist’s posture lead logically to three types of nuclear terrorist nuclear command-and-control postures, viz: pre-determined (in which the leadership sends a fire order to a nuclear-armed subordinate and no change is entertained and no capacity to effect change is established in the field, that is, the order is fire-and-forget); assertive (in which only the central command can issue a nuclear fire order, central control is maintained at all times, with resulting demanding communications systems to support such control); and delegative (in which lower level commanders control nuclear weapons and have pre-delegated authority to use them in defined circumstances, for example, evidence of nuclear explosions combined with loss-of-connectivity with their central command).[8] An example of such delegative control system was the November 26, 2008 attack on Mumbai that used social media reporting to enable the attacking terrorists to respond to distant controller direction and to adapt to counter-terrorist attacks—a connectivity tactic that the authorities were too slow to shut down before mayhem was achieved.[9] Logically, one might expect nuclear terrorists oriented toward short-term, tactical goals to employ pre-determined nuclear command-and-control strategies in the hope that the speed of attack and minimum field communications avoids discovery and interdiction before the attack is complete; whereas nuclear terrorists oriented toward long-term, strategic goals might employ more pre-delegative command-and-control systems that would support a bargaining use and therefore a field capacity to deploy nuclear weapons or materials that can calibrate actual attack based on communications with the central leadership with the risk of interdiction through surveillance and counter-attack. These differing strategic motivations, timelines, and strategies in many respects invert those of nuclear weapons states that rely on large organizations, procedures, and technical controls, to ensure that nuclear weapons are never used without legitimate authorization; and if they are used, to minimize needless civilian casualties (at least some nuclear armed states aspire to this outcome). The repertoire of state-based practices that presents other states with credible nuclear threat and reassures them that nuclear weapons are secure and controlled is likely to be completely mismatched with the strengths and strategies of non-state nuclear terrorists that may seek to maximize civilian terror, are not always concerned about their own survival or even that of their families and communities-of-origin, and may be willing to take extraordinary risk combined with creativity to exploit the opportunities for attack presented by nuclear weapons, umbrella, and non-nuclear states, or their private adversaries. For non-state actors to succeed at complex engineering project such as acquiring a nuclear weapons or nuclear threat capacity demands substantial effort. Gary Ackerman specifies that to have a chance of succeeding, non-state actors with nuclear weapons aspirations must be able to demonstrate that they control substantial resources, have a safe haven in which to conduct research and development, have their own or procured expertise, are able to learn from failing and have the stamina and strategic commitment to do so, and manifest long-term planning and ability to make rational choices on decadal timelines. He identified five such violent non-state actors who already conducted such engineering projects (see Figure 3), and also noted the important facilitating condition of a global network of expertize and hardware. Thus, although the skill, financial, and materiel requirements of a non-state nuclear weapons project present a high bar, they are certainly reachable. Along similar lines, James Forest examined the extent to which non-state actors can pose a threat of nuclear terrorism.[10] He notes that such entities face practical constraints, including expense, the obstacles to stealing many essential elements for nuclear weapons, the risk of discovery, and the difficulties of constructing and concealing such weapons. He also recognizes the strategic constraints that work against obtaining nuclear weapons, including a cost-benefit analysis, possible de-legitimation that might follow from perceived genocidal intent or use, and the primacy of political-ideological objectives over long-term projects that might lead to the group’s elimination, the availability of cheaper and more effective alternatives that would be foregone by pursuit of nuclear weapons, and the risk of failure and/or discovery before successful acquisition and use occurs. In the past, almost all—but not all—non-state terrorist groups appeared to be restrained by a combination of high practical and strategic constraints, plus their own cost-benefit analysis of the opportunity costs of pursuing nuclear weapons. However, should some or all of these constraints diminish, a rapid non-state nuclear proliferation is possible. Although only a few non-state actors such as Al Qaeda and Islamic State have exhibited such underlying stamina and organizational capacities and actually attempted to obtain nuclear weapons-related skills, hardware, and materials, the past is not prologue. An incredibly diverse set of variously motivated terrorist groups exist already, including politico-ideological, apocalyptic-millenarian, politico-religious, nationalist-separatist, ecological, and political-insurgency entities, some of which converge with criminal-military and criminal-scientist (profit based) networks; but also pyscho-pathological mass killing cults, lone wolves, and ephemeral copy-cat non-state actors. The social, economic, and deculturating conditions that generate such entities are likely to persist and even expand. In particular, rapidly growing coastal mega-cities as part of rapid global urbanization offer such actors the ability to sustain themselves as “flow gatekeepers,” possibly in alliance with global criminal networks, thereby supplanting the highland origins of many of today’s non-state violent actors with global reach.[11] Other contributing factors contributing to the supply of possible non-state actors seeking nuclear weapons include new entries such as city states in search of new security strategies, megacities creating their own transnationally active security forces, non-states with partial or complete territorial control such as Taiwan and various micro-states, failing states, provinces in dissociating, failing states that fall victim to internal chaos and the displacement effects of untrammeled globalization, and altogether failed states resulting in ungoverned spaces. To this must be added domestic terrorist entities in the advanced industrial states as they hollow out their economies due to economic globalization and restructuring, adjust to cross-border migration, and adapt to cultural and political dislocation. In short, the prognosis is for the fifth tier of non-state actors to beset the other four tiers with intense turbulence just as waves on a beach swirl around sandcastles, washing away their foundations, causing grains of sand to cascade, and eventually collapsing the whole structure. Observed non-state nuclear threats and attacks In light of the constraints faced by non-state terrorist actors in past decades, it is not surprising that the constellation of actual nuclear terrorist attacks and threats has been relatively limited during and since the end of the Cold War. As Martha Crenshaw noted in a comment on the draft of this paper: We still don’t know why terrorists (in the sense of non-state actors) have not moved into the CBRN [chemical,biological, radiological or nuclear ] domain. (Many people think biosecurity is more critical, for that matter.) Such a move would be extremely risky for the terrorist actor, even if the group possessed both capability (resources, secure space, time, patience) and motivation (willingness to expend the effort, considering opportunity costs). So far it appears that “conventional” terrorism serves their purposes well enough. Most of what we have seen is rhetoric, with some scattered and not always energetic initiatives.[12] Nonetheless, those that have occurred demonstrate unambiguously that such threats and attacks are not merely hypothetical, in spite of the limiting conditions outlined above. One survey documented eighty actual, planned attacks on nuclear facilities containing nuclear materials between 1961-2016[13] as follows: 80 attacks in 3 waves (1970s armed assaults, 1990s thefts, post-2010, breaches) High threat attacks: 32/80 attacks posed substantial, verified threat of which 44 percent involved insiders. All types of targets were found in the data set—on reactors, other nuclear facilities, military bases leading Gary Ackerman and to conclude: “Overall, empirical evidence suggests that there are sufficient cases in each of the listed categories that no type of threat can be ignored.”[14] No region was immune; no year was without such a threat or attack. Thus, there is a likely to be a coincidence of future non-state threats and attacks with inter-state nuclear-prone conflicts, as in the past, and possibly more so given the current trend in and the generative conditions for global terrorist activity that will likely pertain in the coming decades. Of these attacks, about a quarter each were ethno-nationalist, secular utopian, or unknown in motivation; and the remaining quarter were a motley mix of religious (11 percent), “other” (5 percent), personal-idiosyncratic (4 percent), single issue (2 percent) and state sponsored (1 percent) in motivation. The conclusion is unavoidable that there a non-state nuclear terrorist attack in the Northeast Asia region is possible. The following sections outline the possible situations in which nuclear terrorist attacks might be implicated as a trigger to interstate conflict, and even nuclear war. Particular attention is paid to the how nuclear command, control and communications systems may play an independent and unanticipated role in leading to inadvertent nuclear war, separate to the contributors to inadvertency normally included such as degradation of decision-making due to time and other pressures; accident; “wetware” (human failures), software or hardware failures; and misinterpretation of intended or unintended signals from an adversary. Regional pathways to interstate nuclear war At least five distinct nuclear-prone axes of conflict are evident in Northeast Asia. These are: US-DPRK conflict (including with United States, US allies Japan, South Korea and Australia; and all other UNC command allies. Many permutations possible ranging from non-violent collapse to implosion and civil war, inter-Korean war, slow humanitarian crisis. Of these implosion-civil war in the DPRK may be the most dangerous, followed closely by an altercation at the Joint Security Area at Panmunjon where US, ROK, and DPRK soldiers interact constantly. China-Taiwan conflict, whereby China may use nuclear weapons to overcome US forces operating in the West Pacific, either at sea, or based on US (Guam, Alaska) or US allied territory in the ROK, Japan, the Philippines, or Australia); or US uses nuclear weapons in response to Chinese attack on Taiwan. China-Japan conflict escalates via attacks on early warning systems, for example, underwater hydrophone systems (Ayson-Ball, 2011). China-Russia conflict, possibly in context of loss-of-control of Chinese nuclear forces in a regional conflict involving Taiwan or North Korea. Russia-US conflict, involving horizontal escalation from a head-on collision with Russian nuclear forces in Europe or the Middle East; or somehow starts at sea (mostly likely seems ASW) or over North Korea (some have cited risk of US missile defenses against North Korean attack as risking Russian immediate response). Combinations of or simultaneous eruption of the above conflicts that culminate in nuclear war are also possible. Other unanticipated nuclear-prone conflict axes (such as Russia-Japan) could also emerge with little warning. Precursors of such nuclear-laden conflicts in this region also exist that could lead states to the brink of nuclear war and demonstrate that nuclear war is all too possible between states in this region. Examples include the August 1958 Quemoy-Matsu crisis, in which the United States deployed nuclear weapons to Taiwan, and the US Air Force has only a nuclear defense strategy in place to defend Taiwan should China have escalated its shelling campaign to an actual attack; the October 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, when a US nuclear armed missile was nearly fired from Okinawa due to a false fire order; the March 1969 Chinese-Soviet military clash and resulting consideration of nuclear attacks by both sides; and the August 1976 poplar tree crisis at Panmunjon in Korea, when the United States moved nuclear weapons back to the DMZ and the White House issued pre-delegated orders to the US commander in Korea to attack North Korea if the tree cutting task force was attacked by North Korean forces. Loss-of-control of Nuclear Weapons As is well known, nuclear armed states must routinely—and in the midst of a crisis—ensure that their nuclear weapons are never used without legitimate authority, but also ensure at the same time that they are always available for immediate use with legitimate authority. This “always-never” paradox is managed in part by a set of negative and positive controls, reliant upon procedural and technical measures, to maintain legitimate state-based command-and-control (see Figure Four). In this framework, Jerry Conley has produced a taxonomy of nuclear command-and-control structures that embody varying notional national “command-and-control” orientations (also referred to as stability points or biases). Each nuclear armed state exhibits a distinct preference for technical and procedural measures to achieve negative and positive control of nuclear weapons. The way that a state constructs its control system varies depending on its size, wealth, technology, leadership, and strategic orientation, lending each state a unique use propensity affected by the information processing and transmission functions of the nuclear command-and-control system, that in part determines the use or non-use decisions made by the leaders of nuclear armed states. The resulting ideal nuclear command-and-control state structures are shown in Table 1. In Northeast Asia, a four-way nuclear threat system exists that has a three world-class nuclear armed states, the United States, Russia and China, interacting with a fourth tier, barely nuclear armed state, the DPRK. In this quadrilateral nuclear standoff, the DPRK’s simple NC3 system likely is an amalgam of a poorly resourced, militarized, and personalized leadership—which may lead it to oscillate between procedural and technical measures as the basis of control, with a primary emphasis on positive use control, not negative control to avoid unauthorized use. China’s large, centralized NC3 system co-mingles nuclear and conventional communications between national commanders and deployed nuclear forces and may emphasize negative more than positive use controls to ensure Party control. Russia’s highly centralized, complex NC3 system relies on legacy technology and limited economic base for modernization. It too may be more oriented towards negative controls in peacetime, but have the capacity to spring almost instantly to primary reliance on positive controls in times of crisis or tension. The US NC3 system is large, complex and based on wealth and technological prowess. It is under civilian, not military control, at least in principle and in peacetime, and is redundant, diverse, and relatively resilient. Non-state nuclear attack as trigger of inter-state nuclear war in Northeast Asia The critical issue is how a nuclear terrorist attack may “catalyze” inter-state nuclear war, especially the NC3 systems that inform and partly determine how leaders respond to nuclear threat. Current conditions in Northeast Asia suggest that multiple precursory conditions for nuclear terrorism already exist or exist in nascent form. In Japan, for example, low-level, individual, terroristic violence with nuclear materials, against nuclear facilities, is real. In all countries of the region, the risk of diversion of nuclear material is real, although the risk is likely higher due to volume and laxity of security in some countries of the region than in others. In all countries, the risk of an insider “sleeper” threat is real in security and nuclear agencies, and such insiders already operated in actual terrorist organizations. Insider corruption is also observable in nuclear fuel cycle agencies in all countries of the region. The threat of extortion to induce insider cooperation is also real in all countries. The possibility of a cult attempting to build and buy nuclear weapons is real and has already occurred in the region.[15] Cyber-terrorism against nuclear reactors is real and such attacks have already taken place in South Korea (although it remains difficult to attribute the source of the attacks with certainty). The stand-off ballistic and drone threat to nuclear weapons and fuel cycle facilities is real in the region, including from non-state actors, some of whom have already adopted and used such technology almost instantly from when it becomes accessible (for example, drones).[16] Two other broad risk factors are also present in the region. The social and political conditions for extreme ethnic and xenophobic nationalism are emerging in China, Korea, Japan, and Russia. Although there has been no risk of attack on or loss of control over nuclear weapons since their removal from Japan in 1972 and from South Korea in 1991, this risk continues to exist in North Korea, China, and Russia, and to the extent that they are deployed on aircraft and ships of these and other nuclear weapons states (including submarines) deployed in the region’s high seas, also outside their territorial borders. The most conducive circumstance for catalysis to occur due to a nuclear terrorist attack might involve the following nexi of timing and conditions: Low-level, tactical, or random individual terrorist attacks for whatever reasons, even assassination of national leaders, up to and including dirty radiological bomb attacks, that overlap with inter-state crisis dynamics in ways that affect state decisions to threaten with or to use nuclear weapons. This might be undertaken by an opportunist nuclear terrorist entity in search of rapid and high political impact. Attacks on major national or international events in each country to maximize terror and to de-legitimate national leaders and whole governments. In Japan, for example, more than ten heads of state and senior ministerial international meetings are held each year. For the strategic nuclear terrorist, patiently acquiring higher level nuclear threat capabilities for such attacks and then staging them to maximum effect could accrue strategic gains. Attacks or threatened attacks, including deception and disguised attacks, will have maximum leverage when nuclear-armed states are near or on the brink of war or during a national crisis (such as Fukushima), when intelligence agencies, national leaders, facility operators, surveillance and policing agencies, and first responders are already maximally committed and over-extended. At this point, we note an important caveat to the original concept of catalytic nuclear war as it might pertain to nuclear terrorist threats or attacks. Although an attack might be disguised so that it is attributed to a nuclear-armed state, or a ruse might be undertaken to threaten such attacks by deception, in reality a catalytic strike by a nuclear weapons state in conditions of mutual vulnerability to nuclear retaliation for such a strike from other nuclear armed states would be highly irrational. Accordingly, the effect of nuclear terrorism involving a nuclear detonation or major radiological release may not of itself be catalytic of nuclear war—at least not intentionally–because it will not lead directly to the destruction of a targeted nuclear-armed state. Rather, it may be catalytic of non-nuclear war between states, especially if the non-state actor turns out to be aligned with or sponsored by a state (in many Japanese minds, the natural candidate for the perpetrator of such an attack is the pro-North Korean General Association of Korean Residents, often called Chosen Soren, which represents many of the otherwise stateless Koreans who were born and live in Japan) and a further sequence of coincident events is necessary to drive escalation to the point of nuclear first use by a state. Also, the catalyst—the non-state actor–is almost assured of discovery and destruction either during the attack itself (if it takes the form of a nuclear suicide attack then self-immolation is assured) or as a result of a search-and-destroy campaign from the targeted state (unless the targeted government is annihilated by the initial terrorist nuclear attack). It follows that the effects of a non-state nuclear attack may be characterized better as a trigger effect, bringing about a cascade of nuclear use decisions within NC3 systems that shift each state increasingly away from nuclear non-use and increasingly towards nuclear use by releasing negative controls and enhancing positive controls in multiple action-reaction escalation spirals (depending on how many nuclear armed states are party to an inter-state conflict that is already underway at the time of the non-state nuclear attack); and/or by inducing concatenating nuclear attacks across geographically proximate nuclear weapons forces of states already caught in the crossfire of nuclear threat or attacks of their own making before a nuclear terrorist attack.[17] An example of a cascading effect would be a non-state attack on a key node of linked early warning systems that is unique to and critical for strategic nuclear forces to be employable, or the effect of multiple, coincident and erroneous sensor alerts of incoming attacks (as occurred during the Cuban Missile Crisis with radar in Florida monitoring Soviet missiles in Cuba that mistakenly fused an erroneous reading of a missile trajectory with a real observation of a Soviet satellite that happened to be passing overhead). An example of a concatenating effect would an attack that leads a nuclear weapons state to target two other states forces because it cannot determine whose forces attacked its own. This circumstance might arise if key anti-submarine forces or an aircraft carrier battle group were attacked and it was impossible to determine in a given waterway or area of ocean whose submarines were present or responsible for the attack, leading the attacked state to destroy all the submarines presenting on-going threat to its strategic forces. As we noted above, a terrorist nuclear shock may take various forms and appear in different places. Ever since an extortion attempt in Boston in 1974 based on the threat of nuclear detonation, the threat of an improvised nuclear device has been credible. For such a threat to be credible, a non-state terrorist entity must release a plausible precursor such as nuclear material or warhead design information, or stage an actual demonstration attack that makes it plausible that the attacker controls a significant quantity of fissile material (most likely plutonium, or simply radioactive materials suitable for a radiological device that might be used to draw in first responders and then detonate a warhead to maximize damage and terror). Such an attack might be combined with a separate attack on critical infrastructure such as a cyberattack. The attacker might retain sufficient material for bargaining and insurance should the initial attack fail. Given the need to adapt to circumstances, such an attacker is likely to be patient and strategic, in the terms defined earlier, and to have extensive organizational and communication capacities; and to be able to operate at multiple targeted sites, possibly in multiple countries. Given its patience and stamina, such an attacker would select a highly symbolic target such as a high level meeting. Such a case would present the targeted state with an exquisite dilemma: bargaining and negotiation with the non-state actor threatening such an attack may be justified given the explicit and plausible nature of the threat, which may be politically impossible while making counter-terrorism operations very risky and only possible with extreme caution. And, such an attacker might well issue a false statement about state-sponsorship to invoke third parties in ways that vastly complicate the response to the threat. If the attacker is less capable and driven for immediate political or other returns, then it may be satisfied with highly delegated delivery with no recall option, and no use of communications to minimize the risk of discovery or interdiction. Such an attacker is also less likely to wait for the circumstances in which inter-state nuclear war is more likely due to inter-state tension; and also less likely to seek third party effects beyond the damage to the immediate target and resulting terror. Should surveillance indicate that an improvised nuclear device is in motion, then an all-out search to interdict the attackers and to retrieve the device or materials would likely ensue. In these two instances of credible threat of non-state nuclear attack, the insider versus outsider perpetrator factor will affect significantly how the attack affects possible inter-state conflicts. In Kobe’s terms, if the perpetrator is confirmed to be an outsider, then a country-of-origin suspicion matrix may cast suspicion onto another state as possible sponsor. For an attack threatened in China, the linkage might be back to Russia, the United States, or North Korea. For an attack threatened in Russia, the linkage might be back to the United States, China, or North Korea. For an attack threatened in North Korea, the linkage might be back to the United States, China, or Russia. And for an attack threatened in one of the umbrella states in the region, South Korea and Japan, such an attack might be linked to each other, as well as to China, North Korea, or Russia. In each case, the shadow of suspicion and possible accusations could tilt decision-making processes in one or more of these states and ways that could worsen pre-existing views about the nuclear use propensity of an opposing nuclear armed state. Should an actual nuclear attack occur, the situation is even more complex and problematic. Such an attack might be purely accidental, due to hardware, software, or human error while nuclear materials or weapons are in transit. In principle, this limits the site of such an event to the nuclear weapons states or their ships and aircraft as neither South Korea nor Japan host nuclear weapons today. If an insider is involved, then the perpetrator may be identified quickly, and whether there is a linkage with another state may become evident (depending on nuclear forensics as well as insight obtained from surviving attackers). If an outsider is the perpetrator, then the suspicion matrix will come into play again, with possibly severe effects on inter-state tension due to accusation, suspicion, and fear of follow-on attacks. During the attack, especially if it is a hostage-taking type of attack, the identity of the perpetrator may be unknown or ambiguous, and maintaining this ambiguity or even opacity as to the attacker may be deliberate—as was the case with the 2008 Mumbai attack in which the controller tried to ensure that all the attackers were killed in the course of the twelve separate but coordinated attacks across the city over four days. Although much progress has been made in establishing local nuclear forensics capability in Japan,[18] China, and South Korea, there is no certainty that it is sufficiently developed to identify the perpetrator of an act of nuclear terrorism, especially if there is a state sponsor and deception involved. Conclusion We now move to our conclusion. Nuclear-armed states can place themselves on the edge of nuclear war by a combination of threatening force deployments and threat rhetoric. Statements by US and North Korea’s leaders and supporting amplification by state and private media to present just such a lethal combination. Many observers have observed that the risk of war and nuclear war, in Korea and globally, have increased in the last few years—although no-one can say with authority by how much and exactly for what reasons. However, states are restrained in their actual decisions to escalate to conflict and/or nuclear war by conventional deterrence, vital national interests, and other institutional and political restraints, both domestic and international. It is not easy, in the real world, or even in fiction, to start nuclear wars.[19] Rhetorical threats are standard fare in realist and constructivist accounts of inter-state nuclear deterrence, compellence, and reassurance, and are not cause for alarm per se. States will manage the risk in each of the threat relationships with other nuclear armed states to stay back from the brink, let alone go over it, as they have in the past. This argument was powerful and to many, persuasive during the Cold War although it does not deny the hair-raising risks taken by nuclear armed states during this period. Today, the multi-polarity of nine nuclear weapons states interacting in a four-tiered nuclear threat system means that the practice of sustaining nuclear threat and preparing for nuclear war is no longer merely complicated, but is now enormously complex in ways that may exceed the capacity of some and perhaps all states to manage, even without the emergence of a fifth tier of non-state actors to add further unpredictability to how this system works in practice. The possibility that non-state actors may attack without advance warning as to the time, place, and angle of attack presents another layer of uncertainty to this complexity as to how inter-state nuclear war may break out. That is, non-state actors with nuclear weapons or threat goals and capacities do not seek the same goals, will not use the same control systems, and will use radically different organizational procedures and systems to deliver on their threats compared with nuclear armed states. If used tactically for immediate terrorist effect, a non-state nuclear terrorist could violently attack nuclear facilities, exploiting any number of vulnerabilities in fuel cycle facility security, or use actual nuclear materials and even warheads against military or civilian targets. If a persistent, strategically oriented nuclear terrorist succeed in gaining credible nuclear threat capacities, it might take hostage one or more states or cities. If such an event coincides with already high levels of tension and even military collisions between the non-nuclear forces of nuclear armed states, then a non-state nuclear terrorist attack could impel a nuclear armed state to escalate its threat or even military actions against other states, in the belief that this targeted state may have sponsored the non-state attack, or was simply the source of the attack, whatever the declared identity of the attacking non-state entity. This outcome could trigger these states to go onto one or more of the pathways to inadvertent nuclear war, especially if the terrorist attack was on a high value and high risk nuclear facility or involved the seizure and/or use of fissile material. Some experts dismiss this possibility as so remote as to be not worth worrying about. Yet the history of nuclear terrorism globally and in the Northeast Asian region suggests otherwise. Using the sand castle metaphor, once built on the high tide line, sand castles may withstand the wind but eventually succumb to the tide once it reaches the castle—at least once, usually twice a day. Also, theories of organizational and technological failure point to the coincidence of multiple, relatively insignificant driving events that interact or accumulate in ways that lead the “metasystem” to fail, even if each individual component of a system works perfectly. Thus, the potential catalytic effect of a nuclear terrorist incident is not that it would of itself lead to a sudden inter-state nuclear war; but that at a time of crisis when alert levels are already high, when control systems on nuclear forces have already shifted from primary emphasis on negative to positive control, when decision making is already stressed, when the potential for miscalculation is already high due to shows of force indicating that first-use is nigh, when rhetorical threats promising annihilation on the one hand, or collapse of morale and weakness on the other invite counter-vailing threats by nuclear adversaries or their allies to gain the upper hand in the “contest of resolve,” and when organizational cybernetics may be in play such that purposeful actions are implemented differently than intended, then a terrorist nuclear attack may shift a coincident combination of some or all of these factors to a threshold level where they collectively lead to a first-use decision by one or more nuclear-armed states. If the terrorist attack is timed or happens to coincide with high levels of inter-state tension involving nuclear-armed states, then some or all of these tendencies will likely be in play anyway—precisely the concern of those who posit pathways to inadvertent nuclear war as outlined in section 2 above.

### 2NC---DA---Terror---UQ

#### US tech superiority is key to keeping terrorism low

**Kfir 20** [Isaac Kfir (Director of the National Security Program and Counterterrorism Policy Centre at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute), 8-21-20, "Counterterrorism and Terrorist Innovation," GNET, <https://gnet-research.org/2020/08/21/counterterrorism-and-terrorist-innovation/>] // st

Historically, counterterrorism has largely been reactive, adopting policies and measures to respond to what violent extremists do. The purpose of this blog is to argue that as violent extremists innovate, so should counterterrorism because as Professor Leonard Weinberg [noted](https://www.universiteitleiden.nl/binaries/content/assets/customsites/perspectives-on-terrorism/2008/issue-9/49-304-1-pb.pdf), “Innovative terrorist groups seem to be exceptionally dangerous. Their innovations are often emulated by other groups – even ones with other aims and in other parts of the world.” Writing in the late 1980s, Professor Martha Crenshaw [linked](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01402398708437313?journalCode=fjss20) terrorist innovation to survival as she emphasises that state actors adapt to the violence. Included in her assessment is the observation that innovation is not something that all violent extremists do or can do, which is why some may disappear. Crenshaw was writing in the pre-social media and fourth technological revolution, which has affected the process of innovation as nowadays information can and is shared much faster. Nevertheless, the core of her argument remains as valid today as when it was first touted. In her work on terrorism and innovation Professor Crenshaw [identified](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01402398708437313?journalCode=fjss20) three types of terrorist innovation: strategic, organisational and tactical. She conceded that it may be difficult to identify the difference between strategic and tactical innovation or distinguish the source of the innovation according to type, which could become obvious over time. In the context of terrorism, [strategic innovation](https://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/25358/2010_019_Terrorist_WME.pdf;sequence=4) occurs when the group veers from one strategy to another, which may lead the group to adopt new ideas, tactics or tools. The revised strategy need not impact the ideology of the group, which often stays the same. The group recognises that its current strategy is not getting it closer to the end-goal, which is why it needs to innovate. Both al-Qaeda and Islamic State provide good examples of groups that engaged in strategic innovation as a way to survive and continue. The former increasingly adopted a [franchising](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-al-qaeda-franchise-9780190205614?cc=us&lang=en&), [gradualist](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0030438718300425) model. This was a strategic shift, as core al-Qaeda moved away from the direct commission of terrorist attacks to operating as an [ideological disseminator](https://ctc.usma.edu/wp-content/uploads/2010/06/Vol1Iss3-Art5.pdf) marrying the local with the global ([glocalisation](https://www.routledge.com/Glocalization-A-Critical-Introduction-1st-Edition/Roudometof/p/book/9780415722438)). To achieve this, core al-Qaeda has to adapt its organisation and tactics to fit with its franchising model, including focusing more on the non-Western states, as seen for example in Zawahiri’s 11 September 2019 [message](https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2019/09/ayman-al-zawahiri-defends-9-11-hijackings-in-anniversary-address.php), which focused more on those living in Arab-majority countries, calling on the faithful to attack American targets in their country. The Islamic State [recruitment strategy](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/1057610X.2016.1237219) is a good example of strategic innovation, as it applied advertising techniques to encourage young people to migrate to the so-called caliphate or commit acts of violence. Technological changes proved essential to these strategic innovations. Organisational innovation [refers](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/17467586.2013.814069) to changes within the organisational space specifically to changes in the group’s structure and institutions. Organisational innovation is very much impacted by the environment, specifically effective anti- and counter-terrorism measures such as decapitation, as groups lose key strategic and tactical leaders that are not easily replaceable. Al-Qaeda’s founders recognised the need to form a [durable organisation](https://www.hudson.org/research/14365-how-al-qaeda-works-the-jihadist-group-s-evolving-organizational-design) which is why they structured along traditional lines as a top-down, hierarchical organisation with clear strategic goals that are determined by the emir, whilst also permitting an element of decentralisation, giving the locals some operational independence. An important factor in ensuring al-Qaeda’s durability is its [organisation fluidity](https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2013/07/18/global-al-qaeda-affiliates-objectives-and-future-challenges/), which is dependent on secure communication, which in turn has allowed Zawahiri to [reconstitute](https://www.longwarjournal.org/al-qaeda-leaders) the group’s Shura Majilis. Tactical innovation [refers](https://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/25358/2010_019_Terrorist_WME.pdf;sequence=4) to changes in methods, targeting or operations used by a terrorist group. The innovation generally manifests itself through the acquisition of new weapons or new targets or the recognition that a tactic no longer works, which is why there is a need to adapt. [Paul Gill’s study](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/1057610X.2016.1237221?journalCode=uter20) of the Provisional Irish Republican Army highlights how the group adapted its use of improvised explosive devices. The change also altered perception about the group which before the change in tactic was described as ‘clumsy’, ‘disorganised,’ ‘unimaginative’ to one that commentators described as professional. Another example is the usage of drones, which states initially held a monopoly over, but over time non-state actors sought to acquire this tool ([for example](https://ctc.usma.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/Nexus-of-Emerging-Technologies.pdf) Israel had used drones in the 1980s in Lebanon, but by 1993 Aum Shinrikyo sought to acquire this tool. Ten years later, Hezbollah used a surveillance drone and by the mid-2010s, Islamic State had used a quadcopter with an explosive payload). This type of innovation is generally linked to a change within the strategic thinking, although tactical innovation is not necessarily reliant on strategic innovation. It is in the tactical sector that there has been a fair amount of innovation especially as the technological revolution has made communication and therefore the sharing of ideas and information easier and faster. Research has highlighted how effective Islamic State has been in adapting, i.e. innovating, its communication strategy as states and companies develop a mechanism to hinder the group’s message. For example, when Twitter began removing the Islamic State official media account, al-I‘tisam, Islamic State’s main distribution unit adapted, using variations on its name when creating new Twitter handles to come back to the platform. As Twitter became better at shutting down the al-I‘tisam account, Islamic State created a new methodology for distribution, referred by some as the “centralised decentralisation”, allowing it to create official and unofficial dissemination accounts (some were linked to the group and others were managed by others who may not have had direct or even indirect links to Islamic State but supported the group’s agenda). Through this system, Islamic State was able to continue to disseminate propaganda material because when one account was taken down, others remained operational, tweeting whenever the new account of the one taken down was back online using an alternative handle. Another innovative way Islamic State has sought to promote its message and to recruit is through [video games](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09557571.2014.960508). Islamic State was not the first to use this medium, Hezbollah for example released a video game, Special Force, in 2003, in which the player fights against Israel. The game includes real battle fought between Hezbollah and Israel in Lebanon and the game itself is structured to include a [narrative](https://gnet-research.org/2020/04/03/war-isnt-hell-its-entertainment-the-potential-role-of-video-games-in-radicalisation-processes/) that the designers constructed, aimed at generating a new moral reality as much as the construction of heroes and villains. Notably, recognising that creating games from scratch is challenging, they are opting to undertake [gamification](https://www.techagainstterrorism.fm/how-are-terrorists-and-violent-extremists-using-gamification/), whether as a bottom-up or a top-down process. Conclusion Innovation, whether strategic, tactical, or organisational is a complex and yet a crucial process, as without it, violent extremists become susceptible to extermination or irrelevancy, as states adapt. When it comes to innovation, violent extremists are limited by their ideology, availability of resources, and a willingness to change. Currently, many Salafi-jihadi groups are engaged in strategic reassessment as they consider how to proceed with their campaign. This may explain the lull in terrorist attacks (especially against western targets). Nevertheless, these individuals are imaginative, technically savvy, and determined and they bank on the fact that many policymakers suffer from what is best described as a ‘failure of imagination’. Moreover, as Adam Dolnik had shown in his important [research](https://www.routledge.com/Understanding-Terrorist-Innovation-Technology-Tactics-and-Global-Trends/Dolnik/p/book/9780415545167) on terrorist and innovation, groups whose ideology centres on inflicting mass casualties and who want to undertake spectacular events tend to be more innovative. This is very true for most if not all Salafi-jihadi and extreme violent right-wing actors.

#### Terrorism decreasing now

**Institute for Economics & Peace 6/11** [Institute for Economics & Peace (Chaired by technology entrepreneur Steve Killelea founder of IR, IEP is a global think tank headquartered in Sydney, Australia with branches in New York City, Mexico City and Oxford. IEP develops conceptual frameworks to define peacefulness, providing metrics for measurement, uncovering the relationship between peace, business, and prosperity, and seeking to promote understanding of the cultural, economic, and political factors that drive peacefulness). Global Peace Index 2022: Measuring Peace in a Complex World, Sydney, June 11, 2022. Available from: <http://visionofhumanity.org/resources>] // st

On a more positive note, there were substantial improvements for the scores for a number of indicators, including terrorism impact, nuclear and heavy weapons, deaths from internal conflict, military expenditure, incarceration rates and perceptions of criminality. Terrorism impact is now at its best level in six years. The violent demonstration indicator also improved in 2022, albeit marginally. This is in contrast to the trend since 2008, which has seen the indicator deteriorate by 49.6 per cent. The biggest improvements in 2022 in the violent demonstrations indicator were in recorded in Iceland, Romania and Ecuador, while the largest deteriorations were seen in Kazakhstan, Papua New Guinea and Rwanda. Iceland remains the world’s most peaceful nation, a position it has held since the first iteration of the GPI. Afghanistan is the world’s least peaceful country for the fifth consecutive year. Denmark and Slovenia were the only countries to fall in rankings out of the ten most peaceful countries, driven by deteriorations in violent demonstrations and other indicators. Over the history of the GPI high peace countries scores have remained consistently good, highlighting how Positive Peace underpins the necessary resilience to maintain high levels of peace.

#### ISIS is weak now but gaining strength

* TW: includes statistics regarding suicide bombings and attacks

Sagramoso 20 [Dr. Domitilla Sagramoso (Senior Lecturer in Security and Development. Expert on Russian foreign and security policy, with a particular focus on Islamist-jihadist violence in the Russian North Caucasus. Her research examines the dynamics of terrorist violence in the North Caucasus region and Central Asia. She also studies in detail Russia’s actions in the former Soviet space in the military, economic and institutional spheres. This analysis is carried out within the framework of ‘Hegemony’ and ‘Neo-Empire’ theories of International Relations), 5-6-2020, "Who ‘Defeated’ ISIS? An Analysis of US and Russian Contributions," <https://www.russiamatters.org/analysis/who-defeated-isis-analysis-us-and-russian-contributions>] // st

ISIS: Down but Not Out While there is little doubt that ISIS had by the summer of 2019 lost control over most, if not all, of its territorial “caliphate,” it is also clear that the group has not been fully defeated, strategically or militarily. In the past two years we have seen ISIS once again become an insurgency group engaged in hit-and-run tactics and brutal terrorist attacks not only around the globe but also in areas supposedly liberated by U.S.-led coalition forces in Iraq and Syria. Between the summer of 2018 and late March 2019, ISIS carried out at least 250 attacks in areas outside its control in Syria, according to [a New York Times estimate](https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/03/23/world/middleeast/isis-syria-defeated.html). In Iraq, the numbers seem to be much higher: [Research](https://ctc.usma.edu/app/uploads/2018/12/CTC-SENTINEL-122018.pdf) by the Combating Terrorism Center identified 1,271 attacks there by ISIS in the first months of 2018 alone, including a twin ~~suicide bombing~~ in Baghdad that left 38 dead and over 100 wounded. Other notable attacks in Iraq in the past two years have included [a bombing](https://www.yahoo.com/news/16-dead-attack-iraq-funeral-anti-fighters-mayor-170213577.html) at the funeral of anti-ISIS militiamen, which killed 16, a [mortar attack](https://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/middle-east/2019/08/25/ISIS-mortar-attack-on-football-field-kills-six-in-Iraq) on a soccer field near Kirkuk, which killed six, and [a minibus bombing](https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/21/world/middleeast/islamic-state-bus-bomb-iraq.html) last September, which killed 12. This year ISIS fighters have continued the onslaught, [killing three Iraqi soldiers](https://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/bomb-attack-kills-3-soldiers-in-iraq-s-kirkuk/1791291) with a roadside bomb in April and [attacking two Iraqi security posts](https://www.cnn.com/2020/01/14/politics/isis-attacks-iraq-syria-border/index.html) near the Syrian border in January. Inside Syria itself ISIS’ most prominent recent attacks include: a series of coordinated ~~suicide bombings~~ in the southwestern region of Suwayda in July 2018, which killed over 200 people; a January 2019[~~suicide attack~~](https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/17/world/middleeast/syria-bombing-manbij-attack.html) at a restaurant frequented by U.S. military personnel in Manbij, which [killed 19 people](https://www.ajc.com/news/breaking-news/east-point-woman-among-killed-suicide-bombing-syria/auRc0Q17iiIeFYDfpU3kdK/), including four Americans; and [three near-simultaneous bombings](http://www.syriahr.com/en/?p=136521&__cf_chl_jschl_tk__=bea1947a54e9304d5dd9fff5924769d7b2e1743b-1585942290-0-ASqKczRQMzp9kIFclR-eL1wpJ8wG-8xIo2eLLMEEQp6gsR1dTNtTZW4uey_X4xDxyDP14nDdnMcTvozSY1gMcDL2zuPjuvWeipCU1hJKV59z29boK7qc6__RPm0VJSK2qg5RY7wqb9N5nqW7L1MrGTFFgrK0JqAJcQhAEIsrPWd0fkcFHFWmpFDqVoe3Pn5OjRGBismF1bUvwZUl7z1P5xwqEaRvIALr-f_Pm-oUMZJ6_w30wNwy-OCfCvxV5acH0cQY10L_tMN1D0rIx9uKo7ZDhOsjBle-hBPa3zyx28q6) in Hasakah province in July 2019. This February, according to one Syrian NGO [cited by The Media Line](https://themedialine.org/by-region/isis-keeps-up-attacks-in-iraq-and-syria-as-virus-spreads/) news website, ISIS and other groups carried out 53 attacks in SDF territory in the country’s northeast, “mostly targeted killings and home invasions” in the regions of Deir ez-Zor and Raqqa.In addition to staging attacks, the terror group’s fighters and supporters are dispersed across both countries, “reconstituting key capabilities” since late 2018, [according to ISW](http://www.understandingwar.org/report/isiss-second-comeback-assessing-next-isis-insurgency); a recent[Pentagon report](https://media.defense.gov/2019/Aug/06/2002167167/-1/-1/1/Q3FY2019_LEADIG_OIR_REPORT.PDF) concurred, saying that ISIS—also known as ISIL and IS—has now “solidified its insurgent capabilities in Iraq” and is also “resurgent in Syria.” ISIS fighters have taken refuge in Iraq’s “most forbidding terrain,”2 where government control is tenuous at best, “including mountains and caves, remote desert, orchards, river groves and islands,” as well as in “destroyed and abandoned villages,” according to [a recent report by the International Crisis Group](https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/207-averting-an-isis-resurgence.pdf), or ICG.3 (An attempt to clear ISIS militants out of one such area, a cave complex, in Iraq [on March 8 led](https://www.axios.com/us-troops-isis-iraq-d170e20f-a92a-491a-a38c-9f8a7e25ca7b.html) to this year’s first U.S. troop fatalities in the anti-ISIS battle.) Likewise, ISIS fighters are present in Syria: in the open expanses of its central Badiya desert, finding shelter in its “rocky outcroppings and caves” and launching regular attacks against exposed Syrian military positions, but also in Raqqa and Hasakah provinces, where ISIS is believed to have a sophisticated clandestine network and has conducted more “complex and ambitious attacks.”4 [According to the Institute for the Study of War](http://www.understandingwar.org/report/isiss-second-comeback-assessing-next-isis-insurgency),5 as of 2019 ISIS had also established a rural network of support on the outskirts of Idlib province, now the last bastion of anti-regime forces in Syria, which Damascus has been trying to retake for months with Russian support. However, while many ISIS militants fled to the province after March 2019, the terror group’s presence in Idlib has been “low-key,” in the [words of one analyst](https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/baghdadi-hid-among-rivals-and-enemies-in-rebel-held-syrian-province/2019/10/28/fcbf20c0-f982-11e9-9e02-1d45cb3dfa8f_story.html), as Idlib is [dominated](https://www.voanews.com/extremism-watch/will-recapture-syrias-idlib-affect-islamic-state) by [other jihadist groups](https://www.bbc.com/news/world-45401474), in particular an anti-ISIS [coalition called Hei’at Tahrir al-Sham](https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/eastern-mediterranean/syria/jihadist-factor-syrias-idlib-conversation-abu-muhammad-al-jolani), or HTS. Some of the [rebel groups in Idlib](https://www.bbc.com/news/world-45401474) have been supported by Turkey, whose [intervention in northeastern Syria](https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/07/us/politics/trump-turkey-syria.html), coupled with [the U.S.’s partial withdrawal](https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/21/world/middleeast/isis-syria-us.html) from the area, has only served to further strengthen ISIS’ capabilities in this Middle Eastern region, according to a [recent Pentagon report](https://edition.cnn.com/2019/11/19/politics/pentagon-report-syria-turkey-ceasefire/index.html).

### 2NC---DA---Terror---Link

#### Absent LAWs, the weapons are proliferated to terrorist organizations

Yoo and Rabkin 17 [John Yoo (A professor of Law at UC Berkeley) and Jeremy Rabkin {A professor of Law at George Mason University), 9-1-2017, "‘Killer Robots’ Can Make War Less Awful," American Enterprise Institute - AEI, <https://www.aei.org/articles/killer-robots-can-make-war-less-awful/>] // st

Robots won’t bring perfection to the use of force, but they can reduce mistakes, increase precision and lower overall destruction compared with their human counterparts. Some worry that autonomous weapons might prompt leaders to turn more readily to conflict. But decisions about war and peace have much more to do with political leaders and their choices than with the technology available to them. Presidents George W. Bush and Barack Obama had roughly the same military at their disposal, but they used it very differently. The greater risk today isn’t that the U.S. will intervene impulsively but that it won’t intervene at all, allowing serious challenges to intensify. Robotic weapons can ease the dilemma. In World War II, the Allies leveled cities, at enormous human cost, to destroy Axis transportation and manufacturing facilities. Drones today can strike an arms factory, pick off terrorists or destroy nuclear-weapons sites while leaving neighboring structures and civilians untouched. Robotic weapons can reduce the costs that discourage the U.S. and its allies from intervening in humanitarian disasters or civil wars. Even if we shared the apocalyptic worries of Mr. Musk and his allies, it isn’t at all clear that arms control could begin to deal with the problem. Arms control has mostly failed to prevent weapons innovation, from the crossbow to the nuclear bomb. Nations have had more success in imposing rules of warfare, especially to protect civilians, than in restricting specific weapons. Robotics and AI will be even harder to control. Countries already hide their nuclear-weapons programs behind claims of scientific research or energy production. The technology involved in autonomous weapons is a classic instance of “dual use,” with obvious peaceful applications. The same technology that can produce a self-driving car can also drive an autonomous tank. A drone can just as easily deliver a bomb as a box from Amazon . A ban on military development would be almost impossible to verify. Such limits would also be a serious handicap for the U.S. The new technology is most likely to benefit countries with the technical dynamism and the innovative drive to deploy them broadly. Restraining their development seems likely to cancel an American advantage over our authoritarian rivals and terrorist enemies. Tech executives may worry that consumers will come to associate their products with war. But responsible governments buy weapons and wage wars for good reasons, such as self-defense, coming to the assistance of allies, pursuing terrorists and alleviating humanitarian disasters. If force is misused, we should blame our elected leaders, not the weapons.

#### LAWs are crucial for counter-terrorism efforts

Bento 15 [Lucas Bento (International lawyer with a degree from Columbia Law), 8-31-15, "Could Science Defeat Terrorism? Using Robots to Hunt Down ISIS," No Publication, <https://thediplomat.com/2015/08/could-science-defeat-terrorism-using-robots-to-hunt-down-isis/>] // st

In a more practical sense, applied science, and particularly artificial intelligence, may provide more immediate tactical benefits. Enter killer robots, artificially intelligent lethal machines capable of selecting and engaging targets without human intervention. Killer robots have received considerable bad press in recent months. Many scientists, nongovernmental organizations, and states have called for a preemptive ban on their development and eventual use on the battlefield. They fear that lethal autonomous robots may increase the likelihood of war and could one day pose an existential threat to humankind. This anxiety is nothing new. In an article published in 1863 entitled “Darwin among the machines,” English writer Samuel Butler argued that the “the machines will hold the real supremacy over the world and its inhabitants.” The author recommended that as a precaution, mankind should return to the “primeval condition of the race.” Technophobic–or perhaps neophobic, the aversion to all things new–sentiments have ebbed and flowed throughout history, peaking at times when revolutionary technologies were introduced in society. Seventeenth century Japan rejected the use of firearms, then an “advanced military technology.” Nineteenth century England grappled with the Luddites, who smashed mechanical looms for fear of putting people out of work. In many ways, artificial intelligence is different because it raises unique issues about control, legitimacy, and accountability. But could the pessimistic prognoses about killer robots miss the forest for the trees? What if robots were used as partners of peace and promoters of global order and justice? Or, importantly, as terrorist hunters? The war on ISIS shows no end in sight. The group’s unrestrained campaign of violence in Iraq and Syria continues to reveal new shades of brutality. Its disregard for the well-being of humanity is unrivaled in the 21st century. I say “humanity” because ISIS’ political war is costing the lives of the innocent by using tactics that are perhaps best suited to earlier iterations of the human race. Rape, beheadings, torture. Repeat. But I could just as well say that the group has no respect for the “humanities,” the branch of human learning that studies human culture. ISIS’ iconoclastic crusade against Syrian and Iraqi cultural heritage is well documented, both by the group itself and the international community. The group’s obliteration of numerous World Heritage Sites, including the recent destruction of the Baalshamin temple in Palmyra, and of priceless cultural artifacts around the region are part of a systematic campaign to enforce their puritanical interpretation of Islam. For ISIS, cultural cleansing is necessary to wipe the slate clean and build a caliphate free from idolatry. As a commercial hub linking the Far East with the Roman Empire, the city of Palmyra marked “the crossroads of several civilizations in the ancient world.” Its destruction has been condemned as a “war crime” by UNESCO. Irina Bokova, UNESCO’s chief, deplored these actions as the “most brutal, systematic” destruction of cultural heritage since World War II. Enjoying this article? Click here to subscribe for full access. Just $5 a month. These ancient sites are symbols of humanity’s cultural history: a reminder of how the web of human relations intersect and knowledge flows interact. This is what makes ISIS particularly dangerous: not only are they murdering members of communities but also destroying the cultural foundations upon which such communities were built. Culture is not some whimsical collection of pretty paintings and table manners; it is a reflection and embodiment of social identity. Through language, art, music, knowledge, and religion we continuously give meaning to our social existence. By destroying these cultural anchors, ISIS is now on an ideological path that would make Hitler and Malan throw evil nods of approval. Earlier this year, Dario Franceschini, Italian Minister of Cultural Heritage and Tourism, called for the formation of a UN military force to protect the world’s cultural heritage. Killer robots would be particularly useful against groups like ISIS, where political costs are too high for major military powers to put boots on the ground, and political momentum too low to justify human military intervention to protect sites of cultural importance. In addition to using robots offensively to fight terrorists, robots could be used to promote peaceful objectives, such as protecting humanitarian convoys, refugee camps, schools, hospitals, and museums. First iterations will likely be semi-autonomous, featuring some level of human supervision and control. Once the technology is sufficiently capable of meeting the stringent standards of international humanitarian law, such as discriminating between combatants and civilians, as well as operational safety, such as recognizing friendly fire, greater autonomy may be delegated to the robot. ISIS may be defeated before killer robots ever see the light of day. But the value of autonomous lethal technology, operating within legal and morally sound grounds, cannot be underestimated to solve global security problems. Scientific advancements–and its evolving creations, like artificial intelligence–must be given serious thought as a bridge to peace, or at the very least as a weapon to defeat terror.

#### LAWs are key to counter-terrorism

Iyengar and Miller 16 [SS Iyengar (Professor at the School of Computing and Information Sciences) and Jerry Miller (Lab member at Florida International University and a part of the US Air Force for over two decades), 8-6-2016, "Robots to counter terrorism: a brave new world?," Deccan Herald, <https://www.deccanherald.com/content/562497/robots-counter-terrorism-brave-world.html>] // st

As early as 2009, organisations began calling for a pre-emptive ban on killer robots, when the International Committee for Robot Arms Control (ICRAC), founded by roboticists, ethicists, and others, issued a call to stop AI research that could lead to development of killer robots. Five years later, the European Parliament passed a resolution calling for a ban after more than 20 Nobel Peace Laureates issued a statement in favour of banning the robot. In the Third Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) held in Geneva from April 11 to 15, 2015, two high-ranking UN experts issued a report to the Human Rights Council calling for a moratorium on autonomous killer robots. By July 2015, the Future of Life Institute issued an open letter which more than 1,000 AI experts signed supporting a prohibition. Today, there is an active Human Rights Watch campaign to ban the development and use of these technologies. But are they fighting to turn back time? In 1863, English author Samuel Butler published an article, “Darwin among the machines,” arguing that “the machines will hold the real supremacy over the world and its inhabitants,” and further arguing that as a precaution, humans should return to the “primeval condition of the race.” Earlier, the Luddites ravaged English factories, destroying machines they feared were threatening their jobs. In the 17th century, during a period of intense seclusion, the Japanese went so far as to outlaw the use of firearms, which had been introduced into the country as early as 1270 from China, only to resume their use during the conflicts of the mid-1800s. Over the past few days, events in the United States demonstrate the short-sightedness of these actions while illustrating the benefits of the use of robots for law enforcement. After an intensive 45-minute shootout in Dallas, Texas, USA, two police officers lay dead and three others would die within hours from massive injuries received at the outset. An assassin was targeting police officers and terrorising a major US city. Police began negotiating with the sniper to no avail. After two-hours of intensive negotiations, the Dallas chief of police gave an order to neutralise the suspect by any means without risking more officer’s lives. The plan was ingenious. The SWAT team called upon the RemotecAndrox Mark V A-1 robot, manufactured by Northrup Gruman, to deliver a pound of high explosive C-4 directly against a wall on the second floor of the building behind which the sniper was cowered. The robot delivered its payload, completing its mission with only minor damage after the explosive charge ripped a hole in the wall, fragmenting the sniper. This ended the standoff and officially introduced robots as an anti-terrorist weapon. Robots can be mounted with a variety of sensors and tools for law enforcement. The A-1 generally carries a flashbang, a device that emits a bright light and loud sound to stun criminals. These robots can also place an explosive near a bomb in order to disarm it through the explosive discharge. But there are far more uses for the robot, as outlined on Northrup Grumman’s Remotec website based upon an assortment of accessories available. The robot can be affixed with a modified 12 gauge shotgun, which can also be used as a breaching tool; a gas can dispenser mount; a window breaker, a cable cutter; a variety of drills and saws, as well as real time x-ray machines, or mounts for the weapons launcher. Innovative new uses Interestingly, Northrup Grumman lists the Remotec Androx Mark V A-1 robot as, “ready to handle any situation at a moment’s notice.” Thankfully it was ready when called upon. Police departments across the United States, and around the world, are procuring the next generation of robots to make law enforcement safer, as criminals and terrorist employ innovative new uses for common items, such as passenger aircraft and explosives. One of the largest robots currently in the field is the BatCat—a 39,000-pound remote controlled vehicle used to lift cars, and tear into buildings, or barricaded areas. The BatCat (Bomb Assault Tactical Control Assessment Tool) is built upon Caterpillar’s Telehandler base and comes equipped with claw, forklift, and/or bucket in order to make a dynamic entry or respond to improvised explosive devices on vehicles. On the small end is the Recon Robotics Throwbot, which can run slightly ahead of a clearing team to provide valuable intelligence and pictures of potential threats. Weighing just 1.2 pounds, Throwbot can be thrown up to 120 feet (36m) in front of a police team. Directed by an operator receiving audio and video, Throwbot can also transmit infrared optical data of its surroundings. Autonomous and semi-autonomous robots are already involved in a multitude of missions against terrorists and criminals alike. Our safety, as well as that of the men and women who serve us in law enforcement, depends even more on the tools available to outwit the evil that surrounds us. While we accept the fact that technology must advance, we also must accept that all technologies can be used for both good and evil. We are a long way from autonomous robots using artificial intelligence to destroy humankind. At Florida International University (FIU) Discovery Lab, we are exploring robots for many real-time applications.

#### A ban doesn’t stop great power usage of LAWs- terrorist groups will find a way to acquire them post-plan

Ware 19 [Jacob Ware (research associate at the Council on Foreign Relations), 9-24-2019, "Terrorist Groups, Artificial Intelligence, and Killer Drones," War on the Rocks, <https://warontherocks.com/2019/09/terrorist-groups-artificial-intelligence-and-killer-drones/>] // st

Secondly, the international community could look to ban AI use in the military through an international treaty sanctioned by the United Nations. This has been the strategy pursued by activist groups such as the Campaign to Stop Killer Robots, while leading artificial intelligence researchers and scientific commentators have published open letters warning of the risk of weaponized AI. That said, great powers are not likely to refrain from AI weapons development, and a ban might outlaw positive uses of militarized AI. The international community could also look to stigmatize, or delegitimize, weaponized AI and lethal autonomous weapons sufficiently to deter terrorist use. Although modern terrorist groups have proven extremely willing to improvise and innovate, and effective at doing so, there is an extensive list of weapons — chemical weapons, biological weapons, cluster munitions, barrel bombs, and more — accessible to terrorist organizations, but rarely used. This is partly down to the international stigma associated with those munitions — if a norm is strong enough, terrorists might avoid using a weapon. However, norms take a long time to develop, and are fragile and untrustworthy solutions. Evidently, good counter-terrorism options are limited.

#### LAWs can contain the rise of terrorism but a ban increases casualties

Yoo 17 [Joh Yoo (A professor of Law at UC Berkeley), 2017, Embracing the Machines: Rationalist War and New Weapons Technologies, California Law Review, Vol 105: 444-448, https://29qish1lqx5q2k5d7b491joo-wpengine.netdna-ssl.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/Yoo-4.pdf] // st

Unmanned Predator and Reaper drones rove the skies above the Middle East and Africa. They hover over a target for days and launch Hellfire missiles on a moment’s notice. Robots on the battlefield below breach doors in house-to-house searches and explode improvised explosive devices common in wars with terrorists or resistance fighters. Future advances will bring armed sentry robots, autonomous armored vehicles, and automatic missile and artillery fire. On the sea, X-47 aerial drones take off and land on aircraft carriers while others already perform strike and reconnaissance missions. Soon, unmanned surface combat vessels may deploy close to shore, and others may track enemy submarines beneath the waves. Combat is not just moving toward the robotic; it is also becoming ethereal.1 During its 2008 Georgia incursion, Russia became the first nation to deploy cyberattacks on enemy command, control, and communication systems to augment a ground invasion.2 To delay the Iranian nuclear program, the United States and Israel allegedly deployed the Stuxnet virus to damage centrifuges engaged in uranium enrichment.3 China has stolen large databases of U.S. government personnel information in addition to penetrating the networks of U.S. defense contractors, airlines, and technology companies.4 Russia, meanwhile, has allegedly hacked into databases and email systems of the U.S. Departments of Defense and State, along with those of the Democratic National Committee and the campaign of presidential candidate Hillary Clinton.5 These examples illustrate the dramatic advances in weapon technology over the last two decades, which observers sometimes refer to as the “revolution in military affairs.”6 The United States now fields thousands of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) for both reconnaissance and armed attacks. Combined with stealth technology, these drones allow the United States and other nations to gather intelligence around the clock and launch immediate attacks in trouble spots around the world. In the future, the most advanced ground and sea-based armed forces will employ remote-controlled units, such as sentries, light armor, and littoral naval vessels. Advances in missile technology and precision targeting will allow the United States to field a conventional global-strike capability that can hit any target in the world within an hour. Some experts even anticipate autonomous weapons systems that militaries can program for action independent of direct human controllers. The revolution in military affairs may reduce the destruction of war. A nation will place fewer soldiers in harm’s way when remote-controlled combatants are available. Precision-guided weapons and clearer real-time intelligence will inflict less death and destruction on soldiers and military assets. With drones available, for example, nations will no longer need to resort to World War II or Vietnam-era bombing runs to destroy arms factories or oil installations. Precision-strike technology may also shorten war by targeting an opponent’s leadership and strategic vulnerabilities, as it did with the one hundred-hour Persian Gulf War of 1991 and the lightning-quick invasion of Iraq in 2003. Future technology could also reduce harm to civilians—one of the central principles of the laws of war—by tightly concentrating the use of force on military targets. Technology will contribute to changes in tactics that are already blurring our understanding of what constitutes “war.” While modern war has concentrated highly destructive forces on discrete battlefields, new technology may disperse less destructive forces across the globe. For one, technology has played a central role in the rise of nonstate actors. The September 11, 2001, attacks and the evolving sophistication of terrorist groups like the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) show that states no longer have a monopoly on international violence that can rise to the level of armed conflict. Nations have responded to unconventional attacks by nonstate actors with a mixture of armed force, economic sanctions, and criminal prosecution, leaving unclear where law enforcement ends and armed conflict begins. Technology allows nations to gain better intelligence on these groups and attack them without deploying large conventional forces. Moreover, high-tech surveillance and strike systems allow nations to identify enemy groups that hide among civilians, follow a decentralized command structure, and attack civilian targets as often as military targets. While technology has contributed to the effective reach of nonstate terrorist groups, it has also assisted nations in responding to them both domestically and abroad. Critics, however, worry that advances in weapons could increase conflict by making war easier to initiate. If a nation can simply press a button and destroy a target or cripple enemy infrastructure without risking its own personnel, it will choose a military response more often than it should. United Nations officials give voice to these growing worries. “The expansive use of armed drones by the first States to acquire them, if not challenged, can do structural damage to the cornerstones of international security and set precedents that undermine the protection of life across the globe in the longer term,” declares Christof Heyns, the UN’s Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions.7 States can use drones and other technology, such as cyberweapons, to launch attacks far from conventional battlefields in ways that escape immediate detection, and perhaps even responsibility. Ultimately, pinpoint strikes and cyberattacks will continue to blur any clear line between war and peace. Cyberwarfare further blurs this line. Internet attacks can cause real-world destruction and harm, or they can simply interfere with another nation’s communications, financial, or information networks. A cyberattack, for example, could cause a flood by disabling the control mechanisms for a dam or trigger an explosion by forcing a power plant to malfunction. As Russia demonstrated in its invasions of Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine in 2014, nations can also launch cyberattacks as part of an electronic warfare campaign to support a conventional armed attack.8 They can use cyberweapons in place of conventional weapons to commit sabotage, such as the Stuxnet virus. Or governments can use the Internet to steal significant military or intelligence information, such as weapons designs or strategic plans, which appears to be occurring with increasing frequency between the United States and China. “China is using its cyber capabilities to support intelligence collection against the U.S. diplomatic, economic, and defense industrial base sectors that support U.S. national defense programs,” the U.S. Defense Department stated in a 2016 report to Congress.9 “The accesses and skills required for these intrusions are similar to those necessary to conduct cyber attacks.”10 The anonymity of cyberattacks may prevent open armed conflict because targeted nations will not know against whom to retaliate. Indeed, nations have been uncertain about their responses to robotic and cyberwarfare attacks. They sometimes treat them as a form of espionage or covert action, refusing to consider the resulting damage as an act of war. China’s theft of the U.S. Office of Personnel Management database did not prompt an official use of U.S. force, nor did North Korea’s hacking of Sony’s electronic files. Iran took no overt military response to the Stuxnet virus. American drones execute dozens of strikes in countries, such as Yemen, Somalia, Afghanistan, and Pakistan, without sparking any military reaction. And yet, use of these weapons in other contexts would likely start an armed conflict. Cyberattacks to disable military units or critical civilian networks, or to augment a broader military offensive, would surely constitute acts of war, as would the use of robots and drones to harm people or real property. Robotics and cyberweapons could also exert force that does not necessarily kill or destroy tangible objects, but fall somewhere in between the line between domestic crime and an act of war. Governments and scholars are not always clear about when such attacks meet the legal standards for an armed attack or something less. For example, the new United States Law of War Manual, issued by the Department of Defense in 2015, declares that the existing laws of war should apply to what it calls “cyber operations.”11 But it then concedes that the rules here are “not well-settled” and are “likely to continue to develop.”12 The United States even takes the position that it may not have a position, as the manual declares that it does not “preclude the [Defense] Department from subsequently changing its interpretation of the law.”13 This Essay argues that efforts to constrain new military technologies with ex ante per se rules, rather than ex post reasonable regulation, are not only doomed, but dangerous. History is littered with proposals to stop advances in weapons. Medieval leaders tried to ban crossbows, early artillery, and firearms because they violated chivalry and honor.14 During World War I, nations argued over whether international law prohibited airplanes from bombing targets or submarines from sinking ships without warning.15 But by the end of World War II, the United States used atomic bombs to end the war against Japan.16 International agreements, such as the League of Nations and the Kellogg-Briand Pact, failed to stop the Axis. History tells us that restraint arrives through deterrence, not law or morality. In World War II, the Allies and Axis stockpiled ample arsenals of chemical weapons, but did not use them for fear of retaliation.17 During the Cold War, mutually assured destruction ultimately led both superpowers to agree to limits on, and then reductions of, nuclear weapons. International law, rightly understood, does not prohibit the use of these new weapons. The United States will not stop China from stealing its government personnel databases by appealing to common values, but by deploying equally effective offensive and defensive cyber weapons. Europeans will not force the United States to limit its drone campaign against terrorist leaders through legal arguments, but they could pressure Washington by refusing to cooperate with intelligence sharing and joint operations. In fact, limiting, and especially prohibiting, the use of robotic and cyber weapons could have perverse effects on the very goals of international law. If nations cannot employ new, more precise weapons, they will have to resort to traditional conventional warfare, using human soldiers and pilots in larger numbers with more destructive weapons. In addition to causing greater destruction, limits on new weapons will discourage nations from using force when the international system needs it most: to stop terrorism, human rights disasters, nuclear proliferation, and aggression. Perversely, banning new weapons out of a vague desire to make war harder to start will make war more destructive and harmful to the innocent—the very antithesis of the laws of war.

### 2NC---DA---Terror---AT: Won’t Get LAWS / Advanced Tech

#### Terrorists will get their hands on LAWS – multiple warrants.

Ware 19 [Jacob Ware (research associate at the Council on Foreign Relations), 9-24-2019, "Terrorist Groups, Artificial Intelligence, and Killer Drones," War on the Rocks, <https://warontherocks.com/2019/09/terrorist-groups-artificial-intelligence-and-killer-drones/>] // st

Terrorist Acquisition of Lethal Autonomous Weapons Is Realistic The proliferation of artificial intelligence and killer robot technology to terrorist organizations is realistic and likely to occur through three avenues — internal development, sales, and leaks. Firstly, modern terrorist organizations have advanced scientific and engineering departments, and actively seek out skilled scientists for recruitment. ISIL, for example, has appealed for [scientists to trek to the caliphate](https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/use-of-weaponized-drones-by-isis-spurs-terrorism-fears/2017/02/21/9d83d51e-f382-11e6-8d72-263470bf0401_story.html?utm_term=.9047622d3994) to work on drone and AI technology. The individual technologies behind swarming killer robots — including unmanned aerial vehicles, facial recognition, and machine-to-machine communication — already exist, and have been adapted by terrorist organizations for other means. [According to a French defense industry executive,](https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-42153140) “the technological challenge of scaling it up to swarms and things like that doesn’t need any inventive step. It’s just a question of time and scale and I think that’s an absolute certainty that we should worry about.” Secondly, autonomous weapons technology will likely [proliferate through sales](https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2018/05/terrorists-are-going-use-artificial-intelligence/147944/). Because AI research is led by private firms, advanced AI technology will be publicly sold on the open market. As Michael Horowitz [argues](https://thebulletin.org/who%E2%80%99ll-want-artificially-intelligent-weapons-isis-democracies-or-autocracies9692), “militant groups and less-capable states may already have what they need to produce some simple autonomous weapon systems, and that capability is likely to spread even further for purely commercial reasons.” The current framework controlling high-tech weapons proliferation — the Wassenaar Arrangement and Missile Technology Control Regime — is voluntary, and is constantly tested by great-power weapons development. Given interest in developing AI-guided weapons, this seems unlikely to change. Ultimately, as AI expert Toby Walsh [notes](https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/apr/06/its-not-too-late-to-save-the-world-from-killer-robots), the world’s weapons companies can, and will, “make a killing (pun very much intended) selling autonomous weapons to all sides of every conflict.” Finally, autonomous weapons technology is likely to leak. Innovation in the AI field is led by the private sector, not the military, because of the myriad commercial applications of the technology. This will make it [more difficult to contain the technology](https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-42153140), and prevent it from proliferating to nonstate actors. [Perhaps the starkest warning](https://www.amazon.com/Army-None-Autonomous-Weapons-Future/dp/0393608980) has been issued by Paul Scharre, a former U.S. defense official: “We are entering a world where the technology to build lethal autonomous weapons is available not only to nation-states but to individuals as well. That world is not in the distant future. It’s already here.”

#### Terrorists want LAWS – cost, traceability, and lethality

Ware 19 [Jacob Ware (research associate at the Council on Foreign Relations), 9-24-2019, "Terrorist Groups, Artificial Intelligence, and Killer Drones," War on the Rocks, <https://warontherocks.com/2019/09/terrorist-groups-artificial-intelligence-and-killer-drones/>] // st

Terrorist groups will be interested in artificial intelligence and lethal autonomous weapons for three reasons — cost, traceability, and effectiveness. Firstly, killer robots are likely to be [extremely cheap](https://www.vox.com/2019/6/21/18691459/killer-robots-lethal-autonomous-weapons-ai-war), while still maintaining lethality. Experts agree that lethal autonomous weapons, once fully developed, will provide a cost-effective alternative to terrorist groups looking to maximize damage, with Tegmark [arguing that](https://www.amazon.com/Life-3-0-Being-Artificial-Intelligence/dp/1101946598) “small AI-powered killer drones are likely to cost little more than a smartphone.” Additionally, killer robots will minimize the human investment required for terrorist attacks, [with scholars arguing that](https://img1.wsimg.com/blobby/go/3d82daa4-97fe-4096-9c6b-376b92c619de/downloads/1c6q2kc4v_50335.pdf) “greater degrees of autonomy enable a greater amount of damage to be done by a single person.” Artificial intelligence could make terrorist activity cheaper financially and in terms of human capital, lowering the organizational costs required to commit attacks. Secondly, using autonomous weapons will reduce the trace left by terrorists. A large number of munitions could be launched — and a large amount of damage done — by a small number of people operating at considerable distance from the target, reducing the signature left behind. [In Tegmark’s words](https://www.amazon.com/Life-3-0-Being-Artificial-Intelligence/dp/1101946598), for “a terrorist wanting to assassinate a politician … all they need to do is upload their target’s photo and address into the killer robot: it can then fly to the destination, identify and eliminate the person, and self-destruct to ensure nobody knows who was responsible.” With autonomous weapons technology, terrorist groups will be able to launch increasingly complex attacks, and, when they want to, escape without detection. Finally, killer robots could reduce, if not eliminate, the physical costs and dangers of terrorism, rendering the operative “[essentially invulnerable.](http://www.theamericanconservative.com/articles/inside-the-chilling-proliferation-of-artificially-intelligent-drones/)” Raising the possibility of “fly and forget” missions, lethal autonomous weapons might simply be deployed toward a target, and engage that target without further human intervention. As P. W. Singer [noted](https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/the-robotics-revolution/) in 2012, “one [will] not have to be suicidal to carry out attacks that previously might have required one to be so. This allows new players into the game, making al-Qaeda 2.0 and the next-generation version of the Unabomber or Timothy McVeigh far more lethal.” Additionally, lethal autonomous weapons could potentially reduce human aversion to killing, making terrorism even more palatable as a tactic for political groups. According to the aforementioned [February 2018 report](https://img1.wsimg.com/blobby/go/3d82daa4-97fe-4096-9c6b-376b92c619de/downloads/1c6q2kc4v_50335.pdf), “AI systems can allow the actors who would otherwise be performing the tasks to retain their anonymity and experience a greater degree of psychological distance from the people they impact”; this would not only improve a terrorist’s chances of escape, as mentioned, but reduce or even eliminate the moral or psychological barriers to murder.

### 2NC---DA---Terror---Impact---Terrorism

#### Nuclear terror leads to extinction

Toon 7, PhD, chair of the Department of Atmospheric and Oceanic Sciences at CU-Boulder (Owen B., et al., “Atmospheric effects and societal consequences of regional scale nuclear conflicts and acts of individual nuclear terrorism,” *Atmospheric Chemistry and Physics*, 7)//BB

To an increasing extent, people are congregating in the world’s great urban centers, creating megacities with populations exceeding 10 million individuals. At the same time, advanced technology has designed nuclear explosives of such small size they can be easily transported in a car, small plane or boat to the heart of a city. We demonstrate here that a single detonation in the 15 kiloton range can produce urban fatalities approaching one million in some cases, and casualties exceeding one million. Thousands of small weapons still exist in the arsenals of the U.S. and Russia, and there are at least six other countries with substantial nuclear weapons inventories. In all, thirty-three countries control sufficient amounts of highly enriched uranium or plutonium to assemble nuclear explosives. A conflict between any of these countries involving 50-100 weapons with yields of 15 kt has the potential to create fatalities rivaling those of the Second World War. Moreover, even a single surface nuclear explosion, or an air burst in rainy conditions, in a city center is likely to cause the entire metropolitan area to be abandoned at least for decades owing to infrastructure damage and radioactive contamination. As the aftermath of hurricane Katrina in Louisiana suggests, the economic consequences of even a localized nuclear catastrophe would most likely have severe national and international economic consequences. Striking effects result even from relatively small nuclear attacks because low yield detonations are most effective against city centers where business and social activity as well as population are concentrated. Rogue nations and terrorists would be most likely to strike there. Accordingly, an organized attack on the U.S. by a small nuclear state, or terrorists supported by such a state, could generate casualties comparable to those once predicted for a full-scale nuclear “counterforce” exchange in a superpower conflict. Remarkably, the estimated quantities of smoke generated by attacks totaling about one megaton of nuclear explosives could lead to significant global climate perturbations (Robock et al., 2007). While we did not extend our casualty and damage predictions to include potential medical, social or economic impacts following the initial explosions, such analyses have been performed in the past for large-scale nuclear war scenarios (Harwell and Hutchinson, 1985). Such a study should be carried out as well for the present scenarios and physical outcomes.

#### Terrorism leads to extinction

Bostrom 2 [Nick Bostrom (PhD and faculty in Philosophy at Oxford University), “Existential Risks: Analyzing Human Extinction Scenarios and Related Hazards,” <http://www.nickbostrom.com/existential/risks.html>] // st

Risks in this sixth category are a recent phenomenon. This is part of the reason why it is useful to distinguish them from other risks. We have not evolved mechanisms, either biologically or culturally, for managing such risks. Our intuitions and coping strategies have been shaped by our long experience with risks such as dangerous animals, hostile individuals or tribes, poisonous foods, automobile accidents, Chernobyl, Bhopal, volcano eruptions, earthquakes, draughts, World War I, World War II, epidemics of influenza, smallpox, black plague, and AIDS. These types of disasters have occurred many times and our cultural attitudes towards risk have been shaped by trial-and-error in managing such hazards. But tragic as such events are to the people immediately affected, in the big picture of things – from the perspective of humankind as a whole – even the worst of these catastrophes are mere ripples on the surface of the great sea of life. They haven’t significantly affected the total amount of human suffering or happiness or determined the long-term fate of our species. With the exception of a species-destroying comet or asteroid impact (an extremely rare occurrence), there were probably no significant existential risks in human history until the mid-twentieth century, and certainly none that it was within our power to do something about. The first manmade existential risk was the inaugural detonation of an atomic bomb. At the time, there was some concern that the explosion might start a runaway chain-reaction by “igniting” the atmosphere. Although we now know that such an outcome was physically impossible, it qualifies as an existential risk that was present at the time. For there to be a risk, given the knowledge and understanding available, it suffices that there is some subjective probability of an adverse outcome, even if it later turns out that objectively there was no chance of something bad happening. If we don’t know whether something is objectively risky or not, then it is risky in the subjective sense. The subjective sense is of course what we must base our decisions on.[[2]](http://www.nickbostrom.com/existential/risks.html" \l "_ftn2" \o ") At any given time we must use our best current subjective estimate of what the objective risk factors are.[[3]](http://www.nickbostrom.com/existential/risks.html" \l "_ftn3" \o ") A much greater existential risk emerged with the build-up of nuclear arsenals in the US and the USSR. An all-out nuclear war was a possibility with both a substantial probability and with consequences that might have been persistent enough to qualify as global and terminal. There was a real worry among those best acquainted with the information available at the time that a nuclear Armageddon would occur and that it might annihilate our species or permanently destroy human civilization.[[4]](http://www.nickbostrom.com/existential/risks.html" \l "_ftn4" \o ")  Russia and the US retain large nuclear arsenals that could be used in a future confrontation, either accidentally or deliberately. There is also a risk that other states may one day build up large nuclear arsenals. Note however that a smaller nuclear exchange, between India and Pakistan for instance, is not an existential risk, since it would not destroy or thwart humankind’s potential permanently. Such a war might however be a local terminal risk for the cities most likely to be targeted. Unfortunately, we shall see that nuclear Armageddon and comet or asteroid strikes are mere preludes to the existential risks that we will encounter in the 21st century. The special nature of the challenges posed by existential risks is illustrated by the following points:  Our approach to existential risks cannot be one of trial-and-error. There is no opportunity to learn from errors. The reactive approach – see what happens, limit damages, and learn from experience – is unworkable. Rather, we must take a proactive approach. This requires foresight to anticipate new types of threats and a willingness to take decisive preventive action and to bear the costs (moral and economic) of such actions. We cannot necessarily rely on the institutions, moral norms, social attitudes or national security policies that developed from our experience with managing other sorts of risks. Existential risks are a different kind of beast. We might find it hard to take them as seriously as we should simply because we have never yet witnessed such disasters.[[5]](http://www.nickbostrom.com/existential/risks.html" \l "_ftn5" \o ") Our collective fear-response is likely ill calibrated to the magnitude of threat.         Reductions in existential risks are global public goods [13] and may therefore be undersupplied by the market [14]. Existential risks are a menace for everybody and may require acting on the international plane. Respect for national sovereignty is not a legitimate excuse for failing to take countermeasures against a major existential risk.         If we take into account the welfare of future generations, the harm done by existential risks is multiplied by another factor, the size of which depends on whether and how much we discount future benefits [15,16]. In view of its undeniable importance, it is surprising how little systematic work has been done in this area. Part of the explanation may be that many of the gravest risks stem (as we shall see) from anticipated future technologies that we have only recently begun to understand. Another part of the explanation may be the unavoidably interdisciplinary and speculative nature of the subject. And in part the neglect may also be attributable to an aversion against thinking seriously about a depressing topic. The point, however, is not to wallow in gloom and doom but simply to take a sober look at what could go wrong so we can create responsible strategies for improving our chances of survival. In order to do that, we need to know where to focus our efforts.

### 2NC---DA---Nuke Terror---Nuke Terror UQ

#### Nuclear terror risk has diminished but threats remain given emerging tech and widespread vulnerabilities.

Roth, MA, 20

(Nickolas, Public Policy Analysis from the University of Maryland, Senior Fellow and Director of the Nuclear Security Program at the Stimson Center, Preventing Nuclear Terrorism, Blundering Toward Nuclear Chaos, ed. Wolfsthal, pp. 64-65, May) BW

Nuclear threats from major terrorist groups seeking nuclear weapons appear to have diminished in recent years as some of the most dangerous groups – well-funded, sophisticated organizations with apocalyptic beliefs like the Islamic State and al-Qaeda – have faced major defeats. This is a positive development, but serious risks remain. The number of incidents involving rapid radicalization of violent insiders appears to be increasing. There are large areas of ungoverned land where terrorists could hide throughout the world. Nuclear security incidents in which adversaries employ emerging technologies like drones and cyber tools are becoming increasingly common and increasingly dangerous. This is not a time to be complacent. Unfortunately, nuclear facilities in many countries remain dangerously vulnerable to serious threats. Not all nuclear facilities are protected against all plausible threats, especially emerging threats; many do not have comprehensive, multilayered defenses against insiders; some nuclear security systems are not exposed regularly to rigorous vulnerability assessments and testing; the culture within many nuclear organizations is still not focused sufficiently on security; and nuclear materials remain in far too many locations. In addition, the regime underpinning global nuclear security efforts has major weaknesses. Elements of the five action plans agreed to at the 2016 Nuclear Security Summit are being implemented, but international organizations and multilateral groups are doing little to expand their nuclear security-focused work. Many of the joint commitments that countries endorsed during nuclear security summits have been preserved as International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Information Circulars, but few additional countries have endorsed them. Finally, existing forums for discussing nuclear security have not filled the gap left by the end of the summits. Hardly any countries are reporting their progress in strengthening nuclear security or announcing new commitments. The combination of persistent threats and evidence of nuclear security weaknesses means that the risk of nuclear terrorism remains unnecessarily high.

### 2NC---DA---Nuke Terror---Nuke Terror Impact Calc

#### Nuclear terror likely now and turns every impact.

Arguello, MA, and Buis, PhD, 18

(Irma, SecurityStudies@EscuelaDeDefensaNacional, Emiliano, LLM NationalDefense@NationalMinistryOfDefense, Classics@UniversityBuenosAires, AssocProfILaw@UBA, The global impacts of a terrorist nuclear attack: What would happen? What should we do? Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 74(2), 114–119)

Though hard to accept, the detonation of a nuclear device – by states or non-state actors – is today a plausible scenario. And while much of the world’s focus has been on the current nuclear weapons arsenals possessed by states – about 14,550 warheads, all of which carry the risk of intentional or unintentional use – the threat of nuclear terrorism is here and increasing. For more than a decade, Al Qaeda, Aum Shinrikyo, and other terrorist groups have expressed their desire to acquire fissile material to build and detonate an improvised nuclear bomb. None of them could fulfill that goal – so far. But that does not mean that they will not succeed in the future. Making matters worse, there is evidence of an illicit market for nuclear weapons-usable materials. There are sellers in search of potential buyers, as shown by the dismantlement of a nuclear smuggling network in Moldova in 2015. There certainly are plenty of sites from which to obtain nuclear material. According to the 2016 Nuclear Security Index by the Nuclear Threat Initiative, 24 countries still host inventories of nuclear weapons-usable materials, stored in facilities with different degrees of security. And in terms of risk, it is not necessary for a given country to possess nuclear weapons, weapons-usable materials, or nuclear facilities for it to be useful to nuclear terrorists: Structural and institutional weaknesses in a country may make it favorable for the illicit trade of materials. Permeable boundaries, high levels of corruption, weaknesses in judicial systems, and consequent impunity may give rise to a series of transactions and other events, which could end in a nuclear attack. The truth is that, at this stage, no country in possession of nuclear weapons or weapons-usable materials can guarantee their full protection against nuclear terrorism or nuclear smuggling. Because we live in a world of growing insecurity, where explicit and tacit agreements between the relevant powers – which upheld global stability during the post- Cold War – are giving way to increasing mistrust and hostility, a question arises: How would our lives be affected if a current terrorist group such as the Islamic State (ISIS), or new terrorist groups in the future, succeed in evolving from today’s Manchester style “low-tech” attacks to a “high-tech” one, involving a nuclear bomb, detonated in a capital city, anywhere in the world? We attempted to answer this question in a report developed by a high-level multidisciplinary expert group convened by the NPSGlobal Foundation for the Latin American and Caribbean Leadership Network. We found that there would be multiple harmful effects that would spread promptly around the globe (Arguello and Buis 2016); a more detailed analysis is below, which highlights the need for the creation of a comprehensive nuclear security system. The consequences of a terrorist nuclear attack A small and primitive 1-kiloton fission bomb (with a yield of about one-fifteenth of the one dropped on Hiroshima, and certainly much less sophisticated; cf. Figure 1), detonated in any large capital city of the developed world, would cause an unprecedented catastrophic scenario. An estimate of direct effects in the attack’s location includes a death toll of 7,300-to-23,000 people and 12,600-to-57,000 people injured, depending on the target’s geography and population density. Total physical destruction of the city’s infrastructure, due to the blast (shock wave) and thermal radiation, would cover a radius of about 500 meters from the point of detonation (also known as ground zero), while ionizing radiation greater than 5 Sieverts – compatible with the deadly acute radiation syndrome – would expand within an 850-meter radius. From the environmental point of view, such an area would be unusable for years. In addition, radioactive fallout would expand in an area of about 300 square kilometers, depending on meteorological conditions (cf. Figure 2). But the consequences would go far beyond the effects in the target country, however, and promptly propagate worldwide. Global and national security, economy and finance, international governance and its framework, national political systems, and the behavior of governments and individuals would all be put under severe trial. The severity of the effects at a national level, however, would depend on the countries’ level of development, geopolitical location, and resilience. Global security and regional/national defense schemes would be strongly affected. An increase in global distrust would spark rising tensions among countries and blocs, that could even lead to the brink of nuclear weapons use by states (if, for instance, a sponsor country is identified). The consequences of such a shocking scenario would include a decrease in states’ self-control, an escalation of present conflicts and the emergence of new ones, accompanied by an increase in military unilateralism and military expenditures. Regarding the economic and financial impacts, a severe global economic depression would rise from the attack, likely lasting for years. Its duration would be strongly dependent on the course of the crisis. The main results of such a crisis would include a 2 percent fall of growth in global Gross Domestic Product, and a 4 percent decline of international trade in the two years following the attack (cf. Figure 3). In the case of developing and less-developed countries, the economic impacts would also include a shortage of high-technology products such as medicines, as well as a fall in foreign direct investment and a severe decline of international humanitarian aid toward low-income countries. We expect an increase of unemployment and poverty in all countries. Global poverty would raise about 4 percent after the attack, which implies that at least 30 million more people would be living in extreme poverty, in addition to the current estimated 767 million. In the area of international relations, we would expect a breakdown of key doctrines involving politics, security, and relations among states. These international tensions could lead to a collapse of the nuclear order as we know it today, with a consequent setback of nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation commitments. In other words, the whole system based on the Nuclear Non- Proliferation Treaty would be put under severe trial. After the attack, there would be a reassessment of existing security doctrines, and a deep review of concepts such as nuclear deterrence, no-firstuse, proportionality, and negative security assurances. Finally, the behavior of governments and individuals would also change radically. Internal chaos fueled by the media and social networks would threaten governance at all levels, with greater impact on those countries with weak institutional frameworks. Social turbulence would emerge in most countries, with consequent attempts by governments to impose restrictions on personal freedoms to preserve order – possibly by declaring a state of siege or state of emergency – and legislation would surely become tougher on human rights. There would also be a significant increase in social fragmentation – with a deepening of antagonistic views, mistrust, and intolerance, both within countries and towards others – and a resurgence of large-scale social movements fostered by ideological interests and easily mobilized through social media.

#### Government studies prove nuclear terror is possible and has devastating impacts – err on the side of caution.

Bunn, PhD, and Roth, MA, 8

(Matthew, AssocProfPublicPolicy@Harvard, TechnologyManagmentAndPolicy@MIT, Nickolas, PublicPolicy@Maryland, SeniorResearchAssociate@Belfer, 9-28, https://thebulletin.org/2017/09/the-effects-of-a-single-terrorist-nuclear-bomb/)

The escalating threats between North Korea and the United States make it easy to forget the “nuclear nightmare,” as former US Secretary of Defense William J. Perryput it, that could result even from the use of just a single terrorist nuclear bomb in the heart of a major city. At the risk of repeating the vast literature on the tragedies of Hiroshima and Nagasaki—and the substantial literature surrounding nuclear tests and simulations since then—we attempt to spell out here the likely consequences of the explosion of a single terrorist nuclear bomb on a major city, and its subsequent ripple effects on the rest of the planet. Depending on where and when it was detonated, the blast, fire, initial radiation, and long-term radioactive fallout from such a bomb could leave the heart of a major city a smoldering radioactive ruin, killing tens or hundreds of thousands of people and wounding hundreds of thousands more. Vast areas would have to be evacuated and might be uninhabitable for years. Economic, political, and social aftershocks would ripple throughout the world. A single terrorist nuclear bomb would change history. The country attacked—and the world—would never be the same. The idea of terrorists accomplishing such a thing is, unfortunately, not out of the question; it is far easier to make a crude, unsafe, unreliable nuclear explosive that might fit in the back of a truck than it is to make a safe, reliable weapon of known yield that can be delivered by missile or combat aircraft. Numerous government studies have concluded that it is plausible that a sophisticated terrorist group could make a crude bomb if they got the needed nuclear material. And in the last quarter century, there have been some 20 seizures of stolen, weapons-usable nuclear material, and at least two terrorist groups have made significant efforts to acquire nuclear bombs. Terrorist use of an actual nuclear bomb is a low-probability event—but the immensity of the consequences means that even a small chance is enough to justify an intensive effort to reduce the risk. Fortunately, since the early 1990s, countries around the world have significantly reduced the danger—but it remains very real, and there is more to do to ensure this nightmare never becomes reality.

### 2NC---DA---Nuke Terror---AT: Wouldn’t Use / McIntosh and Storey

#### Acquisition does mean use – no ability to secure and detonate against raised defense create use it or lose it pressures rather than threats.

Bell, PhD, 19

(Mark, PoliSci@MIT, AssistProfPoliSci@Minnesota, Defending the “Acquisition-Use Presumption” in Assessing the Likelihood of Nuclear Terrorism, International Studies Quarterly)

In their recent article in International Studies Quarterly, McIntosh and Storey (2018, 289) criticize existing analyses for falling prey to an “acquisition-use presumption” that “assumes that once a terrorist group acquires a nuclear weapon, it will, at some point, attempt to detonate it.” Instead, they argue that “a nuclear terrorist attack is the least likely outcome—even for terrorist groups with nuclear capability.” McIntosh and Storey (2018, 289, 296–97) identify three reasons why terrorist organizations would be unlikely to detonate a nuclear weapon even if they acquired one. First, they point to “many options available to a terrorist group” other than detonating a nuclear weapon. Second, “terrorist organizations are not unitary, homogenous organizations” and must maintain “the continued support of . . . multiple audiences” such as funders and state sponsors, as well as individuals within the organization. These organizational dynamics should be expected to reduce the likelihood of a nuclear attack by a terrorist organization, even if it has acquired nuclear weapons. Third, scholars “conflate capitulation and surrender” because a nuclear attack would likely increase threats to the terrorist organization. These arguments, however, are ultimately unpersuasive. The acquisition-use presumption remains a valid basis for theorizing about the probability of nuclear terrorism.1 Alternatives to a Nuclear Attack McIntosh and Storey (2018, 292–93) identify a range of options for a terrorist organization that has acquired nuclear weapons. Drawing on the literature on the ways that states use nuclear weapons, they highlight four potentially attractive strategies for a terrorist organization with a nuclear weapon. First, a terrorist organization could pursue “ambiguity,” in which a terrorist organization “neither publicly identifies the conditions triggering nuclear attack nor publicizes acquiring the weapon.” “Latency,” the second option, requires a terrorist organization to “keep its capacity covert, but publicly state conditions under which it would employ a nuclear weapon.” A third possibility, “opacity,” occurs when an organization “admits a nuclear capacity but does not identify conditions resulting in an attack.” The fourth option, “blackmail,” involves an organization making “specific nuclear threats to achieve an outcome.” McIntosh and Storey (2018) conclude that “there is always a myriad of options that remain available” other than detonating a nuclear weapon and that nuclear weapons are “much more effectively used, paradoxically, when [they] remain holstered.” These strategies, however, are unlikely to appeal to a terrorist organization with a nuclear weapon. A terrorist organization with a nuclear weapon that adopts a strategy of ambiguity neither acknowledges its nuclear capability nor the circumstances in which it might use it; as McIntosh and Storey (2018, 292, 289) say, nuclear weapons are “not utilized directly.” If so, ambiguity merely provides the terrorist organization with the option of future operational or political use. If that future use involves a nuclear detonation, then the acquisition-use presumption, that the terrorist organization “will, at some point, attempt to detonate [its nuclear weapon]” remains valid. If that future use does not involve a nuclear detonation, then the attractiveness of the strategy of ambiguity depends on the attractiveness of potential future options other than detonation. The other strategies that McIntosh and Storey (2018) identify—latency, opacity, and blackmail—involve the terrorist organization revealing (to some degree) its nuclear capabilities and seeking to gain political utility from nuclear weapons without detonating them, through deterrence or compellence (or both).2 McIntosh and Storey (2018) are correct that states have generally sought political benefits from possessing rather than directly using nuclear weapons.3 However, terrorist organization would find it far harder than states, which are better positioned to reap deterrent or compellent benefits from the possession of nuclear weapons, to gain political benefits from merely possessing nuclear weapons. First, a terrorist organization with nuclear weapons would be in a more vulnerable position than any state with respect to its nuclear weapons. Even newly nuclear-armed states typically possess numerous nuclear weapons, a range of facilities in which weapons and delivery capabilities can be held, military resources to protect facilities and weapons, and control of the territory in which those weapons are being held. These capabilities substantially reduce a state’s vulnerability to having its nuclear capabilities attacked and destroyed militarily and allow a state to achieve political goals without detonating its nuclear capabilities. A terrorist organization’s nuclear arsenal, by contrast, would likely be more vulnerable. Terrorist organizations do, of course, vary substantially in terms of their resources, military capabilities, and control over territory; terrorist organizations with more resources, capabilities, and territorial control would be better able to protect their nuclear capabilities. For example, an organization holding substantial territory, such as the Islamic State at the height of its power, would have a better chance of protecting nuclear weapons. Nonetheless, even an extremely well-resourced, sophisticated terrorist organization is likely to have a far more vulnerable nuclear arsenal than a weak state. Just assembling a single gun-type nuclear device (the crudest and easiest type of nuclear weapon to build) would be a remarkable technological achievement for any terrorist organization, and even scholars concerned about nuclear terrorism conclude that “an attack by nonstate terrorists using an actual nuclear explosive—self-made or stolen—would clearly be among the most difficult types of attack to carry out” (Bunn and Weir 2006, 133–34). A terrorist organization would not be able to produce highly enriched uranium or plutonium (which require operating a nuclear reactor or uranium enrichment technologies such as centrifuges); would not be able to manufacture substantial numbers of nuclear weapons; would not have a large cadre of nuclear engineers, scientists, and metallurgists at its disposal; and generally would not have a large range of facilities or the military capabilities to protect them from attack by powerful states.4 Even the most sophisticated terrorist organization’s nuclear arsenal would, therefore, be more vulnerable than the nuclear arsenal of a weak state. This vulnerability has important consequences for the incentives facing a terrorist organization with nuclear weapons. A terrorist organization with a nuclear weapon would face an extreme version of the “use-them-or-lose-them” incentives that states with vulnerable nuclear arsenals face: to “posture [its] forces for an early use . . . before its nuclear option is curtailed” (Feaver 1992/1993, 165). Similarly, a terrorist organization with a vulnerable arsenal would face strong incentives to use its nuclear weapons to avoid having the opportunity to use them taken away (Van de Velde 2010, 685). Second, states can gain political leverage from nuclear weapons without using them in a direct military attack because a state revealing its nuclear capabilities does not reduce the weapons’ potency or the state’s ability to use them. As Gartzke and Lindsay argue, “nuclear actors can openly advertise their weapons to signal the costs of aggression to potential adversaries” (2017, 37). This is partly because states can protect their nuclear assets, as discussed above. However, additionally, states have generally relied on military technologies to deliver nuclear weapons that are (to differing degrees) difficult to defend against: military aircraft, land-based missiles, or submarine-launched missiles. Indeed, the fact that nuclear weapons delivered by missile or aircraft are difficult to defend against regardless of knowledge of an adversary’s capabilities is at the core of arguments about the stabilizing effects of nuclear weapons on international politics.5 A terrorist organization, however, has much stronger incentives to maintain secrecy about its nuclear capability. As discussed, a terrorist organization cannot protect its nuclear assets to the same degree as a state. In addition, a terrorist organization would likely employ crude methods of delivery such as a truck or a ship navigated into a port rather than the sophisticated delivery technologies available to states (Bunn 2010, 16). Such methods of delivery are far easier to defend against than those employed by states if the defender has knowledge of the attacker’s capabilities or intentions. As a result, any sort of disclosure by a terrorist organization reduces the potency of its nuclear arsenal. For example, if a state knew that a terrorist organization had a nuclear device, it would have a wide range of counterterrorism policy tools at its disposal to reduce the likelihood of a successful terrorist attack. For example, a state could shut down border crossings, increase security at potential target sites, activate intelligence assets within the terrorist organization, share intelligence with other states, or pursue assassinations or other kinetic operations (Ganor 2006). Terrorist organizations, therefore, have greater incentives for secrecy, thereby reducing the feasibility of them achieving political leverage from possessing nuclear weapons without using them directly in a nuclear attack. This, in turn, increases the attractiveness of detonation relative to any other strategy. Third, for a terrorist organization seeking to gain political leverage from possessing nuclear weapons, it must first persuade the world that it has a capability that no previous terrorist organization has previously acquired. States may reasonably doubt such claims by a terrorist organization. First, no terrorist organization has previously acquired nuclear weapons. And second, responding to a nuclear threat from a terrorist organization by granting concessions would set a precedent that other organizations could exploit. Of course, states can unambiguously demonstrate their nuclear capabilities using public and observable nuclear tests because they can replenish their nuclear arsenals; states with uranium-enrichment or plutonium-reprocessing capabilities can easily produce more fissile material. Terrorists are unlikely to have these capabilities and would therefore have a fixed, finite quantity of nuclear materials; any sort of public nuclear test is, therefore, costlier for a terrorist organization than for a state. The United States during World War II provides the closest example of a state facing these constraints. As (Schelling 1982, 67) notes, when the United States “had a very small capability to produce nuclear bombs . . . the possibility of a harmless detonation in an unpopulated place was considered but rejected.” A terrorist organization with a nuclear weapon would face the same incentives as the United States faced in 1945—a small arsenal and limited fissile material, a world potentially skeptical of any claim to have acquired a revolutionary new capability, and defenders potentially capable of interfering with an attack. A terrorist organization in this position would likely conclude, as the United States did in 1945, that “the weapons couldn’t be wasted on a remote battlefield . . . [N]o warning [could be] given that might have allowed interference with the demonstration” (Schelling 1982, 67). This is not to say that terrorist organizations might never seek to demonstrate their capabilities prior to detonating a nuclear weapon in an attack, but such demonstrations are much costlier, and thus less attractive, for terrorist organizations than states. In sum, states can generally protect their nuclear arsenals from attack, can deliver nuclear weapons regardless of actions by adversaries, and can disclose their capabilities without reducing their potency. This makes it plausible for them to use nuclear weapons for deterrence or compellence— gaining political utility from their nuclear weapons without directly using them. While terrorist organizations vary substantially, and some may even approximate some of the capabilities of states on some dimensions, their nuclear arsenals would likely be more vulnerable, their delivery methods cruder, and their incentives for secrecy greater than states. Gaining political leverage from nuclear weapons without using them is more difficult in such circumstances. As a result, a terrorist organization with nuclear weapons would be unlikely to find the strategies that McIntosh and Storey (2018) identify feasible or attractive. Organizational Dynamics While McIntosh and Storey’s (2018) first argument is that a nuclear attack would be a poor strategic choice for a rational terrorist organization, their second argument does not assume that terrorist organizations are unitary, rational actors. As the literature has increasingly recognized, organizational dynamics and intragroup politics shed light on the behavior of terrorist and insurgent organizations.6 For example, terrorist organizations are composed of multiple suborganizations that may have their own interests and incentives distinct from those of the larger organization; have links to other organizations and are embedded within broader societal structures; must maintain the support of individuals within the organization; and must maintain the support of external audiences such as funders or states. McIntosh and Storey (2018, 296–97) argue that these organizational dynamics reduce the validity of the acquisition-use presumption. They argue that (1) “there could be divisiveness [within the organization] regarding themost effective use of the weapon,” (2) “a nuclear attack would exponentially raise the threat to each individual who composes the extended organization,” (3) “transgressing the longstanding nuclear taboo would have dramatic and negative effects on broader public support,” and (4) any “host state/government will likely be much less committed to the survival of the terrorist group” if it conducted a nuclear attack. However, if these arguments should reduce our estimate of the likelihood of nuclear terrorism, it is not because the acquisition-use presumption is faulty.7 Rather, these arguments reduce the probability of a terrorist organization acquiring nuclear weapons in the first place.8 If there are organizational rifts about the utility of using nuclear weapons, an organization will find it hard to generate internal support for a decision to acquire nuclear weapons. If individual members of the terrorist organization fear the consequences of nuclear use, they are likely to resist the acquisition of a nuclear weapon. And if a terrorist organization relies on support from a state that would oppose its use of nuclear weapons, the state has incentives to prevent the terrorist organization from acquiring nuclear weapons in the first place. For example, Pakistan may support numerous terrorist organizations including Lashkar-e-Taiba, Jaish-e-Mohammad, or the Haqqani network (Byman 2005, chap. 6; Fair 2011; 2014, chap. 9) but has strong incentives not to allow such organizations to acquire nuclear weapons (Lieber and Press 2013, 93–95). McIntosh and Storey’s (2018) arguments about the organizational politics of terrorist organizations actually reinforce the logic of the acquisition-use presumption via selection effects: the particular terrorist organizations able to overcome these issues to acquire nuclear weapons are also likely to be those able to overcome them in the decision to detonate nuclear weapons.9 As Schelling argues, only an organization of “high professional quality and excellent organization and discipline” would be able to acquire nuclear weapons (1982, 65). Selection effects also reinforce the acquisition-use assumption through mechanisms other than organizational politics. Groups with ideologies and goals that might incentivize acquiring nuclear weapons— such as those with apocalyptic worldviews or a desire for mass-casualty terrorism, like Al Qaeda or the Japanese cult Aum Shinrikyo—will also be those most inclined to use nuclear weapons after acquiring them and best able to enforce ideological discipline among their members. In short, the terrorist organizations that have the motivation, discipline, and capability to acquire nuclear weapons would be least subject to the dynamics that McIntosh and Storey (2018) identify as a constraint on nuclear use. The Escalatory Potential of an Attack Finally, McIntosh and Storey (2018, 297) argue that “assuming nuclear attack is inevitable postacquisition conflates capitulation and surrender.” As they argue, “it is certainly the case that [a terrorist organization] utilizing threats and violence can sometimes shift a target state’s policy,” but this does “not necessarily end the threat to [its] organization.” A nuclear attack, in short, could worsen the threats a terrorist organization faces. It certainly seems likely that a terrorist organization would “be subjected to heavier attacks than ever before” if it successfully detonated a nuclear weapon in an attack. This is not, however, a persuasive argument against the acquisition-use presumption. First, terrorist organizations often undertake attacks that increase the threats they face. Indeed, terrorist or insurgent organizations often deliberately seek to escalate a confrontation with a state; scholars have long understood the logic of “provocation” or “outbidding” strategies by groups competing for recruits, resources, or notoriety.10 Al Qaeda, for example, sought to provoke the United States into a costly and destructive war using the 9/11 attacks, with Osama bin Laden boasting that the United States had been “easy for us to provoke” (Kydd and Walter 2006, 71). Other terrorist organizations such as Hamas or Shining Path have sought to “outbid” other terrorist organizations to demonstrate that they are “zealots rather than sellouts” (Kydd and Walter 2006, 76). For a terrorist organization seeking provocation, escalation, or outbidding, it is hard to imagine a better way to achieve those goals than a nuclear attack. The argument that a nuclear attack would lead to the escalation of hostilities does not, therefore, support the conclusion that a terrorist organization with a nuclear weapon would not seek to conduct a nuclear attack. Second, the claim that a nuclear attack would cause significant blowback only undermines the acquisition-use presumption if other strategies a terrorist organization could employ with nuclear weapons would not result in significant blowback. However, as discussed above, the other strategies that McIntosh and Storey (2018) identify are unlikely to be attractive to a terrorist organization. More importantly, to the extent that other strategies are attractive, they are also likely to result in significant blowback from states. For example, as Van de Velde (2010, 685) argues, if Al Qaeda sought to gain political leverage from its nuclear weapons without using them, it would be faced with overwhelming “pressure, airstrikes, troop movements, alliances, and alike to find the weapon.” This, as discussed above, would increase the incentives for a terrorist organization to use a nuclear weapon in an attack before its ability to do so is destroyed.

## China DA

### 1NC---DA---China

#### China is rising in LAWS BUT they are lagging behind in expertise.

Justin Haner & Denise.Garcia 19 Justin Haner is a doctoral candidate in the Department of Political Science at Northeastern University, specializing in International Relations,;Denise Garcia is a Northeastern University professor, International Panel for the Regulation of Autonomous Weapons member, and vicechair of the International Committee for Robot Arms Control, “The Artificial Intelligence Arms Race: Trends and World Leaders in Autonomous Weapons Development”, Global Policy Volume 10 . Issue 3 . September 2019, 9-26-2019, https://skrcmdo.com/assets/rmat/AI%20Arm%20trends.pdf)/maze

China is the clear rising contender in lethal AWS and AI development and has outlined in its ‘Next Generation Artificial Intelligence Development Plan’ that it intends to utilize AI on the battlefield in association with AWS (China State Council, 2017; Kania, 2017). With a combination of 70 per cent citizen trust in AI (the highest of the 24 countries surveyed) and the heavy pressure it can exert on companies to transfer technology to the state, it is **unlikely to face significant internal resistance to AWS development** (Ipsos, 2018). China’s capacity for weapons development is high with an estimated annual budget of $250 billion and projected spending of $4.5 billion on drone technology by 2021 (SIPRI, 2019; Statista, 2019). Most impressively, Chinese companies have tested swarming technology with over 1,000 synchronized drones (Kania, 2017). However, while some countries, such as South Korea, Israel, and Japan, seek AWS development to augment their soldiers and fill near-term gaps in security, China, with the world’s largest army, does not have this problem. This frees China to focus the bulk of its resources on long-term strategic investments in AI. China publicly plans to become the world leader in AI development by 2030 (China State Council, 2017). China’s controversial methods of intellectual property procurement have allowed them to make technological leaps forward in a non-linear fashion. With heavy ‘civil-military fusion’ investment, China’s State Council estimates their AI industries to be worth $22 billion by 2020, $59 billion by 2025, and $150 billion by 2030 (China State Council, 2017; Kania, 2017). By some metrics, China has already taken the lead in AI. Despite lagging in total publications, between 2011 and 2015 Chinese scientists published 41,000 papers on AI, almost double the United States during the same period (Baker, 2017). Further, Chinese investment and financing in AI projects between 2013 and 2018 is estimated to be 60 per cent of the entire worlds funding of such projects, again more than doubling United States investment during the same period (CAICT and Gartner, 2019). However, **China does face a problem of top expertise flight** as despite having over 18,000 talented AI developers, when it comes to those who rank among the world’s best, the United States and EU each have more than **five times as many of the top experts** (CISTP, 2019a).

#### Banning LAWS prevents delicate balance between great powers.

John Williams 21, is Professor of International Relations in the School of Government and International Affairs at Durham University, UK. His research addresses ethical, regulatory, and security issues associated with new and emerging military technologies, “Effective, Deployable, Accountable: Pick Two’: Regulating Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems”, E-International Relations, 8-12-2021, https://www.e-ir.info/2021/08/12/effective-deployable-accountable-pick-two-regulating-lethal-autonomous-weapons-system/)/maze

Secondly, I assume efforts to **ban** the development and **deployment of LAWS will fail**. Despite a large coalition of NGOs, academics, policymakers, scientists, and others (e.g. [ICRAC](https://www.icrac.net/members/), [iPRAW](https://www.ipraw.org/), [Future of Life Institute 2015](https://futureoflife.org/open-letter-autonomous-weapons/?cn-reloaded=1)) LAWS development is more likely than not. Amandeep Singh Gill ([2019](https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/ethics-and-international-affairs/article/abs/artificial-intelligence-and-international-security-the-long-view/4AB181EAF648501422257934982A4DD5), 175), former Indian Ambassador to the UN Conference on Disarmament and former Chair of the Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on LAWS at the UN Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW), stresses how:

The economic, political and security drivers for mainstreaming this suite of technologies [AI] into security functions are **simply too powerful** to be rolled back. There will be plenty of persuasive national security applications – minimizing casualties and collateral damage …, defeating terrorist threats, saving on defense spending, and protecting soldiers and their bases – to provide counterarguments against concerns about runaway robots or accidental wars caused by machine error.

Appeals to the inherent immorality of allowing computers to make life and death decisions about human beings, often framed in terms of human dignity (e.g. [Horowitz 2016](https://direct.mit.edu/daed/article/145/4/25/27111/The-Ethics-amp-Morality-of-Robotic-Warfare); [Heyns 2017](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/02587203.2017.1303903); [Rosert and Sauer 2019](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1758-5899.12691)), will fall in the face of ostensibly unstoppable forces across multiple sectors making **incorporating AI into ever more aspect of our daily lives almost inevitable**. From ‘surveillance capitalism’ ([Zuboff 2019](https://profilebooks.com/work/the-age-of-surveillance-capitalism/)) to LAWS, human beings are struggling to find ways to effectively halt, or even dramatically slow, AI’s march (e.g. [Rosert and Sauer 2021](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13523260.2020.1771508)).

Effective

LAWS’ potential military effectiveness manifests at strategic, operational, and tactical levels. Operating at ‘machine speed’ means potentially outpacing adversaries and acquiring crucial advantages, it enables far faster processing of huge quantities of data to generate new insights and spot opportunities, and it means concentrating military effect with greater pace and accuracy (e.g. [Altmann and Sauer 2017](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00396338.2017.1375263); [Horowitz 2019](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01402390.2019.1621174); [Jensen et al 2020](https://academic.oup.com/isr/article-abstract/22/3/526/5522301?redirectedFrom=fulltext)). Shifts, even temporary, in **delicate strategic balances between rival powers may appear as unacceptable risks,** meaning that for as long as adversaries are interested in and pursuing this technology, their peer-rivals will feel compelled to do so too (e.g. [Maas 2019](https://brill.com/view/journals/ihls/10/1/article-p129_129.xml), 141-43). Altmann and Sauer ([2017](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00396338.2017.1375263), 124) note, ‘**operational speed** will reign supreme’. The ‘security dilemma’ looms large, reinforcing amongst leading states the sense **they dare not risk being left behind in the competition to research and develop LAWS** (e.g. [Altmann and Sauer 2017](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00396338.2017.1375263); [Scharre 2021](https://tnsr.org/2021/06/debunking-the-ai-arms-race-theory/)). Morgan et al ([2020](https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR3139-1.html), xvi) argue the US, for example, has no choice but to, ‘… stay at the forefront of military AI capability. … [N]ot to compete in an area where adversaries are developing dangerous capabilities is to cede the field. That would be unacceptable’. Things likely look the same in Moscow and Beijing. Add concerns about potential proliferation to non-state actors (e.g. [Dunn 2015](https://academic.oup.com/ia/article-abstract/89/5/1237/2417187?redirectedFrom=fulltext)), and the security dilemma’s powerful logic appears inescapable.

Of course, other weapons technologies inspired similar proliferation, strategic destabilization, and conflict escalation concerns. Arms control – a key focus for current regulatory debate – has slowed the spread of nuclear weapons, banned chemical and biological weapons, and prohibited blinding laser weapons before they were ever deployed (e.g. [Baker et al 2020](https://www.e-ir.info/2020/04/15/introducing-guiding-principles-for-the-development-and-use-of-lethal-autonomous-weapon-systems/)). International regulation can **alter the strategic calculus** about what weapons do and do not appear effective and persuade actors to deny themselves the systems in the first place, or limit their acquisition and deployment, or give them up as part of a wider deal that offers a better route to strategic stability. LAWS present specific arms control challenges because they incorporate AI and robotics technologies offering many non-military opportunities and advantages that human societies will want to pursue, potentially bringing major benefits in addressing challenges in diverse fields. Key breakthroughs are at least as likely to come from civilian research and development projects as from principally military ones. That makes definitions, monitoring, and verification harder. That is not a reason not to try, of course, but it does mean effective LAWS may take many forms, incorporate inherently hard to restrict technologies, and offer possibly irresistible benefits in what the security dilemma presents as an inescapably competitive, militarized, and uncertain international environment (e.g. [Sparrow 2009](https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/4799404); [Altmann 2013](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs10676-013-9314-5); [Williams 2015](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1758-5899.12203); [Garcia 2018](https://academic.oup.com/isr/article-abstract/20/2/334/5018660?redirectedFrom=fulltext); [Gill 2019](https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/ethics-and-international-affairs/article/abs/artificial-intelligence-and-international-security-the-long-view/4AB181EAF648501422257934982A4DD5)).

#### Shifts in power causes Russia-China War—that outweighs

Lowry 22 – Rich Lowry is editor of National Review and a contributing editor with Politico Magazine. ("The Isolationists Are Wrong: The Pax Americana Is Worth Defending," 2-24-2022, https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2022/02/24/isolationists-are-wrong-pax-americana-worth-defending-00011448, Accessed 6-25-2022, LASA-SC

Vladimir Putin’s war against Ukraine doesn’t just herald a new era in European security, it underlines a growing threat to the American-led international order.

Pax Americana, the post-World War II system that has created the conditions for peace and prosperity in Europe and elsewhere, is entering a great period of testing, with the revanchist powers of Russia and China seeking to overturn it.

It is imperative that the United States, as the leader of the West and the only nation capable of maintaining what it has built over the last seven decades, rises to the challenge, even though its leadership role is increasingly contested at home. The left has long argued that the U.S. is not the benign influence abroad that it likes to believe, and the order that it created is a corrupt scam, not worth the cost of preserving.

Now elements of the right say much the same thing. This sentiment ranges from Senate candidate J.D. Vance pointedly declaring that he doesn’t care what happens in Ukraine to right-wing commentator Candace Owens saying we are at fault for the conflict. Undergirding it all is a sense that the U.S. needs to mind its own business, and perhaps even treat China as a “civilizational equal.”

But Pax Americana isn’t an act of charity. It holds distinct advantages for the United States. We’d be less safe, prosperous, and free without it.

What we are witnessing is, in broad brush, a civilizational challenge. China and Russia don’t have a formal alliance and their current cooperative arrangement may well break down over time, but they share the same interest in ending the long era of Western preeminence.

Russia can punch above its weight, but fundamentally represents a regional threat, in particular to a NATO alliance that has been a keystone of Western security. Moscow seeks to divide European countries from one another and diminish U.S. influence in Europe, toward the end of reversing the post-Cold War settlement that was the fruit of the West’s triumph over the Soviet Union.

What Putin seeks is consequential, but not nearly as sweeping as Beijing’s goal of supplanting the United States at the top of the hierarchy of nations. China wants nothing less than to restore itself as the Middle Kingdom, owed the respect and obeisance of the rest of the world.

What unites Russia and China is that they are two civilizations that feel they were humiliated and trampled by the West (Russia at the end of the Cold War, China from the middle of the 19th century to the middle of the 20th) and need to regain their rightful place in the sun. There is an ideological element to the growing challenge, as these two authoritarian regimes confront the democratic world, but the crux of the matter is cultural—neither Russia nor China has ever been a liberal democracy and each country is reacting against international norms they’ve never embraced.

Can’t we just make way for a more ambitious Russia and China? Within limits, but their maximal demands are an obvious threat to our interests.

Through our system of alliances, we have been, in effect, sponsoring international peace. Should, say, NATO unravel, there is no reason that Europe would not eventually once again become red in tooth and claw, as it has been through much of its history. Even if we could ignore or at least stay out of any future conflict, the loss of a vast zone of free, prosperous and allied counties would be a blow.

If it is expensive and burdensome to underwrite the security of countries around the world, it would be even more expensive and burdensome if a global U.S. exit or diminishment created the conditions for a major war, or if some other power—i.e., China—replaced us at the apex of world power.

There are so many advantages to our preeminent position that we take for granted. In an essay titled “After Hegemony,” former Trump official Elbridge Colby notes some of them: “Think how the American-born internet supported Silicon Valley, and vice versa, leading to a World Wide Web governed by formal laws and informal norms almost entirely of American design. Think how the desire for access to American capital markets gives American regulators de facto control over global accounting standards, or how the need to transact with American institutions allows U.S. Treasury officials to freeze the assets of designated targets anywhere in the world. Think how Americans take for granted that English is the universal language and that everyone accepts dollars. Think how the American university degree has become the preeminent global academic credential, with searching implications for everything from global educational standards to measures of professional success.”

The American order has also been, in the main, just. It is based on the sovereignty of borders and democracy as a norm, and hence has been a boon to self-governing peoples around the world. We can be overbearing and even bullying—as well as greedy, shortsighted, and wrong-headed—but U.S. leadership hasn’t been based on coercion. By and large, our allies trust us, and find our model more congenial than anything else on offer.

The previous hegemonic power, Britain, had a soft landing because Pax Britannica was replaced by Pax Americana, run by a partner that shared similar values and mindsets. The same wouldn’t be true if we hand the baton over to China.

Consider the seas. As the navalist Jerry Hendrix notes, the U.S. Navy has made the seas safe and free over the last 70 years in a way they never had been before. It’s no accident that there’s been a surge of global trade over the course of these decades that has made countries around the world more prosperous. Russia and especially China are a threat to this system, seeking greater control of the seas for their own purposes.

China wants to define a swath of the Western Pacific and the Indian Ocean as its territorial waters. If the U.S. lacks the resources or will to resist this Chinese aggrandizement, the rules of the road of international commerce will change drastically in China’s favor. An enormous proportion of global trade flows through the South China Sea and East China Sea. With control of the key choke points, China would be in a position to create restrictions and fees for everyone else’s trade and privileged status for its own. Imagine a kind of perpetual supply-chain crisis imposed by China as a matter of policy.

Indeed, China doesn’t want to be a leading country among other leading countries. It wants to have its system of government considered superior to liberal democracy. It wants free access to markets, while constraining everyone else. It wants to dominate the setting of technical standards, and so influence how new technologies are developed to suit its own interests. The Belt and Road Initiative is a reflection of its vision, with China at the center and other countries in a subsidiary role.

If China achieves mastery in Asia and a position of global predominance, it won’t leave us alone to enjoy tending our garden at home. “Building upon such economic advantages,” Colby writes, “it could intrude into and shape our national life, using its position to coerce, bribe, and cajole companies, individuals, and governments to do its will, diminishing our economic vitality and, through that, our freedoms.”

Resisting these growing civilizational challenges will require continued engagement around the world and the return in certain respects to a Cold War footing, especially when it comes to the chronically underfunded defense budget. Ducking our leadership role will, eventually, mean inevitable decline and the creation of a more hostile world. Countries don’t become more prosperous and secure on their way down.

## DOD Tradeoff

### 1NC---DA---DOD Link

#### Using robots reduces DoD spending

**Francis 13** [David Francis (Editor-at-large for The Fiscal Times. He has reported from all over the world on a number of topics, from transatlantic relations, to border security, to finance, and has spoken about his work at the Georgetown University School of Foreign Service, the Johns Hopkins School for Advanced International Studies, and the World Affairs Council of Pittsburgh), 4-2-2013, "How a New Army of Robots Can Cut the Defense Budget," Fiscal Times, <https://www.thefiscaltimes.com/Articles/2013/04/02/How-a-New-Army-of-Robots-Can-Cut-the-Defense-Budget>] // st

Right now, each soldier in Afghanistan costs the Pentagon $850,000 a year, according to DOD estimates. Some independent experts put that number as high as $1.2 million.¶ That’s just the cost of keeping soldiers in the field of battle. Over time, these soldiers are expected to cost the Pentagon tens of billions of dollars in long-term health care costs. This expense is expected to be one of the main drivers of DOD spending in the coming years: According to the left-leaning Center for American Progress, health care costs will reach $63.9 billion by 2015.¶ Compare that, however, to the cost of building and maintaining a robot. The TALON robot, a small rover that can be outfitted with weapons, costs $230,000 right now. The SGR-A1, used by the South Korean military to detect movement in the demilitarized zone, costs $200,000. The 710 Warrior, a miniature rover with enough power to tow a car, costs between $300,000 and $400,000.¶ Even the larger, more sophisticated robots that are in development are relatively cheap. PETMAN, the humanoid robot that can run and do pushups, cost $26.3 million to develop. The Pentagon has only invested $11 million in its program to develop robots that can act autonomously. The Navy has invested $813 billion in its unmanned X-47B, a project that is close to operational.¶ This might seem like a large amount until you consider that DOD plans to spend $1.5 trillion on its manned F-35. ¶ Of course, these costs will grow as the robots are produced on a larger scale. And people will never be completely eliminated from the DOD: Pentagon commanders are likely to use robots as companions to human soldiers, not as replacements.¶ But because they’re cheap to maintain, the rise of robot warriors is likely to reduce DOD spending. As production increases, efficiencies will be found, reducing costs. All signs indicate that the cost of using a robot in battle is likely to be less than using a human.¶ The real savings come through medical costs. Robots do not require long-term medical care, the time and services of the Veterans Administration, or anything else connected to the government’s bottom line.

## Russia DA

### 1NC---DA---Link

#### LAWS are being used by Russia now

Robert F. Trager 22, an associate professor of political science at the University of California, Los Angeles,, “Killer Robots Are Here—and We Need to Regulate Them”, Foreign Policy Magazine, 5-11-2022, https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/05/11/killer-robots-lethal-autonomous-weapons-systems-ukraine-libya-regulation/)/maze

Swarms of robots with the ability to kill humans are [no longer](https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidhambling/2021/07/21/israels-combat-proven-drone-swarm-is-more-than-just-a-drone-swarm/?sh=795c48ff1425) only the stuff of science fiction. Lethal autonomous weapons systems (LAWS) are here. In Ukraine, Moscow has allegedly [deployed](https://thebulletin.org/2022/03/russia-may-have-used-a-killer-robot-in-ukraine-now-what/?utm_source=Newsletter&utm_medium=Email&utm_campaign=ThursdayNewsletter03172022&utm_content=DisruptiveTechnologies_KillerRobotInUkraine_03152022) an artificial intelligence (AI)-enabled Kalashnikov ZALA Aero KUB-BLA loitering munition, while Kyiv has used Turkish-made [Bayraktar TB2 drones](https://cset.georgetown.edu/newsletter/march-10-2022/), which have some [autonomous capabilities](https://fortune.com/2022/03/01/russia-ukraine-invasion-war-a-i-artificial-intelligence/). Although it’s always hard to determine whether a weapon’s autonomous mode is used, these technologies have reportedly been employed in at least one conflict: Last year, a United Nations [report](https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N21/037/72/PDF/N2103772.pdf?OpenElement) suggested Turkey used autonomous firing by its Kargu-2 drones to hunt fleeing soldiers in Libya’s civil war (though the CEO of the Turkish company that produced the drone [denies](https://asia.nikkei.com/Business/Aerospace-Defense/Turkish-defense-company-says-drone-unable-to-go-rogue-in-Libya) it is capable of this).

# \*\*Kritik Work\*\*

## Feminist IR

### Link – NATO

#### NATO represents an *ambitious war machine* whilst simultaneously posturing itself as a progressive entity

Cynthia Cockburn 11, British academic, feminist, and peace activist., “Snagged on the Contradiction: NATO UNSC Resolution 1325, and Feminist Responses”, 2012 Women in Action, 11-24-2011 , https://www.isiswomen.org/phocadownload/print/isispub/wia/wia2012/WIA2012\_07TalkingPointsCynthiaCockBurn.pdf)/maze

NATO and The Woman Question The big challenge lies in getting the new instrument implemented, getting governments to commit to it and translating it into action for peace making initiatives and peace-keeping operations. That task has engaged many women and women’s organisations in a great deal of sustained efforts from that day to this.5 They had to ‘get their hands dirty’, negotiating not only with member governments but also with state militaries, for they are the ones who ‘man’ the aforesaid ‘peace keeping operations’. Who else but they, can ensure that women’s concerns are addressed by the UN ‘blue beret’ units who work among the distressed populations in conflict and post-conflict situations? Up to a point, implementing Resolution 1325 could mean relatively unproblematic and even creative encounters with the ‘civil-military’ functionaries of relatively benign state armies like those of the Netherlands, a country which sees its army more as a peace keeping force rather than a war-fighting army.6 However, many of the armies of Western Europe (and increasingly of Eastern Europe and even further afield) are marshalled within, and often commanded by the structures of the North Atlantic Alliance, by NATO. In our No-to-NATO movement we have developed a strong, sustained and carefully argued critique of the Alliance. It may speak the dainty language of ‘security’, but its actions show that it is an **ambitious, expansionist and belligerent war-machine**, primarily serving the economic and strategic interests of the more powerful among its member states.7

NATO has adopted Resolution 1325 with an energy that could easily pass for enthusiasm. A glance at its website will show 47 documents relating to the topic.8 A multi-media exhibition has been mounted about NATO’s contributions to the implementation of the Resolution (September 2010). There are pleasing photos of young women in army fatigues carrying babies, waving to children. NATO even celebrates International Women’s Day. **Apparently standing shoulder to shoulder with the women’s movement**, Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen asked, on 8 March 2010, “Would a world in which women enjoyed rights equal to those of men be safer and more stable? It is difficult to say, but ultimately a lasting peace in many of the world’s most troubled areas may depend upon the answer.”9 The Alliance was, it is true, rather slow off the mark at first in **grasping the merits of Resolution 1325**. They made their first move in 2007, seven years after it came into effect, and in doing so, they addressed action on ‘women, peace and security (WPS)’ from the start, as a joint policy initiative between NATO and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council. In other words the 28 NATO member states didn’t put a go on it alone. They decided, on their own reasons, to include the 22 ‘Partnership for Peace’ states. Otherwise, this would not be, they said, “a true partnership policy on an issue of global interest.”10 They set up an **informal ‘ad hoc group’** to make progress on the matter. It was the following summer, 2008, that the North Atlantic Council ‘tasked’ the NATO Strategic Command to provide guidance on implementing Resolution 1325. In other words, this was the point when the **big political boys asked the big military boys to put their minds on women.** The result was a Bi-Strategic Command guidelines to be ‘taken forward’ by the NATO civil and military authorities. All these member and ‘partner’ nations were urged to adopt National Action Plans on the Resolution. The Alliance envisioned Resolution 1325 **policy on WPS** as ‘an **integral part of NATO’s corporate identity**, in the way it plans and conducts its everyday business, and the way it organises its civilian and military structures’. It should also be fully integrated into ‘all aspects of NATO-led operations’ (my emphasis).

#### NATO functions as a “teaching machine” for hegemonic masculinity – that outweighs

Katharine AM Wright 22, Senior Lecturer in International Politics. Research and teach NATO, gender and security, “Challenging civil society perceptions of NATO: Engaging the Women, Peace and Security agenda”, Sage Publishing Library, 4-18-2022,  [https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/00108367221084561)/maze](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/00108367221084561)/maze)

\*WPS\*=women peace and security agenda\*

Specifically, this article takes a critical feminist approach to conceptualise NATO as an ‘institution of international hegemonic masculinity’ through the way the alliance invokes the masculinist protection logic in its engagement with WPS and acts as a ‘**teaching machine’** shaping the value placed on WPS by NATO members and a growing number of partners (Wright et al., 2019). In this article, I develop this framework through situating civil society within it and, in so doing, contribute something new to understanding how NATO functions through its move to active engagement on the international stage with the WPS agenda. In addition, this framework enables interrogation of how the WPS agenda can become militarised despite civil society engagement. In order to do so, I focus on how civil society engaged in WPS work perceive NATO and, specifically, NATO’s intentions. I seek to understand whether and how NATO’s attempts to engage civil society through the creation of CSAP in 2014 have influenced civil society perceptions of the alliance and in turn whether such engagements have the potential to support transformative understandings of WPS at NATO. My analysis proceeds as follows. First, I introduce my method and approach drawing on an understanding of NATO as an institution of international hegemonic masculinity. Next, I engage with the concept of civil society and the relationship with the WPS agenda, before moving on to interrogate why NATO has until recently remained an outlier in global governance with its lack of formal policy engagement with civil society. The article then moves to introduce the WPS architecture at NATO and specifically the role of the Secretary General’s Special Representative (SGSR) on WPS in relationship building with civil society on WPS. Next, the article turns to examine the motivations for civil society engagement with NATO, before moving to interrogate the value civil society perceive NATO gains from CSAP. Finally, I examine how encounters with **NATO’s bureaucracy and security apparatus shape civil society perceptions of NATO.** NATO as an **institution of international hegemonic masculinity**: method and approach NATO is a political-military alliance built on consensus decision-making. Moving beyond its Cold War origins, the alliance’s remit has expanded significantly beyond a sole focus on collective defence to include crisis management and cooperative security. This has seen NATO’s focus enlarge from a regional one to a global one, with recent engagements in Afghanistan, Libya and Kosovo, for example. Its status as a multilateral institution means it is limited by its members’ priorities and therefore sensitive not to implicate NATO or NATO member states in wrongdoing (Hebert, 2012). In centring NATO as an ‘institution of international hegemonic masculinity’ (Wright et al., 2019), in this analysis, it is possible to shed light on the peculiarities of NATO’s WPS work to date, against which engagement with civil society takes place. This has two co-constituting elements, first, internally, existing gender norms and expectations of masculinity and femininity reflective of a hierarchical military institution are (re)created and (re)enforced through NATO’s engagement with WPS (Wright et al., 2019: 71). For example, men working on WPS at NATO navigate both the **trivialisation and the feminisation of such work a**nd must (re)negotiate their own identities. Yet in so doing they reinforce the importance of men speaking to and listening to other men (rather than women) **reinforcing** the **gendered status quo** (Wright et al., 2019: 93; see also Hurley, 2018a). Second, externally, as a transnational military alliance, NATO acts as a ‘teaching machine’ in which member and partner states learn the value of WPS as a ‘military tool’ through socialisation with each other (Wright et al., 2019; see also Enloe, 1981). This means perpetuating an understanding of WPS as a means to support operational effectiveness through ‘the **role of masculinist protector** which reinforces hegemonic militaristic, masculine ideals and norms’ (Wright et al., 2019: 34). This patriarchal logic puts ‘women and children, in a subordinate position of dependence and obedience’ to justify the waging of war (Young, 2003: 2), for example, NATO’s intervention in Afghanistan (Wright, 2019). It is reinforced through the stories NATO tells internally about its WPS engagement (Hurley, 2018b) and externally in public diplomacy (Wright, 2019) and to support partnerships with other states but also celebrities (Wright and Bergman Rosamond, 2021) and now civil society. Thus, interrogating civil society perceptions of NATO in this context adds an additional dimension to understanding how NATO seeks to legitimise itself as a WPS actor, further constituting its role as an institution of international hegemonic masculinity. It is worth noting here that CSAP was revised in late 2019 following an independent review commissioned by NATO, neither this review, the new Terms of Reference nor full membership have been made public. This reflects some of the challenges to researching NATO, an institution **cloaked in secrecy** by merit of its purpose as a security and defence alliance (see Wright and Hurley, 2017 for a wider discussion). Therefore, the focus of this article is on CSAP as it existed prior to this revision, from the first consultation with civil society on WPS policy in 2014 and the formal establishment of CSAP in 2016 until its 2019 revision which led to a change in membership. This lack of transparency has also necessitated the method. In order to assess civil society perceptions of NATO as a WPS actor, I use a number of sources. First, I conducted 23 semi-structured interviews of varying length with civil society actors working on WPS, including current or former CSAP members. Participants were identified via their membership of CSAP, as prominent civil society actors working on WPS (in line with NATO’s definition) and via snowballing. The interviews took place either remotely or in person in locations across the globe between September 2018 and March 2020. All of the interviews were conducted on the condition of anonymity to enable participants to speak as freely as possible. For this reason, no distinction is made between current and former CSAP members. In addition, the locations of specific interviews have not been revealed (Appendix 1), and this is because the relatively small pool of members means doing so would potentially expose the participants’ identities. Second, I conducted a review of civil society and NATO websites, including features on NATO or CSAP specifically, along with NATO policy documents where available and related content to inform my analysis. I used this information to generate interview questions and also to corroborate interview data where possible.

#### NATO promotes progressive gender values while *sustaining masculine values* of *protection and sovereignty*

Elsa Hedling 22, is an associate fellow at the Europe Programme, Swedish Institute of International Affairs (UI) and a PhD Candidate at Lund University., “Embodying Military Muscles and a Remasculinized West: Influencer Marketing, Fantasy, and “the Face of NATO”, Global Studies Quarterly (2022) 2, 1–12, 3-10-2022, https://academic.oup.com/isagsq/article/2/1/ksac010/6546420)/maze

We argue that influencer marketing, through engaging fantasy, provides a site where military organizations can cre- ate appeal among a wider audience by bridging incompati- ble notions of soldiering, gender, and geopolitics. Through the story of Lasse Matberg, the political project of NATO military buildup was positioned as simultaneously neces- sary, commonsensical, and pleasurable, and NATO could project **gender-progressive values** while **safeguarding** “tra- ditional,” muscular **masculinity.** Our findings add primar- ily to feminist International Relations (IR) research, which has critically analyzed how NATO communication efforts construct the organization as a cosmopolitan defender of gender justice and human rights, thereby legitimating its actions and existence (Kuus 2007; Wright 2019; Wright and Rosamond 2021). More broadly, feminist IR scholars have shown how notions of protection, territoriality, and sovereignty—all central to contemporary security politics— are deeply gendered. Gender relations and specific ideas of masculinity and femininity are, explicitly or implicitly**, invoked** in **discourses about who and what must be pro- tected**, from whom and by whom (Young 2003; Parashar, Tickner, and True 2018; Agius and Edenborg 2019; Strand and Kehl 2019). When seen in light of the above research, our findings show how NATO, through new communica- tion technologies, can engage and appeal to a wider audi- ence by combining a “pro-feminist,” cosmopolitan message with other meanings, associated with “traditional” masculin- ity or nationalist mythologies. These ambiguous enactments of gender and geopolitics are particularly significant in a time when liberal and cosmopolitan values, feminism, and gender equality are increasingly challenged by populist and “masculinist” discourses inside and outside NATO (Nicholas and Agius 2018).

In addition to the primary contribution, our findings are relevant to several other IR conversations. It contributes to the literature on war’s relation to pleasure and joy (Dawson 1994; Welland 2018), which has dealt primarily with mili- tary recruitment, marketing campaigns, or fictional repre- sentations of war. In contrast, we demonstrate how influ- encer marketing—through mundane and **interactive visual storytelling centering on** the **soldier persona**—offers a par- ticularly fertile genre for the production of fantasy. More generally, the article adds to visual IR scholarship by taking seriously the ways in which social media can create new **pos- sibilities for conducting global politics** (Bleiker 2015; Crilley 2021). The article also joins IR discussions of how social me- dia are used to engage with global publics as part of strategic communication, public, and digital diplomacy (Shepherd 2015; Leaver and Highfield 2018, Duncombe 2020; Hedling and Bremberg 2021).

The article proceeds as follows. Next, we introduce our analytical and methodological framework for studying visual storytelling and its geopolitical dimensions. Then we analyze the story of Lasse Matberg through the three layers outlined above. Moving from the composition of the story as told on Instagram, the role of digital media when used by military organizations, and the geopolitical context, we discuss how these three layers interrelate and coconstruct each other. In our conclusions, we reflect upon the wider theoretical and political implications of the analysis and identify pathways for future research.

Tracing Fantasy and Appeal in Visual Narratives of Social Media

Stories of soldiers, circulating in popular culture, war memorials, political speeches and strategic communication, enable civilian audiences to access, make sense of, and “know” war. Military and security organizations attempt to orchestrate such stories in ways that sustain morale within the ranks and foster public support for war preparations and deployments (e.g., Pin-Fat and Stern 2005; Achter 2010; Basham 2016; Cree and Caddick 2020). For wars to be sup- ported, soldiers must be thought of as virtuous and mili- tary sacrifices scripted as meaningful. This is arguably par- ticularly important as professional forces (rather than con- scripted forces) have become the norm in Europe and North America and few civilians have personal bonds to a service member—even less to one serving under NATO command. Still, stories of soldiers are rarely explicit in their motivation of warfare. Instead, war and war preparations are made possible and even desirable through stories that script the soldier as an aspirational war hero and create a deeper resonance with what Dawson (1994) describes as the “plea- sure culture of war.”

Much has already been written about the relationship be- tween pleasure, desire, military power, and war. One influen- tial body of work has discussed how representations of war as an entertaining spectacle—or the soldiering body as inspira- tional and attractive—in media, popular culture, or by mili- tary organizations may produce a desire to enlist in, watch, or support war (Der Derian 2001; Pears 2021). Another body of literature has rather studied war as an emotional and indeed often pleasurable experience, for instance, by de- scribing pleasure attached to combat, synchronized move- ments, and marches as well as to the molding of a strong, capable, and desirable military body (Crane-Seeber 2016; Dyvik 2016; Welland 2018). The emergence of social and interactive media technology as a site for strategic commu- nication and storytelling more broadly has arguably enabled a third body of literature to merge war as a pleasurable ex- perience with war as an enjoyable spectacle, by showing how civilian audiences are called upon to actively engage with, “like,” and “share” strategic messages (Stahl 2010; Kuntsman and Stein 2015; Crilley 2016). We will come back to this body of work in our analysis but, for now, we want to establish that war and war preparations are enabled through desire, plea- sure, and appeal in a range of ways.

Therefore, our analysis of how NATO is ascribed mean- ing through the story of Lasse Matberg focuses not primar- ily on identifying explicit arguments about what NATO does and why it is necessary but rather on laying bare the ap- peal or fantasies that the visual narratives may evoke. Fol- lowing Freinstein and Gadinger (2019), and their reading of Glynos and Howarth (2007), we conceptualize this dy- namic through the notion of fantasmatic logics (as distinct from political logics). While political logics are descriptive as well as prescriptive and may be identified in statements such as “NATO is a guarantor of security in Europe against Russian aggression,” fantasmatic logics lack clear directions or antagonism. Instead, a fantasmatic logic bridges incon- sistent storylines enabling an “impossible union between incompatible elements” (Glynos and Howarth 2007, 147). For Glynos and Howarth, the fantasmatic provides a way to understand why certain practices and representations grip subjects, thus giving political projects energy through a promise of enjoyment or a “fullness-to-come” (Glynos and Howarth 2007,145–47). The function of fantasy, they argue, is not to give a false or misleading picture but to ensure that political controversy and potential conflicts remain in the background, allowing us to “have the cake and eat it” (Glynos and Howarth 2007,147). As an example, in military communication, language drawing on a political logic of compulsory conscription and service for the nation can be combined with images activating a fantasmatic desire for personal growth and adventure.

Attention to fantasmatic logics is crucial for understand- ing how strategic communication by military and security organizations may resonate with and appeal to audiences. In line with Freinstein and Gadinger, we here refer to “the **performative dimension of presentation rather than recep- tion**, to which we have no analytical access” (2019: 2). When we suggest that the story of Lasse Matberg produces ap- peal around the figure of the NATO soldier and NATO’s military buildup, we have in mind the promise or potential of pleasure (Glynos and Howarth 2007). The question of what the possible—and varying—target audiences are, and what promises Lasse Matberg may embody for individuals as well as larger audiences, is a concern to which we return throughout the analysis. Also, we have had no analytical ac- cess to intention (Shepherd 2015) or “real motives,” which is important to underline when studying representations that are described, not least by security organizations themselves, as strategic communication.

How, then, do we trace fantasmatic logics in the story of Lasse Matberg? Drawing on narrative methodology, we un- derstand military marketing and soldier self-representations on social media as storytelling practices (Bamberg 2012; Hedling 2020). In line with much narrative research, we view personal stories as relying on, reproducing, or chal- lenging broader narratives, such as those around nations, or NATO as a geopolitical actor (Somers and Gibson 1994). When analyzing how the story of Lasse Matberg produces appeal and attaches meaning to NATO, we pay attention to both visual and textual elements, with inspiration from lit- erature on visual culture and global politics. Loosely draw- ing on Hansen’s (2011, 2015) three-step model for visual analysis, we first explore the visual strategies used by Mat- berg to construct a public image of himself as NATO of- ficer and social media figure. To interpret these represen- tations, we engage with literature on military masculinities and entertainment. Next, we analyze how digital, social me- dia in general—and Instagram in particular—makes pos- sible a particular story of Lasse Matberg. In this step, we draw on research on digital Web 2.0 technologies, under- lining how the interactivity and intimacy of these platforms shape the narratives communicated by military and security organizations and contribute to their appeal. In the third step, we situate the story of Lasse Matberg within a wider geopolitical context, examining how international relations, and the role of NATO in world politics, are constituted in specifically gendered ways through this soldier story. This discussion engages literature on gender and geopolitics. Throughout the analysis, we identify tensions and incompat- ible elements, which seem to be bridged by, and contribute to narrate, certain fantasies about NATO. Our three-step ap- proach, and paying attention to how the three steps are in- terconnected through the fantasmatic, allows us to gain a more complex understanding of how the story of Lasse Mat- berg produces appeal around the NATO soldier and NATO buildup, not only through his visual representation but how his visual representations are consumed and circulated in a specific digital (second step) and geopolitical (third step) environment.

#### The US and NATO have historically victimized women as a justification for their western imperialism, furthering their hegemonic masculine protectionist logic.

Katharine Am **Wright**, 9-19-20**17**, "Telling NATO’s story of Afghanistan: Gender and the alliance’s digital diplomacy," SAGE Journals, https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/1750635217730588

The gendered underpinnings of NATO’s approach to public diplomacy are nothing new. For example, in the 1960s, NATO produced a propaganda movie called The Atlantic Decade, warning of the dangers of Soviet expansion and specifically targeting women, with the narrator introducing Turkey by saying ‘here too women have been liberated’ (Risso, 2009: 509). Today, NATO’s approach to public (and now digital) diplomacy continues to be underpinned by narratives, whether they concern individuals, states or the alliance itself. As Wibben (2010: 43) argues, narratives are political, they enable and limit representation and these representations shape our world and the possibilities within it, challenging the link between ‘experience, meaning, and knowledge’. A narrative approach is therefore a useful means to challenge traditional conceptions of security concerned with creating meaning and imposing value in what is viewed as an ‘anarchic world’ because it makes ‘explicit the operation and production of particular kind[s] of meaning, and … draw[s] out the implications this understanding has for human existence’ (Polkinghorne, 1988: 16, quoted in Wibben 2010: 44). A deconstructive approach necessitates consideration of the way they are ‘read, understood and located institutionally’ because, for example, the existence of narratives of women in the third world does not necessarily equate to a challenge to established hegemonic histories and their subjectivities (Mohanty, 1991, quoted in Cooke, 1996: 292). The mediatization of war means that the ‘delocalized world’ of TV, newspapers and the internet is where battles over ‘legitimacy, effectiveness and consequences are fought’ (Behnke, 2002: 198). Therefore, understanding NATO’s engagement with digital diplomacy and the narratives that underpin it is important, yet NATO’s public diplomacy efforts have been left on the margins of scholarly analysis of the alliance. This is significant given that, as Ringsmose and Borgesen (2011: 524) argue, in a world of international cooperation and international media, national narratives are not formed in a vacuum. It also leaves work on the use of strategic narratives by both governments (Jakobsen and Ringsmose, 2015; Ringsmose and Børgesen, 2011) and militaries (Crilley, 2015; 2016) separated from the wider regional security context. The use of digital platforms by governments and military actors is on one level an attempt to engage the media and at its most successful this can contribute to the formation of successful strategic narratives, which turns the media into a ‘conveyor belt transmitting elite cues to the public’ (Jakobsen and Ringsmose, 2015: 217). However, it can also be viewed as a means to circumnavigate the traditional dissemination of information through the media in order to engage directly with consumers (Crilley, 2016: 55). The remit of NATO’s Public Diplomacy Division supports both of these purposes, with the division tasked with complementing information activities within each member state and addressing issues related to the public perception of the alliance (Public Diplomacy Divison, 2006: 333). The recalibration of NATO’s public diplomacy to engage with digital platforms came in part as a result of the NATO-led ISAF mission in Afghanistan and the Taliban’s ability to grab both the Afghan and international media’s attention with civilian casualty numbers (Betz, 2011: 622). To address this issue, NATO created a specific media centre hosted in Afghanistan, the web-based NATO TV platform, and appointed Michael Stopford as Deputy Assistant Secretary General for Strategic Communication. Stopford had been credited with bolstering Coca-Cola’s image and reputation in his previous role as an executive for the company (Castle, 2008). This resulted in a change in NATO’s approach to public diplomacy through a shift to direct engagement with publics through digital platforms. The alliance now has a significant digital presence across multiple social media platforms: for example, NATO TV (now hosted on YouTube) features short explanatory clips on NATO, NATO’s military capabilities and short documentary style stories, including on Afghanistan. NATO TV provides a useful insight into NATO’s approach to digital diplomacy, and while the primary video featured on the channel is one detailing what NATO is and why it exists, the three most viewed videos across the site are on ballistic missile defence, female prisoners in a prison in Herat and the food scene in Kabul (NATO, 2017). This demonstrates that NATO’s digital diplomacy strategy is not just concerned with selling NATO and NATO’s ‘hard power’ but has utilized more contextualized narratives to inform outreach initiatives. It also draws attention to the way gendered narratives are utilized to support NATO’s digital diplomacy strategy. The prominence given to women’s stories on the YouTube challenge has been the subject of critique, which concerned the alliance’s apparent ‘failure’ to explicitly link a video showing Afghan women voting in the 2015 presidential election to the alliance’s (‘hard power’) actions to support this (Seib, 2014: 98). However, this analysis misrepresents the purpose of NATO’s public diplomacy, where in respect of public information campaigns the intention is not to sell ‘hard power’, nor to engage in promoting the alliance to individuals already supportive of its agenda but rather to permeate a wider audience.1 In relation to public diplomacy campaigns linked to NATO enlargement in Central Europe, this was also evident, with discussions of NATO framed ‘around the notions of rights, peace, culture, and values’, rather than defence (Kuus, 2007: 271). As NATO’s Head of Communication has stated, the intention of such content is for individuals to be drawn to it not because it is about NATO, but because of the issue it addresses (Inside Agency, 2014). In applying feminist analysis it is possible to see how gendered narratives are instrumentalized by the alliance to support (in this case) a tacit association of NATO with women’s rights. This in turn reinforces the secondary justification underpinning the war in Afghanistan, that the action was taken in order to liberate Afghan women (Shepherd, 2006). The (continued) instrumentalization of (Afghan) women Afghan women have been central to Western involvement in Afghanistan, far predating the 2001 intervention. Efforts to ‘modernize’ women’s status in Afghanistan go as far back as the early 20th century (Kabeer and Khan, 2014: 5). However, the Western approach to Afghan women has been far from consistent, underscoring its instrumentality. For example, during the rise to power of the Soviet-backed regime in Kabul and the subsequent Soviet occupation (1979–1989) efforts were made to emancipate women (Kabeerand Khan, 2014: 1). At this time, the US conveniently left women’s rights off the agenda in formulating its opposition to Soviet actions, although the US was drawing upon women’s rights to oppose other regimes at the time (Enloe, 1989: 57). The selective and instrumental use of women’s rights in US foreign policy was reinforced when the US-backed mujahidin came to power in Afghanistan in 1992 and ushered in one of the worst periods of human rights abuses the country had seen. The subsequent overthrow of the mujahidin in 1994 by the Taliban led to severe restrictions on women’s rights, including to movement, work and education (Kabeer and Khan, 2014: 2). As Kandiyoti (2007: 505) argues, women’s rights have ‘become implicated in the geopolitical manoeuvrings of powerful global actors’ and this makes the invocation of the ‘principled politics solidarity’, which has emerged in the War on Terror, extremely problematic. The discourse surrounding the US-led intervention in Afghanistan in 2001, and subsequent NATO-led ISAF operation has been noticeably gendered. As Messerschmidt (2016: 167) identifies, Bush and Obama drew on a masculinist protection logic in their articulations of the War on Terror, which constructed a particular gendered villain–victim–hero discourse in order to gain support for their actions both globally and regionally. Their speeches constructed the hero–villain relationship as unequally gendered, with the hero – the US – occupying a hegemonic masculinized position as ‘civilized, virtuous, just and peaceful’, while the subordinate masculinized villain – the Taliban – was ‘uncivilized, cruel, unjust, and violent’. In contrast, all ‘other’ people in the world were feminized, framed as ‘passively dependent, innocent, uniformed, vulnerable and unable to protect themselves’ (Messerschmidt, 2016: 169). Feminine subordination in the masculinist protection model is not submission, rather it is undertaken willingly, with adoration expressed for the protector (Young, 2003b: 3). This saw Afghan women framed as victims and, as such, in need of rescue, along with the rest of the world. In November 2001, Laura Bush made history when she became the first First Lady to give the President’s radio address, shortly after the start of the US-led Operation Enduring Freedom intervention in Afghanistan. She drew heavily on the experiences of Afghan women in making her case in support of the intervention: Civilized people throughout the world are speaking out in horror – not only because our hearts break for the women and children in Afghanistan, but also because in Afghanistan we see the world the terrorists would like to impose on the rest of us. (Bush, 2001) The address invoked the emancipation of Afghan women as supplementary to the primary justification that the intervention was a necessary defensive action to protect American people following the attacks of 9/11 and was framed around the masculinist protection logic. As Cooke (2002: 485–486) points out, the rationale presented was that to defend our universal civilisation we must rescue the women. To rescue these women we must attack these men; These women are to be rescued not because they are more ‘ours’ than ‘theirs’ but rather because they will have become more ‘ours’ through the rescue mission. Following the 2001 intervention in Afghanistan, women became beneficial not just in rhetoric but in both doctrine and practice to population centric counter-insurgency (Dyvik, 2013: 412). This was most visible in the military’s use of Female Engagement Teams (FETs) intended to engage local populations. FETs both mirrored essentalized notions of women as peaceful and instrumentalized gender as a ‘new strategic asset’, enabling women to engage in the post-9/11 masculinist protectionist narrative (Pratt, 2013: 778). The gendering of counterinsurgency also served to demonstrate that the US was ‘no longer fighting its new battles with outmoded methods’ (Mcbride and Wibben, 2012: 200). FETs were a new initiative but, as one member of a FET later reflected, ‘we were tourists, unable to solve problems with units that changed every 12 months. Everything was temporary, except Afghanistan’ (Pope, 2016). The preoccupation of the Western interveners with ‘rescuing’ Afghan women has both imperialist undertones and political implications (Khan, 2013: 105). The centrality of Afghan women to the NATO-led ISAF mission in Afghanistan has pervaded every element of the intervention, with public diplomacy and strategic communication no exception. This is exemplified in a classified CIA document released through Wikileaks (CIA [Wikileaks], 2010) which notes: Afghan women could serve as ideal messengers in humanizing the ISAF role in combating the Taliban because of women’s ability to speak personally and credibly about their experiences under the Taliban, their aspirations for the future, and their fears of a Taliban victory. Outreach initiatives that create media opportunities for Afghan women to share their stories with French, German, and other European women could help to overcome pervasive scepticism among women in Western Europe toward the ISAF.

### Link – Human Control

#### The aff opens up the gateway for the military to conduct exacerbated surveillance that disproportionately affects people of color through the lens of white technomasculinity.

Philip **Olson** and Christine **Labuski**, 8-7-20**18**, "‘There’s always a [white] man in the loop’: The gendered and racialized politics of civilian drones," SAGE Journals, https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0306312718792619

As corporations and civilian actors grasp the economic potential for UAS, drones are becoming an increasingly common sight in US civilian airspace. Non-military UAS have existed for decades, consisting mainly of remote control (RC) aircraft used by amateur pilots and hobbyists, but the past decade has seen UAS pressed into service for a wider range of purposes, including agriculture, search and rescue, cinematography and remote sensing (The Economist, 2017). And while military-domestic transfers of technology are common, advancements in civilian drone technologies also benefit the military by offloading research and development to the private sector (Boucher, 2015). Widely perceived as ‘exceptional [military] tools’, drones ‘are fast becoming everyday tools’ (Shaw et al., 2012: 1505), and UAS are often deployed in similar ways across both military and domestic contexts. Targeted surveillance is among the most conspicuous of shared applications. UAS visualizing capacities developed alongside the use of other technologies for surveillance, including ‘security’ cameras, cell phones, laptop computers, body and dashboard cameras, global positioning systems (GPS) and geographic information systems (GIS). The near-ubiquity of surveillance devices has led to what some scholars refer to as an age of omniveillance, in which ‘everyone will soon be watched, targeted, and tracked’ (Shaw et al., 2012: 1505) and where it is ‘unreasonable to expect to not be recorded at all’ (Tran, 2015: 195). Though often referred to in ordinary and distributive terms (Bell, 2009; Koskela, 2012), these surveillance technologies index a ‘scopic regime’ (Gregory, 2011: 190) through which **social hierarchies of race, gender and geopolitical location are enacted and enforced in intrusive and often violent ways.** AbuLaban (2015) refers to this regime, including its ability to render a growing number of people ‘targetable’, as a ‘key organizational practice of late modernity’ (p. 46). We identify two broad groups in our study: established and emerging users. In comparison with emerging users, who exhibit a range of interest in and understanding of the roles that UAS will play in their lives, established users possess more of the technical knowledge, skills and control through which UAS have thus far been interpreted. A key distinction between our two user groups is demographic: established users are almost exclusively white and male/masculine, while emerging users are more diversely identified (Mellström, 2004; Wajcman, 1991). Given that established users have been tasked with advising the FAA on civilian UAS regulation, it is important to consider not only who might soon be sharing the sky with law enforcement, farmers and hobbyists, but also how drone technologies are discursively constructed across these populations. In this study, established users aligned – though not to a person – with the focus groups that contained the highest percentages of men: TEST, SCI and USER. And though we are keenly aware of gender’s arbitrary and plural nature (Connell, 1998), the men from these groups enacted a strikingly consistent hegemonic masculinity (Connell and Messerschimdt, 2005), one that valued and elevated technological expertise, even as it left unmarked the stratified social origins of this technoscientific knowledge (Cockburn, 1985). In this essay, we interpret the discourse of these white technomasculine experts as a form of prototypical white technomasculinity. Our data also suggest that military-civilian continuities persist for established users and that this group sees the challenges to greater civilian uptake of UAS as technical and individual rather than collective and justice-oriented. Sclove (1995) refers to focal and non-focal features of technological systems, but our analysis of race, gender and drones reveals that we can also distinguish between focal and non-focal people, or groups of people – that is, between the perspectives of those who control the development of civilian UAS and those whose lives are more likely to be disrupted or menaced by these systems. Surveillance remains central to how UAS are imagined and we further argue that via prototypical white technomasculinity – a subject position interpreted as original, standard and in no need of justification (Gordon, 2006: 242) – surveillance can be perceived as unproblematic and even ‘cool’. This perspective differs sharply from how surveillance technologies are experienced and described by so-called minority groups in the US and elsewhere, including people of color (of all genders), women (of all racial groups), and queer and other nonconforming people (e.g. Abu-Laban, 2015; Browne, 2015; Tran, 2015). We employ the term ‘so-called’ here in order to underscore that though white technomasculine people often understand their discourse to reflect a neutral or majoritarian stance, it is more accurate to describe them as a particular minority interest group. Browne suggests that the experiences of **black women in particular**, whose lives **are routinely subjected to** what she calls ‘a **scrutinizing surveillance’** (Browne, 2015: 156), can be instructive for interrogating the racialized and gendered dimensions of security and surveillance. It is our worry that racialized and gender minorities in the US will bear a disproportionate burden of what Koskela (2012) calls ‘the fruits of surveillant labor’ (p. 53). Related, we are concerned that uncritical and/or under-informed perspectives on UAS will mask the role of discriminatory attitudes and affects in shaping how these technologies are deployed. Prototypical white technomasculinity camouflages digitized data as both neutral and precise, despite the fact that even cursory assessments of such data reveal that algorithms rely upon developers’ perceptions of normality and difference (Magnet, 2011; Wilcox, 2017). Gender and race are ‘intertwine[d] with practices of intense information gathering’ and ‘[d]isciplinary power and control’ (Koskela, 2012: 50) and, in military contexts, analysts have argued that drone surveillance and signature strikes are often ‘little more than a form of high-tech racial profiling’ (Wall, 2016: 1123). In sum, though there might be consensus regarding **military drones’ capacity to carry out ‘lethal surveillance’**, there is disagreement among differently ‘targetable’ populations regarding the dangerous nature of civilian UAS. Following Browne (2015: 116–121), we advocate for the cultivation of a critical technological consciousness in relation to civilian UAS. Such a consciousness would apprehend the particularity of the white technomasculine perspective – evinced here by our focus groups – through which UAS are constructed, and would advocate for ‘informed public debate … accountability by the state and the private sector’, and an acknowledgement of the ‘connections between contemporary … [UAS] technologies and their historical antecedents’ (p. 116). Absent such a consciousness, the public uptake of commercial drones will likely rehearse the social hierarchies by which they were generated and that perpetuate unmarked **white technomasculinity**. To highlight the constructed specificity of this subject position, we use transcript data from the white technomasculine actors in our focus groups to demonstrate that UAS can scarcely be discussed – by these actors and those they influence – without masculine pronouns and imagined scenarios involving exclusively male actors. We refer to this discourse as a **white technomasculine imaginary**, given the disproportionate role these actors play in designing, employing and now regulating these and other technologies. Such an imaginary may constrain the abilities of emerging users to identify and develop alternative uses, questions and ethical norms related to civilian drones. Highlighting the specificity of white technomasculinity helps us to see that masculinities are not only constructed and plural, but also contingent upon the mutable social arrangements through which they are upheld (Cockburn, 1985; Connell, 1998; Salter, 2014). Civilian UAS **technologies** may **facilitate new ways of living race and gender** in an omniveillant world; we note focus group moments where anxiety and vulnerability inhere in white technomasculinity. Here we join Daggett (2015) in asking whether civilian drones, despite their militaristic and imperial origins, can subvert or even queer social relations. Though not currently marketed as tools with which emerging users can engage in sousveillant acts – ‘taking back the night’ or ‘shooting back’ (Beirne et al., 1997), for example – our focus groups suggest that drones have the capacity to produce ontological insecurity in white technomasculine actors who may newly perceive themselves as ‘targetable’.

### 1NC – Alt - FSS

#### The alternative is to reject the affirmative and engage in feminist security studies – this requires shifting our focus from security cooperation to building communities of care that recognize NATO is incompatible with feminist movements.

Kumskova and Scheyer 19 [Victoria Scheyer (Master’s Degree in Human Rights from Columbia University and has previously worked for several non-profit and academic research centres, where she conducted in-depth gender analysis across the security spectrum) and Marina Kumskova (Master’s Degree in International Peace. Studies at the University for Peace mandated by the United Nations. She has previously worked with think tanks and research institutes on various research projects on feminist politics, gender analysis and migration.) “FEMINIST FOREIGN POLICY: A FINE LINE BETWEEN ‘ADDING WOMEN’ AND PURSUING A FEMINIST AGENDA.” Journal of International Affairs, vol. 72, no. 2, 2019, pp. 62–63. JSTOR, https://www.jstor.org/stable/26760832. Accessed 28 Jun. 2022.] // st

Safety and Wellbeing In traditional foreign policy approaches, security is given high priority. Concepts such as national or human security represent understandings of governments on what to target or how to achieve security. Feminists have criticized both concepts because these approaches ignore or overlook the gendered dimension of security.35 Feminist security studies emphasize and elaborate the importance of asking questions such as “security for who, by whom?”36 It is the questioning of the militarized security that is not able to protect women, children, civilians, migrants, among others, neither in times of conflict nor in times of peace.37 Feminist security studies emphasize the need to rethink traditional concepts of security. Putting the security issues of all intersectional groups and individuals at the center of security, the usefulness of the military industrial complex will have to be questioned.38 Buying tanks or fighter jets are not preventing children from dying of hunger, stopping preventable diseases from spreading, or averting gender based violence. Instead, this form of security often perpetuates these situations.39 In an ever-changing society featuring dynamically evolving conflicts, Sylvester emphasizes that there is a need to always review, reframe, and reflect on current approaches of security and avoid the formulation of universal, timeless, and fixed security concepts.40 With this in mind, we refrain from unpacking the concept of security, and we support feminist ideas of shifting the focus from security toward the peace, safety, and wellbeing of the gendered individual. Wellbeing, in this vein, includes physical safety in addition to the social and political security of people and the fulfillment of basic social needs. We argue that the way problems are framed inherently influences the way solutions are found. While defining security not through the absence of violence but through the foundations of peace, world leaders can commit to peace through, for example, renaming the United Nations Security Council into the United Nations Peace Council. Feminist Foreign Policy demands shifting toward a positive peace model and away from security. Empathic Communities The third indicator we have identified is based on the building of empathic communities. We differentiate between alliances based on military or defense strategies and communities based on empathy and friendship. Alliances such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), or even the current structure of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), serve the goal of engaging in alliances to advance militarized security and national interests. These coalitions further capitalize on the fundamental values of neo-realism in international politics and represent the hegemonic security model. Because these alliances always come with implicit assumptions such as the presence of an enemy, a threat, and power conflict, violent escalation often proves inevitable. Feminism claims that there are more reasons for building communities, which are not about military and power, but rather about common goals such as peace, mutually beneficial trade agreements, or agreements on disarmament. Those can eventually build trust and dependencies so that attacks and war would seem illogical. Communities such as the Group of Friends of 1325, the Informal Expert Group on Women, Peace, and Security, and Friends of Gender Parity are built on agreements that open dialogue builds trust and empathy.

### 1NC- Feminist Failure

#### Thus, the alternative is to reject the aff and embrace feminist failure. This is a politics that requires a gendered thinking of the political to open discursive space for feminist interventions to unsettle the comfortability of the 1AC.

Stern and Zalewski 09

(Maria, lecturer and researcher at the Department of Peace and Development research at Gotberg university, AND MARYSIA ZALEWSKI, Director of Centre for Gender Studies at university of Aberdeen. “Feminist fatigue(s): reflections on feminism and familiar fables of militarization” Review of International Studies (2009), 35, 611–630, Cambridge journals, JKS)

In this article we pick up on the contradictory threads running through the account above to re-consider the work of feminist scholarship in the study of international politics through the specific example of familiar feminist fables of militarisation. The rest of the article will proceed as follows. First, we will explain why we think it matters to have a discussion about feminism framed by its location within the disciplinary boundaries of the academic study of international politics. We then move to explain what we mean by the performative predicament of sexgender and the attached weariness inflecting feminist narratives; we then give readings of how this predicament plays out in what we call familiar feminist fables of militarisation. Finally, we return to the question of feminism’s failure, working with the idea of failure as being part of the process of intervening politically.7 In an associated move, we consider the grammar of temporality that haunts representations of feminism. We argue that this grammar or logic of temporality glues feminism to a generational trajectory of activity always seemingly en route to proffering a solution to gender – unsurprisingly beckoning an unavoidable failing to ever arrive. We work with the spectre of feminist failure – which we suggest is one of the dominant motifs of feminism within contemporary IR theory – to accomplish two tasks. One is to interrogate the implications of the performative production of sexgender through feminism, which, although well discussed in feminist theory more generally, has not been adequately attended to in the field of International Relations. We link the discussion of feminism’s reproduction of sexgender to the ongoing implicit and explicit expectation that a central task of feminism is to produce effective and productive knowledge in a conventionally recognisably temporal and political manner.9 Feminism’s ‘failure’ to ever ‘fully arrive’ is suggestive of unfulfilled expectations in this context. Our overall concern has to do with the multiple violences that persistently prevail in the construction of theories of international politics – and which can be traced through reading the production of feminist failure in IR, as demonstrated through our familiar narratives of militarisation. We ultimately suggest that failure to resolve the predicaments that feminist International Relations scholarship appears to face may be alternatively presented as a specific political and pedagogical stance which offers potential aporetic room for ‘thinking otherwise’ about the production of knowledge. In conclusion we reflect on the atmosphere of feminist anxiety, or melancholia, that the article infers, culminating with the suggestion that failure and disenchantment are perhaps necessary to re-imagine the possibilities of unrecognisable interventions that lie at the heart of feminist political imaginations. Feminism/International Relations We are not offering a conventional audit of feminist work in International Relations in this article;14 rather, our focus is primarily on one thread of the discursive production of feminism within the discipline of International Relations. traditional forms of feminism have fared in relation to and in competition with conventional theories of international politics. Such studies clearly privilege IR’s boundaries but also tend to work with a very parsimonious definition of feminism.15 Our approach works with a more expansive and malleable understand- ing of the practices and possibilities of feminism. Hence, it is not our intention to measure how far feminism has succeeded in the context of the discipline’s conventional epistemological, methodological and political boundaries,16 or to prove in some kind of neo-scientific way that IR has ‘got it wrong’, but rather to investigate some implications of the discursive representation and production of feminism within the discipline. We argue that one of the dominant motifs or signatures of feminism within IR is one of decline and demise particularly in relation to feminism’s theoretical and methodological potential.17 These apparent tired limits of feminism within IR mirror a quandary facing feminist scholarship more generally.18 Manifestations of this quandary include a certain lassitude inflecting narratives about gender weaved through feminism parsimoniously represented,19 accompanied by a sense that feminism is becoming increasingly obsolete.20 As noted above, we investigate this quandary in order to think more deeply, if tangentially through feminism, about the limitations and accompanying violence that marks the academic production of knowledge,21 as well as to ponder feminism’s own performative function in this regard. Feminist scholars have consistently focused on the knowledge that authoritative accounts of the world accredited by academic institutions generates; and as an historically hyper-masculinised discipline, IR has always been a significant empirical site to investigate, not least its role in discursively reproducing gender and related power structures, regimes and practices.23 In this overly ‘manly [inter- national] moment,’24 it therefore remains important to reflect on the gendered power that pervades the construction and performance of scholarly investigations.25 This entails continuing to scrutinise the discursive production of feminism in the context of its representation within the disciplinary boundaries of the academic study of international politics, especially as this is an arena which has embarked on a re-energised (re)turn toward hegemonic certainty.26 In our investigation of this we have chosen to focus our inquiry on demonstrating how, in the production of feminist narratives of militarisation through IR, we can glimpse traces of how ‘organizational practices play a central role in recreating and entrenching gender hierarchies, gender symbols and gender identities.’ To carry this enquiry forward we therefore offer a doubly layered and interlocking reading of the general discursive production of feminism within IR, as exemplified in stories of militarisation. We work with the paradox of feminism’s apparent failure within IR given that, at this historical juncture, the nexus of feminism and global politics calls for harder work to mitigate the harms produced through gender and that feminist work is globally abundant.28 The idea that feminism has apparently failed in regard to its own normative ambitions given that global gendered inequality remains endemic calls for careful reflection.29 Though all certainly do not ascribe to the belief that the task of feminist scholars in IR is to accurately map gender relations in order to prescribe solutions to gender(ed) violence, the idea that this is the purpose of feminist work – however diffusely articulated – is nonetheless widespread.30 And clearly feminist scholars/activists have not shied away from this remit; indeed quite the opposite, as they/we have seemingly eagerly grasped apparent opportunities to alter unjust gendered struc- tures and practices. Such normative projects have indeed been perceived to be the hallmark and raison d’être of much feminist activity.31 Correspondingly, feminist scholars have traditionally been expected to respond to the task of ‘doing some- thing’, hopefully practical and tangible, about the disadvantages which have ensued from cultural constructions of gender.32 Indeed, in our view it is increasingly politically and pedagogically required by what we call the burgeoning ‘gender industry,’ for feminist scholars to strive towards providing effective knowledge to this end, including, for example, the formulation of policy, especially policies for gender mainstreaming, or through the delivery of academic programmes in universities or to meet institutional research auditing and funding requirements.

### 1NC- Reproductive Futurism

#### The aff’s drive to prevent extinction is a form of masculine survivalism where gendered bodies become the unwilling tools to sustain humanity. You should refuse their obsession with patriarchal reproduction.

Mitchell 15

(Audra Mitchell, Audra Mitchell is a settler scholar who lives and works on the Ancestral and treaty lands of the Neutral (Attawandaron), Haudenosaunee and Mississaugas of the New Credit (please see Honouring the Land). She currently holds the the Canada Research Chair in Global Political Ecology at Wilfrid Laurier University. From 2015-18 she held the CIGI Chair in Global Governance and Ethics at the Balsillie School of International Affairs Audra is an Associate Professor at Wilfrid Laurier University, Canada, 8-3-2015, "Gendering extinction," Worldly, <https://worldlyir.wordpress.com/2015/08/03/gendering-extinction/>, JKS)

The reproduction of survival/ the survival of reproduction

Extinction is almost always understood against the horizon of survival and the imperative to sustain it – at least for life forms deemed to be of value to humans. In many cases, this imperative takes the form of deliberate strategies for enforcing existence. Donna Haraway’s influential book When Species Meet devotes considerable attention to the logics, practices and politics of Species Survival Plans. These plans monitor and enforce reproduction amongst ‘endangered’ species, not least by collecting data on populations, genetic profiles and genetic materials to enable selective breeding. This strategy assumes that all organisms can, should, and can be made to exercise their reproductive capacities in order to resist extinction, and it actively mobilizes members of ‘endangered species’ into this project. In so doing, it helps to entrench norms regarding gender, sexuality and reproductive labour that are deeply entrenched in modern, Western human cultures. Attention to these programmes highlights an important way in which extinction is gendered in dominant scientific and policy frameworks. Specifically, strategic breeding programmes share in the belief that reproduction is an imperative for those capable of reproducing if ‘the species’ is at risk’. This belief is directly related to Western norms of the reproductive imperative for women. Indeed, Haraway points out that it is precisely “‘woman’s’ putative self-defining responsibility to ‘the species’ as this singular and typological female is reduced to her reproductive function”. In a similar sense, within SSPs and other strategies of enforced survival, entire life forms are reduced to their reproductive capacities. Moreover, programmes of enforced survival can, in the context of sexual reproduction, disproportionately burden female organisms with the task of avoiding extinction. This logic is particularly fraught in discussions of the possibility of human extinction, in which female fertility (captured in the standard policy language of ‘births per woman’) is framed simultaneously as a threat to survival, and the only hope for escaping extinction (see, for instance, Alan Weisman’s comments on this). In these ways, the securitization of survival entrenches the intersectional categories of gender, species and race discussed above. Dominant discourses of extinction and conservation also entrench and privilege sexual reproduction, in ways that entrench heteronormative assumptions and norms. This is reflected in the way that the subjects of extinction and conservation are framed. The standard object of conservation is the biological ‘species’, a term which is defined by the ability of organisms to reproduce sexually. As Myra Hird has pointed out, this conception of ‘species’ makes it appear as if sexual reproduction is the ‘best’ means of sustaining the existence of a life form. However, Hird’s work demonstrates that Earthly life forms actually engage in myriad forms of reproduction, from the free exchange of DNA between bacteria to the hermaphroditic practices of some fish. The upshot of these arguments is that Earthly life is sustained through a huge variety of reproductive activities that do not conform to biological understandings of life processes or species. Crucially, Hird argues that there is no necessary hierarchy between forms of reproduction. In Darwinian terms, all species that manage to survive are equally successful. However, by conflating survival with sexual reproduction, existing discourses of extinction embed hetero-normative frameworks that devalue other forms of reproduction. They also reduce reproduction to the imperative to survive, ignoring the myriad cultural, political, aesthetic, sensual and other dimensions of reproduction.

#### The panic over potential threats to the nation is a form of masculine futurity which allows reproductive bodies to be regulated. Claims of utilitarianism justify the endless sacrifice of reproductive freedom in the name of the “greatest good.”

Petersen 15

(Kristin Petersen B.A., University of Southern California 2003 M.A. New York University 2008, A dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the James T. Laney School of Graduate Studies of Emory University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Women’s, Gender, and Sexuality Studies, The Logic of Futurity: Reproduction, Cultural Eugenics, and Contingencies of Women’s Citizenship in the Contemporary United States, Proquest, JKS)

Cultural theorist Ruth McElroy suggests, “Women’s belonging to nations is indissoluble from their reproductive biology” (325). For all that motherhood may be conceived as a private choice occurring in the supposedly private sphere, reproduction and motherhood are nonetheless public and political as well, and thoroughly entangled with women’s status as members of their nation. By virtue of their reproduction (or even lack thereof!), women can be constructed in cultural narratives and political scripts as contributors to society or threats to the national good, caretakers of the future who merit protection and support or wayward parents who must be disciplined back into the national fold, national maternal ideals or outsiders within. The state’s identification of and response to women as reproducers reflects the continuous processes of the politics of belonging, which “involve not only the maintenance and reproduction of the boundaries of the community of belonging by the hegemonic political powers...but also by their contestation, challenge and resistance by other political agents” (Yuval-Davis 20). We see these politics of belonging manifested not only discursively, but also in the policies and laws that protect or privilege some mothers and not others, some children, but not all. When anthropologists Faye Ginsburg and Rayna Rapp ask, “who defines the body of the nation into which the next generation is recruited? Who is considered to be in that national body, who is out of it?” (3), therefore, there is no one answer; rather, this is the question perpetually being asked and answered by political discourse and practice infused with the logic of futurity. The hopes and fears of the present political moment and the imaginative desires for the future are thus continually projected upon the bodies of women and their procreative capacities. Futurity, I suggest in this project, as a possibly inevitable perspective or worldview, allows for the state to focus on women as reproductive beings in a way that it does not for men. Following from Foucault’s explication of biopower, the modern state takes an interest in the workings and ostensible health of its populations, creating new knowledges and indices for the normal as it counts up the characteristics of its citizenry and sets goals for demographic management. While Foucault tends not to focus on the reproductive elements of the state’s biopolitical interest—for instance, the setting of ideal rates of fertility, health expectations for women and children, creation of access to the medical, economic, and social resources needed for reproduction—these are, I would argue, operations of the state that have potential for tremendous impacts upon women particularly. The other biopolitical interests of the state—appropriate number of workers, manageable immigration rates, proper ratio of elderly to young, and so on—are also all implicated in the procreative behaviors of women, which would seem to intensify the state’s interest in them. Brought into the broader framework of women’s political status and national belonging, reproduction in this context seems poised to function as an axis upon which the dispensation of women’s citizenship can pivot, with particular regard to her racial, economic, and social demographic and the state’s assessment of her (and her children’s) value to the national future. Penelope Deutscher suggests that through the emergence of biopower: Women would later assume a status as a reproductive threshold of the future and health of nations, populations and peoples. But the condition for this role for women and maternal reproductivity was the very possibility of reproduction being associated with a shifting field of possible substances, telos, outcomes and obligations: the overall good, the general happiness, the future of the nation, the health of the nation, the competitiveness of the nation, the future of the people, individual flourishing or freedom, individual rights, domestic happiness, the family unit as building block of the nation, the transmission of the bloodline, the family name, transmission of property or family or genealogical transmission, reproduction of the labour force, etc. That reproduction be plausibly thought of in such terms at all was a precondition of it becoming associated with women’s role as threshold of futurity. (Deutscher 129) The state’s biopolitical management of women’s reproduction may thus allow it to approach women primarily as reproductive beings, an essentalist or even utilitarian collapse that may make it easier to intervene upon their bodies and perhaps reflects a deeply ingrained discomfort with the notion that women have tremendous potential power to impact the composition of the future. In this project, I am proposing a framework of futurity that is in operation, characterized by discursive and eugenic aspects, that uses women as the vehicle for future world-building and nation-making. This futurity aims to enact particular visions of the future via changes in the present, particularly through the management of women’s reproduction in the present such that the future population comports with present desires. When this futurity framework is picked up by the state in its various capacities, I suggest there are significant consequences for women’s citizenship as women because they are so intrinsically linked in the cultural and political imaginary with reproduction. In the process of grappling with these concepts, this project asks how the logic of futurity functions to organize the terms of women’s social or political belonging in reproductive terms. How does the state pick up and extend this logic to women, and how might that impact the meaningfulness of women’s citizenship or national belonging? Does the logic of futurity, the constant pressure of the forward vision combined with the imaginative limitations of the present, insist upon women’s citizenship being or becoming something fundamentally different from men’s by virtue of reproductive capacity and association? Exploring these questions brings this project into several disciplinary contexts, including feminist theory and philosophy, political theory, disability theory (eugenics), and even the sphere of economics. In connecting these concepts to ongoing conversations about women and citizenship in the contemporary United States, this project is ultimately working to tie together disparate fields and illuminate how they interact with respect to a model of futurity that I theorize as containing discursive and eugenic aspects. It may be that state-based discourses and practices related to women’s reproduction and citizenship are not so much causes as they are effects of the logic of futurity.

### Research 1st

#### You should prefer the research process and product of Feminist IR \*over their moralizing “but what do you do tho”

Sjoberg 11

(Laura is bae, Sjoberg is Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Florida, Looking Forward, Conceptualizing Feminist Security Studies, Politics and Gender, 2011, doi:10.1017/S1743923X11000420, JKS)

Along these lines, I have come to see the substance of Feminist Security Studies as a dialectical-hermeneutic argument, an approach that has implications for its process and its product. In this understanding, the purpose of doing research in Feminist Security Studies is to raise problems, not to solve them; to draw attention to a field of inquiry, rather than survey it fully; to provoke discussion, rather than serve as a systematic treatise. The conflicts and contestations both among feminists in Feminist Security Studies and between feminists and security that have come up in this conversation are not an outline of problems that need to be solved or divides that need to be crossed, healed, or closed. Instead, those debates, along with how they are handled and addressed, constitute Feminist Security Studies. Feminist Security Studies, then, neither needs to solve nor ignore either the fundamental differences among feminists or the dissonance between Feminist Security Studies and security studies as a discipline. Instead, Feminist Security Studies is defined not only by its fundamental contestabilities but also by its actual contestations. Feminist Security Studies is not the sum of the different approaches or the winner of the debate between them, but the narrative generated from their arguments, disagreements, and compromises.

### Subject Formation

#### Subject formation comes first—the community they create will inevitably privilege masculine comfortability and dismiss feminist connections- building a feminist affect is necessary to form embodied collectives that drive political action.

Chamberlain 16

(Prudence, Department of English, Royal Holloway University (2016): Affective temporality: towards a fourth wave, Gender and Education, DOI: 10.1080/09540253.2016.1169249, JKS)

This discussion of the contemporary and feminist timekeeping serves as a framing device for the way in which the wave narrative can be considered as an ‘affective temporality’. Social movements are bound to emotional convergences, in which feeling becomes transferred amongst wider groups, encouraging them to action. This is central to initiating and then sustaining surges of feminist activism, drawing a number of subjects together through shared investment within a specific historical moment. The formulations of affect also mirror the way in which the contemporary is constructed through Agamben’s work, allowing for activists to cohere while still remaining without set definition. In The Affect Theory Reader, Melissa Gregg and Gregory J. Seigworth state that ‘affect is born in in-between-ness and resides in accumulative besides-ness’ (2010, 2). This sense of ‘beside- ness’ mirrors the simultaneity of the contemporary, while the ‘between-ness’ relates to the idea that feminism is caught in temporal tension, in which the past dictates and future aspirations orientate. Affect also explores the relationship between the private and the public, as Love out- lines when she writes: Politics and feelings are very different kinds of things; the public sphere is big, feelings are small; social life happens out there, psychic life, somewhere inside; public time is collective time, measured by the clock, whereas in psychic life the trains hardly ever run on time. (2007, 11) Inevitably, it is challenging to map what is ostensibly a more personal and feeling sphere onto a wider public, or indeed vice versa. However, despite the difference between public and personal, affect creates an undeniable relationship between the two. The feminist tenet that the ‘personal is political’ encourages a shared public intimacy, which is central to the transference and perpetuation of affect. Airing feeling, and allowing feeling to be aired, creates a context in which responses and emotions become integral to a political collective. Cvetkovich writes that she views ‘affect as a motivational system and as the ground for forging new collectivities’ (2003, 12). Resonating with the formulation of waves affects may serve to catalyse and sustain a surge of related activity. If feminist unity is no longer pre- dicated on identity, then common ground is found through political aims. The movement away from collectives determined by shared characteristics to those formed through shared feeling creates a feminism that is able to adapt and evolve with affect at its centre. Affect may in fact work as an adhesive for political subjects, sticking them together through shared feeling (Ahmed 2010). Affect, then, is able to form collectives that are driven to political action through feeling, forming a cohesive series of relations and connections.

### AT: You’re Just Theory!

#### The process of the alt is much more than just “theory”. It recognizes that feminists work with concrete rather than abstract senses of the political and prioritize grounded senses of theory, that works actively with the socially located circumstances of feminine lives

Weber 2k

(Cynthia Weber (2000), Professor of International Studies, University of Leeds, Why IR needs theory/practice debates: Or, from enlightenment to romanticism to enlightened romanticism , Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 14:1, 296-308, DOI: 10.1080/09557570008400344, JKS)

And, indeed, if we revisit the guarantors of Enlightenment and Romantic knowledge claims, we find that these guarantors may not be guarantors at all. Do policy-makers really set the limits on what IR theory and its connection to practice must be, or do Enlightenment theorists tell us that this is what policy-makers do? And do 'the world's oppressed people' really demand that IR theory be practical in the terms that Romantic theorists claim it must, or do Romantic theorists tell us that this is how theory should be connected to practice? In other words, in making their separate claims to how IR knowledge can be legitimated, aren't Enlightenment and Romantic scholars 'socially constructing' or even 'textually inventing' their guarantor's voices as if they were the limits on how IR theory must be practiced. And, whether speaking to elite policy-makers or speaking for 'the world's oppressed peoples', isn't this a terribly elitist move? Isn't this a pretension to knowledge that creates its guarantors as guarantees rather than just 'telling it like it is' in 'the real world beyond'? I would argue the answer to this question is 'yes . Furthermore, I would argue that, whether we have poststructuralist critiques of this move or not, such a move is bound to fail. It is impossible to stabilise the 'who' for whom we speak, even if that 'who' is ourselves. It is therefore impossible to stabilise what IR theory must be, what IR practice must be, and what the relationship between the two must be. The CRIA debates register this failure. Their critiques of traditional IR tales expose how the 'who' on whose behalf Enlightenment and Romantic IR theorists claim to speak is always absent. Think about it. How many times have we read IR theory/practice debates, and in those debates, how many times have 'elite practitioners' or 'the world's oppressed people's' told us what the limits on good theory, good practice, and their connections must be? In exposing this absence the CRIA debates expose Enlightenment and Romantic tales as nothing more than articulations of power. By 'whose' authority is it after all that Enlightened and Romantic IR theorists speak? Only their own. And this is precisely why the discipline of IR needs theory/practice debates. It is in this site of the ritual revisiting of the question 'how can knowledge be legitimated?' that IR theorists telling traditional Enlightenment and Romantic tales resist destabilising moves by the 'dissident margins'. It is at this site of ritual return that the discipline of IR is normalised, authorised, and legitimised. And it is at this site that pretensions to normality, authority, and legitimacy always fail. And so the debates go on.

### AT: It’s a Link of Omission

#### No, these aren’t merely links of omission. Their post-facto desire to include gender as a variable is antithetical to the alternative.

Sjoberg 18

(Laura, total bae, Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Florida., 2018, Feminist Security and Security Studies, Chapter 4 in: The Oxford Handbook of International Security, edited by Alexandra Gheciu, William C. Wohlforth, JKS)

The fourth commonality that I noted in 2009 was that Feminist Security Studies work shares the view that “the omission of gender from work on international security does not make that work gender-neutral or unproblematic” (Sjoberg 2009: 202). This might be the most radical tenet Feminist Security Studies shares. In this view, Feminist Security Studies is not another paradigm like realist work or constructivist work—where it offers a different perspective than other paradigmatic alternatives based on a different worldview. Instead, it argues that security studies across paradigmatic approaches is incomplete and exclusive inasmuch as it is [oblivious] ~~blind~~ to the gendered nature of the analysis it undertakes and the gendered nature of the global political phenomena that it observes. In this view, Feminist Security Studies is not seeking the inclusion of gender, either as a variable of analysis or as a perspectival approach, but instead the transformation of security studies.

## Cybernetics

### 1NC---K---Link---Cybernetics

#### Technology has been *weaponized* by NATO to drown out counternarratives – that outweighs—it causes *techno fetishism* of modern warfare.

Elsa Hedling 22, is an associate fellow at the Europe Programme, Swedish Institute of International Affairs (UI) and a PhD Candidate at Lund University., “Embodying Military Muscles and a Remasculinized West: Influencer Marketing, Fantasy, and “the Face of NATO”, Global Studies Quarterly (2022) 2, 1–12, 3-10-2022, <https://academic.oup.com/isagsq/article/2/1/ksac010/6546420)/maze>

Strategies of Depiction: Fitspirator, Viking, and Modern Warrior

NATO’s desired audiences are **found in a noisy environment**, filled with competing messages and alternative voices. New technologies and social media channels mean that all organizations must **constantly communicate to** their desired **audienc**es or risk their communications being drowned out by noise or counter-narratives [. . .] Like never before, individual influencers can be a major factor in affecting societal change. An individual can now attract millions of supporters from around the world to any particular cause. (Paxton 2018) This quote from the NATO Review, an online magazine pub- lished monthly by NATO, describes the reasoning behind using influencer marketing as strategic communication. In October 2018, NATO released a first video of Matberg vis- iting the new NATO headquarters (HQ) in Brussels, which was shared widely by NATO (on YouTube, Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram) as well as by Matberg himself. The thirty- second film features Matberg arriving in his service dress uniform, with a backdrop of member-state flags (zooming in on the NATO flag), and shaking hands with the Secretary- General Jens Stoltenberg, whose “normal” body accentu- ates the massive body of Matberg. The music alludes to a movie scene and communicates significance and sincerity. In a close-up, Matberg smilingly explains that “Trident Junc- ture is the biggest NATO exercise in decades” and that he is going up to Trondheim to “see what the fuzz is all about.” The film ends with Matberg stating “Stay tuned for more!, exiting the HQ premises and putting his navy cap back on his head. The video launched Lasse Matberg as a personality who would give not only a glimpse into the life of a NATO soldier but also an entertaining report from Trident Junc- ture. In the following weeks, he did multiple media inter- views, which he documented in his “insta-stories” along with images and short video footage from his own participation in Trident Juncture. The social media content quickly went viral and attracted media attention both within and outside NATO’s member states. As an example of the latter, the Rus- sian state media agency Rossiya Segodnya published an arti- cle (originally published in a Serbian outlet) asking if “hand- some Lasse is NATO’s secret weapon in a future Instagram war” (Mekina 2019). Several clips feature Matberg heading toward an army he- licopter and scenic views from the helicopter flying over Norwegian fjords. Although the helicopters, tanks, vessels, and army clothes communicate that Trident Juncture is a military event, the beautiful nature, smiling faces, the ab- sence of rifles, and the large number of journalists and photographers in the images signal a media spectacle (Der Derian 2001). Matberg navigates the scenes in the ways of a celebrity; he looks healthy and relaxed, stops, shakes hands, and poses for the photographers, always with a smile reveal- ing his bright white teeth. The celebrity and “clean-war” rep- resentations detract attention from any contentious or less- appealing aspects of military buildup (Stahl 2010). Trident Juncture did however include combat training, and such im- agery was also shared but in other channels aimed to attract more traditional audiences. The strategy of a clean-war rep- resentation of Trident Juncture through social media was described by NATO officials as “fusing hard power imagery with a positive message” (Hilton 2019). Closely connected to the clean-war depictions, **images of advanced weaponry invoke “techno-fetishism**” (Stahl 2010). In two video clips with “Top Gun-aesthetics,” Matberg walks toward a moving helicopter in slow motion accompanied by dramatic music. More notably, a number of short clips feature Matberg “amazed” by a micro unmanned aerial ve- hicle (a really small helicopter that fits in his hand). The small size and the fact that it is unmanned not only **enhance** the **clean-war trope** but also **glorify** the modern **military** by **emphasizing** the **precision** and effectiveness **of high-tech weapons** (Stahl 2013). The micro helicopter is controlled by a joystick controller (Matberg is childishly excited to try it out), which adds to the “gamification of war” (Jarvis and Robinson 2019). Paying attention to the fantasmatic logics, we can see how the techno-fetishist depiction of modern warfare is merged with Matberg’s muscular Viking imagery (discussed further below), which rather signals readiness for close combat.

#### Artificial intelligence perpetuates racial biases by paining people of color as expendable “human shields.” Search engines, algorithms, and networks have biases engrained within them which makes them predisposed to relegating entire communities as objects that can be disposed of.

Wilcox 22 Lauren Wilcox, 2-20-2022, "Becoming shield, unbecoming human," SpringerLink, https://link.springer.com/article/10.1057/s41312-022-00141-5

The “human shield” is a civilian “whose status as a civilian is simultaneously assumed only to be disavowed” (Perugini & Gordon, 2017, p. 3) and said disavowal does not turn them into a combatant, but a liminal figure on the threshold between civilian and combatant. The war crime of using “human shields” becomes then a claim that these “human shields” are actually an attack, not on the so-called human shields but on those who are using violence against such persons. It is part of a calculative logic of making citizens responsible for their own deaths, instead of the military bearing responsibility to prevent civilian deaths, and it plays precisely on the question of how ‘the human shield’ is produced as an object of knowledge. Neve Gordon and Nicola Perugini take readers on a far-reaching tour of historical and contemporary instances of human shielding, both voluntary and involuntary in Human Shields: A History of People in the Line of Fire (2020) with powerful story-telling that underpins disturbing truths about how violence becomes legitimated. The paradoxes of the figure of the “human shield” lie at the heart of the work, and Gordon and Perugini use this figure as a means to pry open international humanitarian law’s inconsistencies in regard to who counts as “the human”. Of critical importance is their insistence that “the seemingly neutral term human in the phrase human shield denotes not merely an ostensibly universal biological condition but also a political one” (p. 5). Gordon and Perugini’s wide-ranging series of vignettes on different aspects of how human shields have been deployed and/or invoked, and to what effect, provides a compelling read in which the abstract question of “who counts as human” comes to life with great complexity. Yet, the underlying argument speaks to deep injustices at the core of frameworks for thinking about the ethics of violence. “Human shielding” and the discourse around the legal and ethical implications of this category “illustrates how racial, class, religions, sexuality, and gender orders help shape our understanding of the human and thus the ethics of violence and how legal frameworks, particularly the laws of war reflect, reinforce, and even produces these orders and their ethical valence” (p. 6). As Gordon and Perugini argue, because the figure of the human shield elides the two main classifications of humans—combatants and noncombatants—this figure “destabilizes the order regulating the use of lethal violence in war” (2020, p. 7). Throughout the history of the use of such human shields from the American Civil War onward whether or not being a “human shield” protected one from the violence of war or did not reflects and reproduces racialized, gendered, and class about how life is valued by the opposing force. The claim that persons were “human shields” when used to justify treating such persons outside of the protections granted to civilians (inadequate as these maybe) makes humans into weapons of war who are positioned as defensive weapons to block or divert attacks: humans that are objects, obstructions. There is a paradox evident in this kind of use of “lawfare” as Gordon and Perugini show in many compelling examples: the deaths of civilians who are said to be “human shields” positions responsibility for the deaths of such persons in their own hands, not those who attacked them. While Gordon and Perugini note the paradox of the human shield being a civilian-who-is-not-a-civilian, another paradox might be said to exist in the coexistence of the “human” and the “shield”, that is, a human whose becomes less human, (that is to say, less worthy of humane treatment) when their bodies are considered weapons. As such, thorny questions of the ethics and politics of ‘human shielding’ revolve around the weaponization of the body. The weaponization of the body has most often been considered in terms of forms of military discipline, dehumanization, and even mechanization of the soldier’s body within the military apparatus (as Bourke, 1999 discusses for example). Paul Kirby has recently explored some of the uncanny and uncomfortable ways in which the soldier’s body and particularly, the body part of the penis figures in discussions of wartime sexual violence and the idiom “rape as a weapon of war” (Kirby, 2020). While IR traditionally considers weapons to be instrumental and as human artifacts, and recent critical scholarship has sought to examine how “objects, ideologies, practices, bodies, and affects get drawn into specific assemblages of violent intentionality” (Bousquet et al., 2017, p. 1). Benjamin Meiches has recently argued, “weapons operate as bodies that incite, prompt, and undermine human agency in ways that are largely unaccounted for by traditional security studies literature” (Meiches, 2017, 10). Referring to hunger strikers/death fasters struggling against the Turkish state, Banu Bargu has articulated this form of the “weaponization of life” as a form of necropolitical resistance to one’s construction as “bare life” (2014, 81). Here, it is not the “body” per se that is weaponized, but the body as a conduit through which the weaponization of life works as a political tactic (Bargu, 2014, p. 16). What particularly interests me about Gordon and Perugini’s work here is embodied persons made into weapons: the “becoming-weapon” of “human shields” especially when this is a designation given to certain persons. While Gordon and Perugini focus on instances that are or might be interpreted as involving human shields from a wide variety of examples (including environmental struggles), their primary concern is how human shielding is considered in the laws of war, including in appeals made to the laws of war. I wonder, however, if in thinking about the ways in which certain persons, certain bodies are made into weapons, or treated as such, we might locate these varied histories of human shielding into an even broader and longer standing set of concerns about the human, weapons, and war that extend even beyond the temporal and spatial limits of “war” as it is treated in the laws of war. To this end, Gordon and Perugini’s work on “proximity” and “proximate” human shields (pp. 159–169) was one of the most intriguing discussions. “Proximate” human shields are those who are categorized this way only due to their proximity to fighting, as in civilians located in and around Mosul, Iraq, when it was held by ISIS in 2016, rather than having been coerced into an area near a military target or intentionally choosing to put themselves between military force and a target. As Gordon and Perugini note, “Since practically any person trapped in a war zone can be cast as a proximate shield rather than as an innocent bystander without the accuser having to demonstrate anything about the action of that person of the belligerents, it becomes relatively simple to frame hundreds of thousands of civilians as human shields. This act of framing convers entire urban populations trapped in a war zone into killable subjects” (2020, p. 164). Importantly, the civilian population was not depicted as human shields when the Iraqi army, assisted by the US and its coalition: “proximate human shields are the weapon of the state par excellence” (p. 165). Such “proximate” human shields are only framed as such by major media outlets when they are in supposedly decolonized parts of the world. As such, Gordon and Perugini put their respective fingers on the core of the issue when they write, after noting that human shielding was codified in international law when the laws of war became applicable to conflicts in (former) colonies, “[p]recisely when increasing numbers of nonwhites were finally recognized as fully human, they also become potential human shields, and when they are either used or framed as human shields, they lose some of the legal protections they gained following decolonization” (p. 169). This question of “proximate human shields,” as becoming less human as they “become shield” and thus “become weapon” through proximity and military/legal parlance is a form of objectification that recalls Frantz Fanon’s famous declaration “All I wanted was to be a man among other men” (Fanon 1967 [1952] p. 112) and its rejoinder “and then I found that I was an object in the midst of other objects.” (p. 109). Making of persons into objects was and is legal, political, cultural, and epistemic strategy of colonialism to enable extraction. The native is one of many such things that need classification, management, containment. Such “body-objects,” as Mbembe elaborates in expanding upon Fanon’s work, is a matter of a “spectral and phantasmatic object, at the limit of desire and of terror….” (Mbembe, 2019, p. 133). The spatial designation of bodies is a core component of colonialism: “Colonizing broadly consisted in a permanent work of separation: on one side, my living body; on the other, all those ‘body-things’ surrounding it” (Mbembe, 2019 p. 46). In the work of designating which persons are “civilians” and which persons are “human shields,” there also seems to be some congruity with Denise Ferreira da Silva’s “transparency thesis,” which attempts to comprehend the role the “racial” plays in modern thought and its ties to the emergence of “the global” in the “first encounter” of Europe’s conquest of the Americas (2007). For Ferreira da Silva, this project produces the human body as the exteriorization of the mind and establishes the distinction between the “transparent I” of Europe post-Enlightenment and the “affectable other” institutes race as the signifier of those persons who are subject to universal reason, although not capable of grasping it. Ferreira da Silva locates this subaltern racial subject as being constituted temporally and ontologically before principles of universality upon which the laws of war are constructed. The designation of racial difference carries with it suggestion of threat, raising fears of insecurity, contagion, consumption, annihilation: it carries with it an inversion of the relations of violence in which, the recipients of violence are coded as having caused such violence. The racialized body is coded as a justifiable site pre-emptive violence as it is coded as always about to commit violence. Christina Sharpe captures that this inversion of how violence is framed: “We see in many visual and other representations in public life, certainly in the US…Black people ejected from the state become the national symbols for the less-than-human being condemned to death; become the carriers of terror, terror’s embodiment (an internal, the internal terroristic threat) and not the primary objects of terror’s multiple enactments but the ground of terror’s possibility.” (Sharpe, 2016, p. 79). The racialization of such weaponized bodies is not limited to prior racial categorization either: David Theo Goldberg, for example, describes as “racially indexed” the “prevailing proxy articulation” of migration, terrorism, contagious disease, and the threat of invasion implicit in each as racialized (2009, p. 359), and certainly other articulation of racialized threat and invasion can be cited and articulated. As Helen Kinsella points out, the commentary on additional protocol I suggests that civilians and combatants are to be differentiated “principally by visual means,” and that “visuality is not a neutral observation, but an embodied, racialized, and gendered practice that does not merely detect, but actively produces what is to be seen and how it is to be understood” (2016). Fanon’s description of epidermalization as means of estrangement from fully human being by colonial power has been supplemented by a range of digital technologies, vast, and complex surveillance and intelligence gathering systems involving facial recognition, digital databases, algorithmic analysis, AI detection of gunshots and more that are used by military and policing bodies alike to predict and track both known individuals and patterns of movement in order to identify potential threats to the order. Work by Timnit Gebru, Joy Buolamwini, Safia Noble, Ruha Benjamin, and others has drawn attention to how contemporary AI technologies like search engine algorithms, facial recognition technologies, and more are built upon, and reproduce, gender, and racial differences, often leading to the **perpetuation of racial oppression.** Ruha Benjamin refers to as “the New Jim Code” in terms of the use of new technologies that reproduce and even exacerbate existing power hierarchies, especially those of race, while appearing to be racially neutral (2019). This suggests that the “visual” means of identifying and producing human shields as objects of knowledge and either protection or vulnerability is not longer, if it ever was, dependent on the visual alone, but rather a broad array of **technologies of visualizing, sensing, and data gathering and analysis, much of it indebted to prior “codes” of interpretation.** The; in the context of the war spread of surveillance and targeting technologies suggest that the question of “who counts as human” in terms of how violence is regulated on terror, the US and NATO have shifted to “militants,” “insurgents,” “unlawful combatants,” and particularly in terms of the use of drone strikes, “**military-aged males”: all whom make up the “ungrievable” and killable bodies.** Rather than “civilians,” Christiane Wilke documents, for example, how the term “uninvolved” was used to refer to a much narrower range of perceived “innocence” following the September 2009 Kunduz air strike which killed up to 113 civilians (2017). In a similar vein, I’ve elsewhere written about how the use of various forms of **digital surveillance and visual evidence was not enough to override the “racial schema”** (including the labeling of certain activity as that of a “human shield”) that affected the decision to bomb an Afghan convoy on the basis of a perceived “imminent threat” (Wilcox, 2017). It is also certainly worth thinking about to what extent, given the racialization of how the figure of “human shields” has come to be treated, and the ongoing coloniality of many of the conflicts involving the use of, and framing battles over, the use of human shield (especially in relation to Israel’s ongoing occupation of Palestinian lands) whether further consideration beyond the legal, temporal, and spatial limitations of the laws of war might push this work even further. The killing of teenager Trayvon Martin by George Zimmerman who invoked “stand your ground” laws to enable his acquittal although Martin was only carrying a package of candy skittles, or police officer Derek Chauvin’s attempted defense of killing George Floyd—that Floyd was suffering from “excitable delirium” (a term with no medical definition meant to cast him as possessing superhuman strength) certainly resonate with ongoing legacies of racialized bodies as “always already” weapons. That is, absent almost uniquely compelling video evidence to the contrary (and in many cases despite such evidence) such racialized bodies are accepted as threats and therefore justifiably killed. Neither of these two, nor any of the thousands of other similarly killed were labeled “human shields” but both are examples of, Judith Butler’s words on the subject, “those who exemplify the form of human life worth saving and those who in their person and their cultural or racial status come to represent a living threat to a form of human life worth saving” (Butler, 2015 p. 233). Gordon and Perugini have powerfully, skilfully, and with great detail, shown how this division is reproduced in international law and practice; by tracing this through-line, they have brought to the fore the intricate workings of how “humans” can be made less so, and “shields” can be made to do the opposite of protecting.

# \*\*Topicality\*\*

## T Preemptive

### 1NC---T---Preemptive

#### “Should” is obligatory, NOT advisory.

Riddle ’14 [Finis E; December 22; Justice on the Supreme Court of Oklahoma; Westlaw, “St. Louis & S. F. R. Co. v. Brown,” 45 Okla. 143]

The specific grounds of objection are that the court should have used the word “shall” instead of “should,” that the word “should” is merely advisory, and that the jury was left at its discretion in the matter of reduction of the damages. It has been said that the word “should” is the past tense of the word “shall,” and we think, in the connection in which it was used, the jury understood that it meant more than simply advisory.

In the case of Smith v. State, 142 Ind. 288, 41 N. E. 595, the Supreme Court of Indiana held that it was more imperative than the word “may.”

In the case of Lynch v. Bates, 139 Ind. 206, 38 N. E. 806, where the court charged the jury that in passing upon the weight of the evidence, etc., they “should” take into consideration \*1081 the interest of the witness, etc., the court reversed the case, holding that the word “should” there was too imperative.

In the case of Durand's Adm'r v. N. Y. & L. B. R. Co., 65 N. J. Law, 656, 48 Atl. 1013, the court held that the word “should” implies the performance of some obligation or duty. Often the word “shall” is used to mean “may.” So, it will be seen that either of the terms cannot be considered abstractly, but must be considered in connection with the subject-matter and sense in which it is used.

#### LAWS literally don’t exist – the plan is banning FUTURE technology

Inger Österdahl 21, Professor at Department of Law at Uppsala University, “Laws on LAWS (Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems): The Work of the United Nations and the Swedish Position”, The Faculty of Law in Uppsala 179-205, http://www.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:1608922/FULLTEXT01.pdf)/maze

2 LAWS and the Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) Lethal autonomous weapon systems (LAWS) are intensely discussed, but there is no generally accepted definition of what they are. The central point is that they can function without human intervention. However, the question is where the line should be drawn between a highly automated system – which is not subject to discussion within the framework of LAWS – and an autonomous system – which is the subject of discussion within LAWS. With respect to a technical system, the terms **automatic and autonomous mean the same thing**, that is, the system works without human influence. A technical system can have many automated functions, and a complex system with many automated functions is often labelled autonomous.6 Depending on what definition of LAWS one uses – a **definition that sets the degree of automation so high that no such weapon system yet exists** or a definition that stipulates a lower degree of automation for a weapon system to be labelled ‘autonomous’ – LAWS can be claimed not to exist today or to exist already. It is uncontroversial to claim that there are weapon systems today with highly automated – or autonomous – functions, without these weapon systems necessarily being subject to discussion within the framework of LAWS. Weapons with certain autonomous functions have existed for more than 100 years. The most common highly automated – or autonomous – weapon systems today are **different kinds of targeting robots**, which were first put into use during and after the Second World War. Different forms of air defence systems with highly automated – or autonomous – functions also exist, for instance.7 Probably, the discussion on LAWS relates to weapon systems **that do not yet exist**, but that might soon be brought into existence due to the rapid technological development in the field of AI.

#### Vote NEG.

#### 1---GROUND they wreck it by ensuring AFF’S that defend uncontroversial future emerging technologies

#### 2---LIMITS--opening up the topic to infinite new technologies overstretches the neg research burden and undermines preparedness for all debates- and undermines clash because this technology could not even be viable